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Abstract 
Risutora: The Impact of Globalization and Restructuring upon 
Women in the Japanese Workforce 
This thesis is an analysis of the relationship between gender and globalization in one 
specific national context: Japan. Japan's position as an affluent, industrialized liberal 
democracy, with a distinctive model of capitalism, means that Japanese women's 
experiences of globalization differ from those of women both elsewhere in Asia, and 
in other First World countries. The actions of the Japanese state and Japanese 
companies have been instrumental in the globalization of production, which is now 
having reCiprocal effects upon the Japanese national model of capitalism. In 
response to global economic change, the Japanese model of capitalism is being 
intentionally restructured through company practice and legal change. This 
restructuring (risutora) impacts differently upon men and women, as the liberalizing 
processes associated with globalization interact with specific local institutions, 
including the ideal of the three generation family and the position of women in the 
Japanese national model of capitalism. 
After an analysis of the mainstream literature about globalization, the state and 
historical institutionalism and feminist literature about gender and globalization, the 
thesis demonstrates that the complex trends associated with globalization have 
produced pressures for two kinds of, ostensibly contradictory, employment reforms in 
Japan. There are pressures for labour market deregulation, to increase the 
international competitiveness of Japanese production. There are also pressures for 
the 're'-regulation of labour to establish a prinCiple of sexual equality at work. The 
deregulation of employment, including the removel of sex-specific protective 
legislation, has made it increasingly difficult for many women to pursue full-time 
careers. A detailed examination of the impact of the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Law (EEOL) shows that this legislation has led to the formalization of 
the gender-based segregation of regular workers, and encouraged employers to 
employ an increasing proportion of women in non-regular pOSitions. Nevertheless, 
social and political changes, which are also associated with globalization, are leading 
an increasing number of women to seek higher status careers or longer tenure in the 
workforce. These changes are also providing campaigners for women's labour rights 
with new opportunities for effective action, as this thesis demonstrates, using a case 
study of an activist group. 
Notes on Citation Style 
1) Where the full names of Japanese individuals are cited in this thesis, in 
accordance with Japanese convention, the given name is written before the family 
name. 
2) Where websites are quoted in-text, only the date and author are given. Instead of 
page numbers, website addresses can be found in the bibliography. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Aims, Methodology and Structure of the Thesis 
1 
1.0. Introduction 
This thesis argues that globalization is a real, but not an immutable, force 
which is producing profound changes in national models of capitalism and 
national socio-economic institutions, and impacting differently upon different 
groups within these national models. Specifically globalization has different 
impacts upon men and women. This thesis puts forward an analysis of the 
relationship between gender and globalization using women workers in Japan 
as a case study. The case of Japan was chosen because its distinctive model 
of capitalism is being transformed by the processes associated with 
globalization. As men and women have had very different positions within 
that model, this transformation is having different impacts upon male and 
female workers. 
The last few decades have seen growing cultural, economic and political 
interconnections and interdependencies between countries. Globalization 
results from flows of people; flows of images and information through the 
mass media; flows of central ideas, terms and images; flows of ideologies; 
flows of technology; and increasingly rapid flows of international capital 
between national economies (Appadurai, 1990). While these flows impact 
upon all countries to a greater or lesser extent, this thesis will argue, that the 
way in which globalization impacts upon nations depends upon cultural or 
institutional factors. Furthermore globalization does not impact upon all 
groups within a nation in the same way: the impact of globalization on any 
individual will be mediated by, among other things, gender, age, ethnicity and 
social class. 
Japan was chosen as a case study because of its distinctive national model of 
capitalism, which is characterised by clearly gendered division of labour, and 
by a government which long resisted adopting the neo-liberal model 
associated with globalization. The Japanese national model of capitalism is 
defined in Section 1.1. This thesis analyses the relationship of the institutions 
of the Japanese national model of capitalism to globalization. It shows how 
2 
Japanese government and business reactions to globalization are interacting 
with changes in the roles and expectations of women in the Japanese labour 
force. Specifically, it shows that, faced with the pressures of globalization, the 
Japanese state and other key economic actors are attempting to deregulate 
the Japanese labour market. At the same time the development of the ideal 
of equality of opportunity and of a nascent global legal standard of sex 
equality within the workplace has resulted in the Japanese government 
increasing the regulation of women's labour rights. 
This chapter will put the research into its academic context and explain the 
central aims of the thesis. It will then describe the method that have been 
used, before setting out the structure of the thesis and outlining the 
contribution made by each chapter to the overall argument of the thesis, and 
to meeting its central aims (shown in italics). 
1. 1. Context 
The rate of economic growth of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s 1, its 
consequent increased importance in the world economy and its apparently 
low level of industrial strife have attracted considerable attention from 
Western theorists since the late 1950s. The focus of much industrial 
relations literature in English about the Japanese model has been the 
organisation of work for core workers within large companies. Abegglen and 
Stalk (1985) wrote of the way workers traded a guarantee of lifetime 
employment for loyalty to the firm. Dore (1986) attributed the success of the 
Japanese model to 'flexible rigidities': the tendency towards oligopoly, tenured 
job security for core workers and state underwriting of capital, actually made 
the Japanese system more flexible in that they engendered co-operativeness, 
functional flexibility, the ability to negotiate sensible compromises between 
capital and labour, and thoroughness of planning. Political economists 
examined the idea that we were witnessing a "global Japanisation" of the 
1 In the 19505 and 19605, economic growth in Japan averaged 10 per cent per annum in real 
terms (Maruo, 1997). 
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labour process (Jessop et a', 1987; Elger and Smith 1994). Japan's recent 
, economic decline has again focussed business and academic opinion on 
Japan. The focus now however is on how the Japanese model is changing to 
respond to the exigencies of globalization (Boyer and Drache, 1996; 
Hasegawa and Hook, 1998; Hook and Hasegawa, 2001; Dore, 2000). 
Theorists such as Abegglen (1958) and Dore (1973, 1986) largely neglected 
the role of women in the Japanese workforce. The classical Japanese 
'model', which they described, was one that was mainly relevant to male 
workers (Wakisaka, 1997: 31), despite the fact that female workers have 
constituted a significant part of the workforce. In 1945, the proportion of 
working women in the total population was arguably the highest of all 
developed nations (Iwao, 1993: 154). However, Japan was the only 
industrialised country in which a decline in the number of women working 
outside the home was observed for the years following the Second World 
War. Today, Japanese women participate in the workforce in numbers 
comparable to those of women in other modern industrial societies2• This 
reversal in participation trends can be attributed to a number of factors 
including an increase in longevity, a decline in the fertility rate3, an increase in 
housing and education costs, the return of 'baby boom' wives to the labour 
market, and changing social attitudes to women's place in society (Whittaker, 
1990). Furthermore, the Equal Employment Opportunities Law (EEOL), which 
came into effect in 1986 and was revised in 1997 (with the revisions coming 
into effect in April 1999), has been enacted with the ostensible aim of giving 
women equal opportunities in the workplace. These social and legal changes, 
which are, as I shall show also partially attributable to globalization, are 
interacting with government and company attempts to restructure the 
Japanese model of employment in the face of economic globalization. 
2 In 2001, 41 per cent of the Japanese workforce was female (Ministry of PubliC Management, 
Home Affairs, Posts (sic) and Communications, 2002). 
3 The number of births per woman has fallen from 4.54 in 1947 to 1.3 today (Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare, 2002). 
4 
In Japan, as in other countries, women earn less, on average, than men and 
tend to be vertically and horizontally segregated from men in the workforce 
(Gelb and Palley, 1994:9). This trend is becoming even more marked as the 
labour shortage resulting from demographic change, i.e. a shortage of young 
people entering the labour market, draws more women into the paid 
workforce, particularly into poorly rewarded 'non-core' jobs, as this thesis will 
demonstrate. This process is being facilitated by legal change (Sugeno and 
Suwa, 1997) and the planned and actual reorganisation of the Japanese 
labour force, which intensified in the wake of the East Asian economic crisis of 
the late 1990s (Economist, 1998). The changing regional political economy of 
East Asia has had particular consequences for Japan. The intense 
competitiveness of other East Asian economies, the international reaction to 
the high value of the yen, and the relocation of a substantial proportion of 
Japanese manufacturing to other countries have led to predictions that 
Japan's distinctive labour practice will be radically restructured (Ministry of 
Labour, 1999). Despite obvious similarities with trends in Western 
industrialised economies, there is a tendency for the deeply gendered division 
of labour in Japan to be seen as either rooted in national culture (Stockman, 
Bonney and Xuewen, 1995) or as an epiphenomenon resulting from Japan's 
relatively late industrialisation (Brinton, 1993). I shall show that, although 
affected by the Japanese family model, a gendered division of labour was 
established in the specific conditions of the postwar international political 
economy. This division of labour is changing in response to a changing global 
political economy. 
The structural transformation of other developed economies has had 
particularly far-reaching effects for women in all 'core' areas of the world 
economy. The growth of the service sector, the leisure industry and the use 
of information technology have affected several aspects of the organisation of 
work, including the proportions of men and women in the workforce, the types 
of employment available, the number of temporary and part-time jobs, work 
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and leisure-related aspirations; and the place of work in women's life course 
(Dex, 1988: 1). Globalization is accelerating structural change in developed 
and developing countries. However, most mainstream theoretical work about 
globalization does not emphasise the particular effects that such structural 
change has for women. As Chapter Three will show, feminist researchers 
working within gendered political economy have added gendered 
perspectives to mainstream theories of globalization. However, these 
perspectives have been of limited applicability to Japan. The characteristics 
of Japan's national model of capitalism have influenced the patterns of 
women's participation in the workforce throughout the post war period. 
Furthermore, unlike other First World countries, Japan has maintained the 
tradition of the three-generation household4. This family structure impacts on 
demand for migrant domestic workers; means that highly-educated women 
tend to leave the workforce upon becoming mothers, then re-enter the 
workforce at rather lower levels than they left; and informs government 
assumptions about welfare provision and the appropriate legal framework for 
non-regular work. The patterns of resistance to neo-liberal globalization and 
activism in support of equal labour rights for women are also informed by 
Japan's normative homosocial order. 
1. 2. Central Aims of Thesis 
The central aims of this thesis are as follows: 
• To contribute to the debate about the impact of globalization upon 
women by bringing in insights from the case of Japan into the wider 
academic discourse. 
• To examine the impact of restructuring upon women's employment in 
Japan. 
• To describe the actions women are taking individually and collectively to 
resist or campaign for change in their working environment and the laws 
and practices regulating it. 
4 Although this is becoming less common in reality, the ideal perSists and impacts upon policy 
and expectations of women's reproductive labour. 
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1. 3. Methodology 
I used a mixed mode of data gathering, drawing on both quantitative and 
qualitative data. Most statistical information in this thesis comes from the 
wealth of data published by Japanese government agencies, trade unions, 
and research organisations, as well as that produced by activists. These data 
are complemented by material from semi-structured interviews with working 
women, in-depth interviews with trade union representatives, plaintiffs in court 
cases about gender and employment, and Japanese academics, as well as 
primary data from reports, and surveys. 
Using a mixture of research methods is often recommended as a way to 
achieve triangulation, i.e., when the same explanations of accounts can be 
obtained from different sources then the explanation is more plausible. 
Mason's (1994) rationale for combining quantitative and qualitative methods is 
also persuasive. This was not so much to permit triangulation but to allow the 
quantitative component to map general patterns and the qualitative stage of 
the research to reveal the processes and perspectives of those actually 
involved in the situation under investigation. This is particularly important in 
conducting cross-cultural research, where it is necessary to search for 
"meanings within a social context where people act according to the rules of 
the social setting" (May, 1997: 190). 
To examine the extent to which women's experience of work is changing as 
the Japanese national model of capitalism adapts to the exigencies of 
globalization, it was first necessary to gain an understanding of the 
experiences of women within that model. For this purpose, I conducted a pilot 
study in 1996 and 1997, using semi-structured interviews and written 
questionnaires. This provided useful background material and informed some 
of the research questions which I later composed. More information about 
this, the demographic and employment status of respondents and the text of 
questionnaires can be found in Appendix A, while Appendix 8 lists the types 
of employment carried out by face-to-face interviewees. 
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I returned to Japan to conduct more focussed fieldwork at the International 
Research Centre for Japanese Studies in Kyoto from October 1999 to March 
2000. This fieldwork was focussed on the specific effects of globalization 
upon women's employment and on women's agency in using some of the 
trends induced by globalization to improve their position. I consulted 
Japanese academics who were working in the field of gender studies and 
labour studies. I was also an active participant in two grassroots campaigning 
groups, Working Women's Network and Women Helping Women, taking part 
in meetings and attending protest actions, court hearings in support of women 
bringing cases of sexual discrimination against different branches of the 
Sumitomo corporation. Through taking part in protest actions, I was able not 
only to gain an understanding of the range of methods employed by 
Japanese women activists, but also to build relationships with some of the 
plaintiffs. 
questions5. 
Being involved in activism did however raise some ethical 
5 Some of the most illuminating studies of women's work in Japan have come from 
anthropologists using a participant observation method. Glenda S. Roberts (1994) and 
Jeannie Lo (1990) both worked alongside Japanese female factory workers and Lo (1990) and 
Ogasawara (1998) worked with white-collar employees, without drawing attention to their role 
as researchers. This method of data collection has several advantages. It is flexible, in that 
the researcher can constantly reflect upon and adjust the focus of research, in the light of new 
observations, while it may not be possible to change or add to questions in a more structured 
and formal survey, when they do not seem to be working. The observer also gains a richer 
understanding of research participants though the proportionally higher (compared to other 
methods of data-gathering) 'indices of subjective adequacy' (Bruyn, 1966). These are: 
• Time 
Spending more time with a group will enlighten the researcher about how deeply subjects feel 
about or are affected by social phenomena 
• Place 
The researcher will be aware of the physical setting in which actions take place. 
• Social circumstances 
If the researcher has varied opportunities to interact with different individuals in a variety of 
settings, this will deepen his or her comprehension of how a phenomenon is enacted. 
• Language 
As the researcher becomes increasingly aware of the language employed in a social setting, 
the more fully they will understand the meaning of what is being said. 
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Feminist researchers, particularly, have raised the question of the ethics of 
power imbalance in the relationship between researcher and researched in 
the research process. Wolf (1996) notes three areas of potential power 
imbalance: 
• Power differences stemming from the different positions of the researcher 
and researched (race, class, nationality, life chances); 
• Power exerted during the research process - defining the research 
process, unequal exchange and exploitation; 
• Power exerted during the post-fieldwork process - writing and 
representing. 
I do not believe that there were significant intrinsic power differences between 
my informants and myself. To the best of my knowledge all were from the 
majority Japanese communitl, and few were of a significantly different 
• Intimacy 
If a researcher is personally involved with a group of people, she or he is more likely to 
understand their actions. 
• Social consensus 
The index of 'social consensus' refers to 'the extent to which the observer is able to indicate 
how the meanings within a culture are employed and shared among people' (May, 1997:146). 
Participant observation does however raise ethical problems about the extent to which all 
those who are observed can really give valid consent (particularly if the research is covert). If 
research subjects are being observed over a period of time in their everyday lives they do not 
have the same control over the information a researcher gleans about them that they would 
have if they had just filled in a questionnaire or agreed to take part in a one hour interview. 
6 Although Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, in 1986, described Japan as a 'homogenous 
community', there are several minority communities in Japan. The largest minority ethnic 
community is made up of around 700,000 North and South Korean nationals, who have 
permanent resident status in Japan. They represent about one per cent of the population of 
Japan. Many of these are fourth or fifth generation descendants of those who came to Japan 
in search of work during the period of Japanese colonisation of Korea (191 0-1945) (Fukuoka, 
2000). This community usually adopt Japanese names and are indistinguishable from 
Japanese citizens. However, as they do not hold Japanese nationality, they are barred from 
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economic or educational status from myself. 1 I am aware that one limitation 
of this thesis is that it does not address in any depth how globalization has 
resulted in an increased flow of female migrant workers into Japan. 
Increasing migration is an important effect of globalization, and takes very 
gendered forms, as I shall discuss in Chapter Three. Furthermore, non-
Japanese women are recruited to Japan fill very specific niches in the labour 
market, which have arisen as because of globalization. These niches include 
carrying out sex work and being recruited to be wives of Japanese male 
farmers. However, conducting primary research about female migrants such 
as these would have raised significant ethical problems. It would have 
involved using a group of people with comparatively fewer life chances than I 
have had, in order to further my career, without being able to offer them any 
reciprocal benefits of participating in research. It would also have raised 
issues of 'race', sexuality and colonialism that are not core to my central 
argument and are therefore outside the scope of this thesis. This thesis 
therefore addresses female immigration to Japan, only insofar as it affects or 
does not affect the productive and reproductive work of the Japanese women. 
As far as power exerted in the research process was concerned, although I 
was genuinely supportive of the cause of WWN and WWIN, my primary goal 
in coming to Japan, and in joining the groups was to conduct research, the 
parameters of which I had defined in advance. Many of the activists were 
also experienced researchers and were therefore well aware of the research 
process, advising me on useful seminars and court hearings to attend, and on 
certain government employment, and, if they attend Korean schools, may find that their high 
school graduation is not recognised by tertiary level educational institutes, and therefore they 
suffer disadvantage in pursuing further studies. Another community, known as 'Burakumin', 
are ethnically Japanese. Burakumin are descendants of former hereditary occupational 
outcaste groups. Despite legislation, and well-organised campaigns from Burakumin 
activists, these communities continue to suffer socio-economic and educational disadvantage. 
The indigenous communities known as Ainu are geographically concentrated in Hokkaido. 
They are physically distinct from the ethnic Japanese. Ainu people are three times more 
likely to be living on benefits than the majority population, and high school enrolment among 
Ainu children is only 78.4 per cent compared to a national average of 94%, with obvious 
negative consequences for their future employment (Keira, 1996: 12). 
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Japanese texts to consult. These women agreed to be interviewed and 
loaned me materials that they had used in support of their case. The 
organisations in question were keen to attract foreign members. They used 
strategies such as hosting websites in English, advertising their meetings in 
an English language magazine and sending out regular updates of their 
activities to an international mailing list. This was an overt attempt to employ 
a 'boomerang' strategy such as that described by Keck and Sikkink (1998)7. 
Nonetheless, I am acutely aware that the exchange was not equal, and their 
contribution to my work was far greater than my contribution to theirs. 
During the fieldwork process, and afterwards, I took steps to avoid falsely 
representing the groups with whom I was working. I showed draft papers to 
activists, gave talks to women's groups and asked questions of Working 
Women's International Network and Shosha ni Hataraku Josei to check 
whether they believed I was accurately representing their actions and 
opinions8• I also conducted a focus group meeting with an organisation of 
women who had worked together to produce an English-language book about 
the situation of women in Japan, and exchanged ideas with members of 
Japan Women's Messages. In the interests of reciprocity, a copy of this 
thesis has been provided to Working Women's Network. 
Initially, the majority of questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were 
carried out with the aid of interpreters and translators. When my Japanese 
language proficiency improved after auditing MA Japanese language classes 
at the University of Sheffield, I began to carry out interviews without an 
interpreter present, but using a translator to help me transcribe interviews. 
Some respondents wished to carry out interviews in English, because they 
7 The 'boomerang strategy' refers to a situation where State A blocks redress to organisations 
within its boundaries. These organisations activate transnational networks, in an attempt to 
persuade members to pressurise their own states and (If relevant) a third party organisation), 
which in turn pressures State A (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
8 I am particularly grateful to Professor Komatsu Makiko and Ms Usui Yuki for the insights 
they provided during and after the fieldwork period. 
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had lived in English-speaking countries, they met to discuss women's issues 
in English, or they produced a bilingual magazine. In these cases, I have 
used verbatim transcripts of the interviews (with omissions or additions for 
clarification in square brackets) when quoting these respondents in this 
thesis. While I believe the meaning of the quotations to be sufficiently clear, 
the wording of some quotations may seem unconventional. 
During my fieldwork, I frequently attended lectures and seminars organised at 
the Dawn Centre (Osaka women's centre). These events were not only 
extremely informative in their own right, but also enabled me to first gain 
contact with, and subsequently interview representatives of, both trade unions 
and organisations for professional women. The Dawn Centre has an 
extensive collection of journals and press cuttings about the situation of 
women in Japan. This material and material supplied by the Tokyo Josei 
Union and two other unions (which remain anonymous in this thesis), 
provided concrete examples of recent case studies of legal changes as well 
as changes in company employment practice. The Japan Institute of Labour, 
the Ministry of Labour, and the Gender Equality Bureau of the Prime 
Minister's Office and Japanese think tanks and business organisations also 
provide a considerable amount of statistical data about the gender 
composition of different parts of the labour force and detailed information 
about changes in laws and policies in the face of globalization. 
As the diversification of employment resulting from restructuring is often 
presented by proponents of restructuring as enabling diverse women to fulfil 
their potential in different ways (Koike 1995), it is important to gauge whether 
women feel this to be the case. Using the same snowball technique used the 
1996/1997 survey, I carried out further semi-structured interviews with female 
agency workers, part-time and full-time employees and women who have 
chosen or attempted to enter the management track of firms. Initial contacts 
were made through my membership of the grassroots organisation, Women 
Helping Women. 
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1. 4. Organisation of thesis 
This thesis is divided into three sections. Chapters Two and Three review the 
theoretical insights which have informed this thesis. Chapter Two presents a 
synthesis of insights from theories of globalization, the state and historical 
institutionalism, and Chapter Four critically reviews the attempts that have 
been made to 'gender' globalization. Chapters Four and Five are an essential 
background to the analysis by setting out conditions specific to Japan, namely 
the position women have traditionally held in the Japanese labour forces since 
1945 and the pressures of globalization on the Japanese economy. Chapters 
Six and Seven present empirical evidence to show the changes that are 
occurring for women working in the regular and non-regular workforces in 
Japan. The final substantive chapter, Chapter Eight, examines women's 
activism, describing both the struggle against the effects of globalization that 
these women perceive as negative, as well as the use feminist campaigners 
are making of transnational networking and transnational organisation to 
change their work situations. Each chapter contributes to meeting the central 
aims of the thesis. The aims are shown in italics). 
Chapter Two contributes towards meeting the first two aims listed above: 
• To show how the secondary effects of globalization on the Japanese 
workforce are mutable and are shaped by the responses of the Japanese 
state, and other actors and institutions. 
It does so by providing a synthesis of insights from three areas of enquiry: the 
globalization debate, theories of the state, and historical-institutionalist views 
of structure and agency. The chapter begins by summarising the main 
theoretical perspectives surrounding globalization, defining globalization and 
discussing whether it is a real phenomenon. It examines the work of 
hyperglobalizers, who argue that globalization is a real condition, which has 
rendered the nation state irrelevant. However, as the chapter illustrates, 
closer analysis shows that the nation state is still a salient feature of an 
increasingly globalized international political economy. The chapter then 
examines the work of sceptics and shows that, while some of their 
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reservations about the triumph of globalization are valid, globalization is a 
phenomenon that is qualitatively different from international trade and is a 
process that has been increasing in momentum in recent decades. The 
transformationalist thesis was found to be the most convincing in that it 
recognises that globalization is a progressive phenomenon, and that its 
effects are mutable, because they are refracted through the institutions of 
different states. As evidence will be presented about how the Japanese state 
had been implicated in facilitating the reorganization of employment in Japan 
as a response to globalization, the next part of this chapter will examine the 
role of the state in an increasingly globalized political economy. Examples are 
provided to show that, while the state remains highly relevant in an age of 
globalization, and indeed is a necessary enabler of the project of 
globalization, the role and the capacity of the state are changing. This thesis 
also draws upon historical institutionalist perspectives, which assert that, 
rather than necessarily converging, states' development will tend to be 'path 
dependent'. This means, that, although individuals and groups within a 
society, and ideas that gain acceptance within that society, can have an 
impact, the institutions of a society, ranging from its laws, to its normative 
social order will tend to influence the way it develops and reacts to external 
shocks (such as globalization). Chapters Six, Seven and Eight will discuss 
how Japan's laws, company practice and gender order have affected the 
positions open to Japanese working women and how these institutions have 
accommodated the changes wrought by globalization, thereby showing how 
the secondary effects of globalization on the Japanese workforce are mutable 
and are shaped by the responses of the Japanese state, and other 
institutions. 
Theories of globalization, the state and historical institutionalism have, to a 
large extent, been formulated without consideration of gender, although the 
impact of globalization has been shown to be heavily differentiated according 
to, inter alia, gender. As the focus of this thesis is the impact of globalization 
upon women in Japan, Chapter Three will critically review attempts to 'gender' 
the analysis of globalization. This is in order to contribute to the feminist 
debate about the impact of globalization upon women by bringing in insights 
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from the case of Japan. The chapter sets out major strands of feminist debate 
about the impact of globalization upon women, showing how an 
understanding of feminist ideas greatly enriched the theoretical framework 
outline in Chapter Two. The chapter identifies areas where the Japanese 
case exemplifies or runs counter to existing hypotheses, and lists general 
hypotheses about gender and globalization, the validity of which in the case of 
Japan will be examined in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. 
Feminist analyses of globalization can be divided into three main areas: two 
theoretical and one empirical. Firstly, feminist critiques of neo-liberal 
economic globalization are an extension of more general critiques of the 
gender blindness of neo-classical economics, which has been heavily drawn 
upon by promoters of neo-liberal economic globalization. Secondly, feminist 
writers have also perceptively discussed the gendered nature of the discourse 
surrounding globalization, that is, the way that hegemonic discourse 
constructs globalization as a natural, and irresistible force, to which feminised 
national cultures must submit. Thirdly, feminist researchers have conducted 
empirical case studies, which show that the actual effects of global 
restructuring on women are complex and contradictory. Some educated 
and/or middle class women in most countries are gaining job positions that 
were not previously open to them. There is also some, disputed, evidence 
that women in developing countries experience economic gains, as their 
countries become integrated into the global economy. However, such change 
does not necessarily mean a rise in social status, and views about how 
globalization affects the status of women within families and societies are 
mixed. In states where women's social and economic rights have been well 
established, a move towards economic liberalism can lead to job losses. 
Although, little has been written on how the social and economic processes 
associated with globalization affect Japanese women particularly, drawing out 
key observations about the impact of such processes upon women globally 
provides a basis for comparison. The relative wealth of Japan means that it is 
some ways difficult to draw parallels with studies of the impact of globalization 
upon women elsewhere in Asia. However, women's increasing incorporation 
into the workforce, the use of women as flexible labour; women's reproductive 
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work filling the gaps left when states withdraw from the provision of welfare; 
grassroots mobilisation loosening the bonds of custom, and the use of 
transnational networking are all observable phenomena in Japan, as 
elsewhere. The pre-existence of a distinctive national model of capitalism, 
Japanese gender roles and the persistence of the three generation 
household, however, differentiate Japan from other First World countries. 
Following reviews of the general theoretical literature about gender and 
globalization, Chapter Four provides more country-specific information about 
the role key economic actors in Japan have played in facilitating neo-liberal 
economic globalization. It also explains the reciprocal effects this has had on 
the Japanese national model of capitalism and on the institutions of Japanese 
society. The chapter situates the 'Japanese economic miracle' in the context 
of the Cold War, and shows how US security considerations enabled Japan to 
develop a very distinctive and economically successful model of production, 
which was nonetheless dependent upon women being largely confined to 
peripheral pOSitions in the workforce. 
Japan's own security considerations, trading relations, and economic 
pragmatism encouraged the Japanese government and Japanese companies 
to invest overseas. The globalization of Japanese production followed on 
from the globalization of Japanese capital investment, as economic change 
encouraged companies to locate more and more production overseas. The 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1970, the 1985 Plaza Accord in 
1985 and the 1996-7 East Asian financial crisis were key discontinuities, 
which fuelled the outflow of capital and production. This 'hollowing out' of 
Japanese industry has resulted in the steady erosion of the capacity of the 
Japanese state to influence Japanese corporations. Japanese policy-makers 
have experienced pressure from sources both inside and outside Japan to 
allow Japanese firms to produce overseas and to allow entry of foreign 
companies into the Japanese domestic market. However, while imports have 
entered Japan, Japan has seen very little foreign direct investment. 
Consequently, it appears that net flows of jobs and finance are out of Japan. 
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Japanese industry has tried to counter this challenge by attempting to cut 
costs of domestic production, by reducing labour costs and making the 
workforce more numerically flexible. The chapter goes on to explain how the 
impact of globalization upon Japan is not only economic, but also social and 
cultural. Japanese managers and students today have more diverse 
experiences through work that are altering their attitudes about social 
relations within the workplace, including gender relations9• 
Chapter Five describes how the institutions of Japanese state regulation and 
company practice in Japan, in combination with pre-existing gender relations 
in Japan, have played a large part in constructing a gender order in which 
men and women experience employment very differently. In general, since 
the Second World War, young Japanese women have been confined to 
routine jobs with little or no training and have been expected to leave paid 
employment upon marriage or childbirth. However, even before the 
acceleration of the process of globalization (explained in Chapter Five), 
gender relations in the post war Japanese model of capitalism were evolving. 
Societal and demographic change, educational advance and the increased 
acceptance of the ideology of equal labour rights have resulted in a gradual 
increase in the determination of Japanese women to continue to work. A 
minority of determined women have succeeded in establishing themselves as 
professionals and a larger number of women have re-entered the workforce 
as non-regular employees. Both as short-term regular employees and as 
non-regular workers, Japanese women have enabled Japanese companies to 
maintain secure and well-rewarded employment for most male company 
employees. As shown in Chapter Four, the Japanese national model of 
capitalism emerged in the very specific conditions of the immediate post war 
period. As Japan becomes ever more integrated into a very different 
international economy, this model is undergoing changes, which will both 
impact upon and be affected by the actions and choices of Japanese men and 
women. The chapter will examine the extent and nature of women's 
9 The extent to which this change has altered the position of female regular workers in Japan 
is examined in more detail in Chapter Six. 
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participation in both the non-regular workforce and the different sectors of the 
restructured regular workforce. This aim will be further developed in Chapters 
Six and Seven. 
Chapter Six examines the role that the Japanese state has played in changing 
the regulations governing the employment of regular women workers. It goes 
on to explain how this interacts with the desire of Japanese companies to 
reduce labour costs to compete more effectively in an increasingly global 
economy. In particular, the chapter shows how the promulgation of the EEOL 
and the repeal of protective legislation have institutionalised a dual labour 
market. The chapter examines the extent to which, and the way in which, the 
regular workforce is being re-organised, through studying how firms have 
adopted tripartite recruitment and employee organisation. The vast majority 
of women work in less-skilled jobs than their male counterparts, and leave the 
workforce to raise children. For a minority of highly skilled specialists, 
professionals, and extremely dedicated sogoshoku (management track) 
employees, legal changes and restructuring are shown to provide some 
labour rights, despite frequent violations of the spirit of the law. However, 
historical institutionalists recognise the importance of ideas, as well as 
institutions, in politics. For society in general, the EEOL seems also to have 
contributed to changing attitudes about working women, and has given 
activists for women's labour rights a tool to use in the courts to fight against 
sexism in the workplace. 
Most women who leave the workplace to raise children return as 'non-regular', 
part-time, temporary or agency workers. The regular and non-regular 
workforces in Japan are strictly differentiated. Non-regular workers can 
expect to receive lower wages, fewer fringe benefits and less legal protection 
than their full-time regular co-workers, and to be excluded from trade union 
membership. Chapter Seven details the growth of the non-regular workforce 
in Japan, and the characteristics associated with part-time work, agency 
workers and homeworking. 
18 
This change is particularly apparent in sectors, such as the airline and 
banking industries, which have become more subject to foreign competition, 
or are vulnerable to capital flight. The affected industries have, therefore, 
attempted to restructure their workforces to cut costs and increase flexibility. 
The Japanese government has facilitated this restructuring through legal 
change. This restructuring not only makes use of the skills and experience of 
Japanese women in the workplace, but also enables the government to keep 
spending on welfare to a minimum, because, as shown in Chapter Three, 
women's reproductive work fills gaps left by state cutbacks. However, as the 
non-regular workforce has grown, it has also diversified. Chapter Seven also 
details the development of 'regular' part-timer jobs and in the number and 
types of job that may be filled by dispatched workers. Chapters Six and 
Seven also determine the characteristics of women who typically participate in 
different sections of the labour force, examining the effect of labour market 
and household structures. Taken together these two chapters demonstrate 
that the impact of globalization has had complex and contradictory effects on 
the situation of working women in Japan. 
Chapter Eight describes how campaigners in Japan are raising the global 
profile of Japanese women workers in order to describe the actions women 
are taking individually and collectively to resist or campaign for change in their 
working environment and the laws and practices regulating it. 
The institutions of the parliamentary system and mainstream trade union 
movement have largely excluded women. As a result, female activists have 
tended to concentrate their efforts in community groups or women's networks 
(ct. Chapter Three). Ironically, women are now gaining more national political 
representation, as national state capacity is decreasing (cf. Chapters Two and 
Four) However, as the powers of the state are devolved to the subnational 
level or being lost to supranational organisation (ct. Chapter Two) some 
feminist activists are proving to be successful political actors at the local, 
transnational and international levels. A case study of Working Women's 
Network exemplifies the characteristics of feminist activist groups in Japan: a 
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high degree of commitment from members, longevity, a combination of 
research and protest, and effective use of institutional facilities for women. 
The final chapter summarises the main findings of this thesis and examines 
these findings in the context of claims made about the relationship between 
gender and globalization, then makes suggestions for appropriate further work 
in this area. 
1. 5. Summary 
Globalization is a multi-faceted process, which impacts differently upon 
different states and upon different groups within those states. Although 
globalization generally results in a reduction of the sovereignty of the nation 
state, the effects of economic globalization are mediated by state action and 
by national economic, political, social and cultural institutions. This thesis 
examines the impact of globalization upon women working in Japan, using a 
theoretical framework that draws on literature about globalization, the state, 
and historical institutionalism. An explanation of this theoretical framework 
and insights from literature about gender and globalization form the first major 
section of the thesis. The second section describes Japan's role in promoting 
globalization and the role that women have played in the Japanese labour 
force during the post war period. The third section shows how this role is 
changing with the impact of state re-regulation of Japanese employment, and 
company attempts to 'flexibilize' the workforce. It then goes on to describe 
and assess the effectiveness of women's activism under these changing 
conditions. The final chapter summarises the main arguments of this thesis, 
and contextualizes these arguments in debates about gender and 
globalization, and, finally, offers suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter Two: 
Globalization, the State and Historical Institutionalism 
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2. O. Introduction 
This thesis argues that the Japanese model of capitalism is becoming less 
economically competitive in an increasingly globalized international economy, 
and that the Japanese and other key economic actors are attempting to 
counter this by deregulating the Japanese labour market and restructuring 
the Japanese workforce. Simultaneously, changing social attitudes and an 
emerging global standard of sexual equality of opportunity have created a 
momentum in favour of legal change and the 're'-regulation of women's work 
in Japan. Both deregulation and re-regulation are taking place in a specific 
national context. The changes being made are interacting with pre-existing 
social and political institutions in Japanese society, particularly the Japanese 
national model of capitalism, and the gender norms of Japanese society. In 
addition, workplace practices are being affected by the responses of workers 
and campaigners. Some advocates of sexual equality have also adapted their 
responses to the organization of labour in Japan to changes in the global 
political economy. The outcome of this complex interaction between the 
forces of globalization, national socio-economic and political institutions and 
the actions of, and reactions to, activists is that globalization impacts 
differently upon men and women in the Japanese workforce. To examine 
the impact of globalization and restructuring upon women in Japan, it is 
therefore appropriate to draw upon important insights from literature about 
globalization, the state, and the relationship between institutions and actors, 
described in the theories of historical institutionalism. This chapter critically 
reviews mainstream perspectives in these areas, assessing their validity and 
identifying both their shortcomings and their relevance to this thesis. 
The concept of globalization describes the exponential growth in recent 
decades of trans-national interdependencies and interconnections. 
Globalization has been particularly significant in the economic sphere. Trade 
flows have increased, the world's core economies have significantly 
increased their foreign direct investment (FDI), and the processes of 
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production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and services 
are increasingly being organized on an international basis. However, 
globalization is also said to be fundamentally transforming the political sphere 
through institutional innovations, and the internationalization of control and 
surveillance, such as global regulations upon trade and the international 
policing and law. Furthermore, the cultural sphere is being transformed 
through the representation of 'facts, affects, meanings, beliefs, preferences, 
tastes and values' (Waters, 1995:8). As a consequence of these changes, 
advocates of a 'strong' globalization thesis, such as Ohmae (1995), argue 
that we now live in a 'borderless world', where states are irrelevant. Others 
argue that globalization is a 'myth' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) or at least a 
large overstatement (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995). Those termed 
'transformationalists' (Held et ai, 1999) accept that globalization is a genuine 
'transformation of social geography marked by the growth of supraterritorial 
spaces' (Scholte, 2000:8), albeit that they accept that this transformation is 
an uneven process, and that globalization has not (yet) rendered territoriality 
redundant. 
Section 2.1 begins by defining globalization and then critically reviews the 
main theoretical perspectives on globalization, presenting empirical evidence 
to show that globalization is a real phenomenon, which is qualitatively 
different from internationalization. In addition, this section introduces the idea 
that globalization is not a phenomenon driven purely by technological change 
and economic logic. Globalization is also a project: the goal of states, 
companies and individuals, albeit that their decisions create a momentum 
which encourages further integration. The section explains why theorists 
believe that the processes of economic globalization are having, and will 
continue to have, a significant impact on the labour forces of modern 
industrialized countries, and is impacting differently on different groups within 
those labour forces, but note that the way in which these processes impact 
upon groups or nations is mediated by cultural and institutional factors. In 
other words, there is a complex interaction of global and local forces. 
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Section 2.2 presents and critically analyses literature about the role of the 
state under these new conditions. The section examines the extent to which 
globalization has led to a decline in the de facto power of the state, or, 
according to the alternative thesis, the extent to which states have merely 
changed their policies and reformed their institutions to better cope with 
increasing internationalization. Empirical evidence shows that both of these 
perspectives have shortcomings. The state is not powerless, but the nature 
of governance is constantly changing in a globalizing world undergoing 
globalization: power is exercized at supra- and sub-state levels; the state is 
serving different constituencies; new actors are being incorporated into the 
governance process; and new forms of political participation become more 
salient. 
Section 2.3 sets out the historical institutionalist perspective. Institutionalism 
has proved to be an influential tool in the analysis of Japanese political 
economy. The institutionalist analysis illustrates how ideas and actors form 
social, political and economic institutions and how those institutions create a 
'path', which a national mode of capitalism will follow. Although the 
preferences of actors are largely formed by the institutions of the society in 
which they live, individuals do have choice of action within those institutions 
and can influence and reform those institutions, particularly in times of flux. 
2. 1. Globalization 
Globalization has been described as "the concept of the 1990s, a key idea by 
which we understand the transition of human society into the third millennium" 
(Waters, 1995: 1). The hegemonic nature of this discourse of globalization 
can be accounted for by both market-led trends in the organization of 
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production and changes in policies resulting in a normative preference for 
neo-liberal economic globalization among influential policy-makers 10. 
Political, economic and social changes have cumulatively created a 
momentum towards a more globa"y integrated economy. Economic 
globalization was greatly facilitated by the decolonization that followed the 
end of the Second World War. This ended the segmentation of the world 
economy into zones controlled by different imperial powers. In 1944, 44 
delegates of the United and Associated Nations met Bretton Woods 
conference met to establish an international economic order based up the 
liberalization of international trade. They set the rules of cooperation for the 
convertibility of the dollar into gold and the exchange rates regime, and the 
US dollar became the international reserve currency. Demographic change 
in mature Western economies in the 1960s and 1970s encouraged the 
internationalization of production. Fa"ing birth rates meant that Western 
economies had tight labour markets characterized by low unemployment 
rates, high wages, and chronic labour shortages. Despite recruiting migrant 
workers, generally from former colonies, industrialized countries lost their 
international comparative advantage. Developing countries had abundant 
labour, high urban unemployment and low wages. TNCs' total profits are 
likely to be much higher that those of local firms, so, even though their 
reinvestment and tax payments to their host countries might be relatively 
sma" as a percentage of total profit11 , Third World governments had every 
10 This will be examined in more detail in the Section 2.2. 
11 Critics of overseas investment argued that it was of dubious benefit to host countries 
because: 
The wages of Third World workers were lower and working conditions worse than in the home 
countries of TNCs 
Few transferable skills or industrial linkages of use to the host country were generated 
Developing countries became heavily dependent on foreign capital 
Few taxes were paid by TNCs in the host countries 
High profits accrued to foreigners and these profits were mostly remitted overseas (Lim, 
1997). 
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incentive to encourage FDI. A further motivation for American and European 
manufacturers to shift production overseas was to cut costs, so that their 
products could compete with imports of low-cost Japanese manufactured 
goods 12. 
The Bretton Woods system was effectively made obsolete in 1971 when the 
US moved to a floating exchange rate and other countries followed suit13• 
This creating an incentive for currency speculation and for firms to move their 
sites of production to countries where wages became relatively lower. In 
1973, members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
agreed to quadruple oil prices 14. This decision sent shock waves through 
First World economies. Financial markets and manufacturers tried to 
compensate for the crises in their home markets by seeking new markets and 
investment opportunities, leading to an increase in bank lending to the Third 
World, a rise in the Eurodollar market and an increase in FDI relative to 
production in advanced economies. As the value of the yen increased and 
labour costs grew in the 1980s, Japan experienced the same tight labour 
markets resulting from demographic change that Western competitors had 
12 The reasons for the success of Japan's export-oriented development strategy will be 
explained in Chapter Four. 
13 The multinationalization of US firms from the 1960s, led to an increased outflow of foreign 
capital from the US, and a consequent trade deficit. This was exacerbated by the costs of 
the Vietnam War, and confidence in the dollar started to slide. States began to convert their 
dollars, which they used in international trade, into gold. The US reacted by announcing in 
August 1971 that it was going to abandon the convertibility of the dollar. Consequently the 
exchange rates set at Bretton Woods broke down, and states were forced to float their own 
currencies. 
14 In an attempt to undermine Western, and particularly US, support for Israel during the 
1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt (and several other Middle Eastern states). 
OPEC countries nationalized petroleum production facilities, reducing production by 25 per 
cent and imposing export quotas. Oil prices quadrupled within the year, reaching $12 per 
barrel. As Western countries had a high level of demand for oil and very limited capacity for 
replacing oil from the Middle East, the costs of manufacturing production soared. 
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experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the result that Japanese production 
also was increasingly moved to low wage economies 15. Rising oil prices 
also led to increased migratory flows, especially to Middle Eastern states, 
which were oil-rich, and keen to develop, but, as they were sparsely 
populated, had significant labour shortages. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, rapid advances in information technology, transport 
and communications made it possible to organize production on an 
international basis. In addition, these advances were also changing the 
values of diverse societies, opening them to intercultural interaction. FDI 
grew at an exponential rate 16: between 1985 and 1990 it grew at four times 
the rate of world output and three times the rate of trade (Ostry, 1996:334). 
During this period, trade has also grown at consistently higher levels than 
output. The ratio of exports to gross domestic product (GOP) in countries 
participating in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(DECO) rose from 9.5 per cent in 1960 to 20.5 per cent in 1990 (Wade, 1996: 
62), also indicating increasing international interconnectedness. Since the 
end of the Cold War, Eastern bloc countries have been increasingly 
integrated into the world economy and they too have become important 
destinations for FDI. 
The export of capital from First World economies to developing countries led 
to the rapid development of the Newly-Industrialising Countries (NICs). 
These areas increasingly produced goods for export to First World markets. 
The low wages which attracted investors to Asian and East European 
economies allowed products to be produced more cheaply than if they were 
15 Japan had additional, political, reasons to produce overseas, as Chapter Four will explain 
in more depth. 
16 FDI involves the investment of capital and consists not just of flows of finance but of 
specific types of technology, management styles and organizations of labour. As a result, FDI 
has more profound consequences for political and social globalization than trade links or 
even shifts of purely portfolio capital. 
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produced in the core economies of the First World. Consequently, many 
manufacturing jobs were 'exported' to the Third World, a process known as 
'hollowing out' (or kudouka in Japanese). From the mid-1970s, there was 
also an increased flow of migrants who came to work in the rapidly 
developing Asian economies, particularly Taiwan and Singapore. This re-
ordering of the international division of labour had reciprocal effects on 
production in First World economies. 
Globalization has had a profound effect on the economies of nation states 
and has lead to changes in the types of work available and the way that work 
is organized. Globalization is therefore a structural phenomenon. However, 
in addition, the world economy is increasingly subject to cyclical forces 
. (Dicken, 1998: 429). Structural change means that many manufacturing jobs 
which used to dominate the economy in the First World have been 'exported', 
as the availability of new technology and liberalization of financial flows have 
made it easier to organize production on an international basis. This 
structural change has led to a decline in the proportion of semi-skilled and 
unskilled jobs available in First World nations. Furthermore, where the 
volume of outward investment of TNCs is very high, there are bound to be 
adverse effects on employment in the domestic economy. Conversely, there 
has been a growth in new types of work in service industries at both ends of 
the employment spectrum. Those who carry out poorly paid service work, 
such as childcare, household cleaning, and work in call centres and late night 
convenience stores, facilitate the work of others in highly paid but time-
consuming jobs in fields such as information technology and financial 
services. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, state withdrawal from 
economic demand management and the liberalization of capital flows have 
together increased the likelihood of cyclical fluctuations, and, moreover, 
reduced the capacity of states to act in concert to implement counter-cyclical 
policies. These fluctuations result in periodic recession, a consequent 
decline in the demand for goods and services, and hence corresponding 
decline in the demand for the workers who produce them. In response, 
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employers have attempted to cut back production costs and to make labour 
more flexible (to be examined in later chapters). Firms that have not gone 
overseas have invested in machinery to compete with low-cost labour; with a 
consequent reduction in job opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. 
Although Dicken and several of the other mainstream theorists (for example, 
Held et ai, 1999) cited in this chapter rightly note the changes in the labour 
market associated with the processes of globalization, and draw attention to 
the increased significance of service sector and non-regular jobs, they 
neglect to detail and analyse the gendered effects of these changes. The 
overwhelming majority of temporary workers and those engaged in poorly-
paid service work in First World countries, are female. Furthermore, 
migratory flows are very 'gendered', with male and female migrant workers 
carrying out very different tasks. 
The concept of globalization does not only encompass increased economic 
integration and increased flows of capital, but also social, political and 
cultural change. Appadurai (1990) identifies five increasingly strong 'flows' 
that produce globalization. Finanscapes are the increasingly rapid flows of 
international capital between national economies. Ethnoscapes, or flows of 
people, such as tourists, or guest workers, are impacting upon domestic and 
international politics to an unprecedented extent. Mediascapes are flows of 
images and information through the mass media, disseminating central ideas, 
terms and images central to ideoscapes, the international dissemination of 
the ideologies of freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation and 
democracy. Technoscapes are flows of technology. These processes 
reinforce each other. For example, ethnoscapes are facilitated by the spread 
of technology in the form of the increased accessibility of air travel. This 
multiplicity of flows implies that the process of globalization has social and 
cultural, as well as economic impacts. 
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Giddens sees globalization as resulting from an extension of the process of 
modernization. Modernity's dynamism stems from time-space distanciation; 
the disembedding of social systems and the reflexive ordering and re-ordering 
of social relations (Giddens, 1990:16-17). Following McLuhan, he believes 
that time and space have become disembedded. Connections can be formed 
between people and cultures across great distances by symbolic tokens, 
such as money. These tokens form the means of conducting economic 
relations across great distance. In addition, expert systems (technical 
knowledge that can be applied in a range of different contexts) provide 
'guarantees' of expectations across distanciated time-space'. In other words, 
people have expectations of expert processes, even when they do not know 
how these processes function. For example, it is accepted that computers 
control the movement of traffic, and that architects build structurally sound 
buildings. These expectations permit social relations to be restructured 
across great distances. The flows of information permitted by technological 
innovation mean that communities become reflexive, looking to print and 
electronic media for information on every subject and change their behaviour 
based on this new information, rather than purely relying on tradition. 
"Social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of 
incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively 
altering their character." (Giddens, 1990:38). 
This incoming information leads to the spread of ideas and ideologies, and 
sometimes the adoption of ideas and practices 17. Consequently societies 
becomes much more reflexive and aware of the precarious and contingent 
nature of their own structures and institutions. Reflexivity is a somewhat 
wider concept than 'self-consciousness': it refers rather to the 'monitored 
character of the ongoing flow of social life' and, as human beings are 
purposive agents, they will be able to reflect discursively upon their actions 
and choices (Giddens, 1984). This phenomenon of reflexivity resulting from 
17 An incontrovertible example of this is the adoption of Japanese production techniques 
several factories in the US and Western Europe, following the publication of works such as 
the MIT study, The Machine That Changed The World (Womack et ai, 1991). 
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flows of ideas, ideologies and practices, is very pertinent to this thesis in two 
ways. Firstly, neo-Iiberal economic globalization is also overtly linked to this 
reflexivity about hitherto consensual ideas. For example, the election and 
administration of New Right leaders, notably Margaret Thatcher in the UK 
(1979-1990), and Ronald Reagan in the US (1981-1989), were instrumental 
in disseminating policies of the deregulation of labour markets, the 
privatization of nationalized companies and provision of welfare, move from 
Keynesian demand management to monetarist economic policies. Secondly, 
an obvious potential area for reflexivity is gender relations. All societies have 
culturally-specific gender norms and localized patriarchal structures18• When 
exposed to the differing gender norms from another society, it becomes 
apparent that gender norms in one's own society are contingent rather than 
'natural'. The restructuring of social relations between Japan and Western 
countries has encouraged reflexivity about gender roles as well as attitudes 
towards work and leisure (see especially Chapters Four, Six and Eight). 
As the tendencies towards time-space distanciation; the disembedding of 
social systems and the reflexive ordering and re-ordering of social relations 
permit integration across ever wider distances, a globalized society and 
economy results. Of course, the process of social change is more complex 
and contradictory than the adoption of new technologies. As Featherstone 
(1987) pointed out, people who watch the same television programmes and 
movies respond to and interpret them very differently according to their own 
social and cultural context. The diversity of flows can also lead to the 
establishment or strengthening of new identities, rather than convergence. 
Those involved in identity politics and new social movements use new 
technology to contact or exchange ideas and campaigning strategies with 
others sharing their identity or values. This contact with others who share 
one's values or identify, can reinforce and increase the salience of such 
18 Walby (1986), for example, shows how in Britain, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the concept of the 'family wage' was instrumental in excluding women from paid 
work, and enforcing working class women's dependence upon low-waged men. 
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values or identities (Mann, 1997). Islamic movements are one example of 
this phenomenon, although, of course, Islam is politically stronger in some 
countries than others. The feminist movement, on the other hand, spreads 
through almost all countries, although usually self-identified feminists account 
for only a minority in any society. The strengthening of non-territorial 
identities, the spread of ideas and ideologies and information technology, 
transport and communications have combined to augment the growth and 
effectiveness of transnational activism 19. Section 2.3 will return to this theme, 
but Keck and Sikkink claim that transnational activism is particularly likely to 
be effective where it is centred around achieving the enforcement of issues 
around which there is an international consensus: these are likely to be 
issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals and issues involving 
legal equality of opportunity (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
In summary, as well as being a political project, and a transformative process, 
globalization is associated with attempts to establish a global standard of 
basic human rights, and of equality before the law. Thus, globalization can 
be viewed as a project by non-state actors to imagine and implement global 
rights (Sassen, 1996; Neysmith and Chen, 2002). 
Is globalization really happening? 
There is considerable debate about the extent to which globalization is a real 
phenomenon that represents a significant discontinuity from that which has 
gone before. This debate is complicated by the fact the some of the analysts 
19 That is not to say that transnational movements are new. Historical precursors include 
Anglo-American anti-slavery campaign, efforts by Western missionaries and Chinese 
reformers to abolish foot-binding, and the international socialist movement (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Hanlon, 2002, personal communication). However, for the reasons cited 
above, such movements have increased massively in number and influence. Ninety per cent 
of the 15,000 transnational institutions (of all kinds) that existed in 1993, had not existed in 
1960. Between 1970 and 1995, the number of international non-governmental organizations 
with consultative status at the UN increased fivefold (Cohen and Rai, 2000). 
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of globalization are also advocates of transnational production in a neo-
liberal environment. Kenichi Ohmae has been described as a 
'hyperglobalizer' (Held et ai, 1999). He advances the thesis that, as the 
result of the forces of technology, transnational corporations, advances in 
information technology and competition, we now live in a borderless world, 
where the actions of states are, in effect, irrelevant (Ohmae, 1995). Hirst and 
Thompson, on the other hand, argue that globalization is a 'myth' (albeit a 
'necessary myth') employed by policy-makers to justify the implementation of 
unpopular neo-liberal policies. Most theorists of globalization, though, fall 
into the third category, 'transformationalists' (Held at ai, 1999). The 
transformationalist literature, represented by the works of Scholte (2000), 
Held at al (1999) Goldblatt et al (1997), Appadurai (1990) and others, offers a 
more nuanced analysis. The transformationalist literature describes 
globalization as stemming from increasing frequency of economic, cultural, 
political and social interactions across borders. Although globalization is 
gaining momentum, it has not (yet) rendered territories irrelevant, according 
to this school of thought. While transborder flows have an impact upon a" 
nations, the precise nature of that impact will depend upon the structures, 
institutions and actors relevant to those nations. 
The hyperglobalization thesis 
Ohmae argues that we are now moving towards a 'borderless economy,' 
where 'nationalityless' global corporations wi" serve consumers by targeting 
products towards different regions and that this task will become increasingly 
simple as consumer tastes converge. He further recommends that 
developing countries open their doors to foreign investment and implicitly 
rejects the criticisms of the disadvantages experienced by Third World 
countries that encourage inward FDI (Lim, 1992). According to Ohmae, 
'nationalityless' global corporations are qualitatively different to colonial 
institutions, such as the East India Company, that sought to repatriate profits. 
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He argues that the fixed costs of manufacturing in particular, mean that 
multinational corporations are not so 'footloose' as has been assumed 
(Ohmae, 1995). This is a very contentious argument. The East Asian 
financial crisis demonstrates how very quickly investment can be withdrawn 
from a country, and the impact that this has upon manufacturing there. 
Ohmae is also optimistic that there is an alternative to the 'hollowing out' of 
corporations in the First World. He envisages First World firms maintaining 
their profit level by stimulating demand through innovation and 'branding' and 
by forming alliances with firms in other countries to create mutually beneficial 
supply networks. He relegates the role of government to that of producing 
adequate infrastructure to make their countries attractive to FDI and of 
educating its citizens to be wise consumers and good employees. 
It should not, however, be assumed that the hyperglobalization standpoint is 
only associated with a neo-liberal viewpoint. Indeed, hyperglobalization does 
seem to be the logical conclusion of the Marxian thesis that firms will go ever 
further in the search for new markets to solve crises of overproduction and to 
cut production costs by finding sources of cheaper labour and raw materials. 
Amin (1997), writing in Marxist tradition, also takes as read globalization, 
while Wallerstein (2000) also argues that globalization is merely a 
continuation of the logic of capitalism20• The difference between neo-liberal 
hyperglobalizers and those on the political left is that the former tend to view 
globalization as the triumph of oppressive global capitalism, rather than the 
triumph of individual autonomy over state power (Held et ai, 1999). 
Several criticisms can be levelled at the hyperglobalization thesis. Ohmae's 
analysis can be challenged on empirical grounds. Most trade is not 'global' 
but, at most, regional (Goldblatt et ai, 1997). Furthermore, at least formally, 
the nation state remains the locus of political legitimacy and power 
20 Wallerstein is not among the hyperglobalizers, however, as he believes that an alliance of 
progressive social forces could produce different outcomes. 
34 
(Fukuyama, 1992; Goldblatt et ai, 1997; Weiss, 1998). Ohmae's 
prescriptions can be challenged on normative grounds. Ohmae does not 
differentiate between different groups of citizens in the new 'borderless 
economy'. He envisages consumers around the world benefiting; jobs being 
created in developing countries, and employment levels being maintained in 
First World economies. His vision of a constantly innovating core of 
permanent employees is one of the characteristics of the shift from Fordist 
production, characterized by large plants employing semi-skilled workers, to a 
post-Fordist situation, where a small number of highly skilled expert workers 
conduct research and development. However, the move from the economies 
of scale to economies of scope also depends upon the existence of a 
'peripheral' workforce: more work is outsourced to developing countries, and 
there is an increasing reliance on part-time, temporary and casual workers, 
who, in many countries have fewer employment rights than full timers. 
Migrant workers who come to First World states are also unlikely to enjoy the 
conditions envisaged by Ohmae. As even the most economically liberal 
states generally do not support a free market in terms of labour, many migrant 
workers are undocumented and therefore unable to claim labour rights. 
Groups in the peripheral workforce tend to be segregated by gender (as well 
as by ethnicity, nationality and/or geographical location) as Chapters Three, 
Six and Seven will demonstrate. 
The shortcomings and exaggerations of hyperglobalization and the conflation 
of analysis and policy prescription among some of its advocates has led the 
authors of the sceptical theory, discussed below, to dismiss the whole 
concept of globalization as a merely a discourse employed by political and 
economic actors in order to legitimate unpopular neo-liberal pOlicies. 
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Sceptical thesis 
Hirst and Thompson argue that globalization is a 'myth', although 
internationalization is not, and that there was more openness in international 
trade during the 50 years before the start of the First World War than there is 
today (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). They argue that the concept of the global 
economy, as currently described, is not significantly different from previous 
descriptions of the international economy. They criticize the tendency of 
globalization theorists to cite examples of internationalization of sectors and 
processes as evidence that global market forces increasingly dominate the 
economy. In a truly globalized economy, they argue, national economies 
would be first subsumed by and subsequently reintegrated into a global 
system through international process and transactions. The domestic 
policies of governments and private corporations would reflect that the sphere 
where they operate was primarily determined internationally. It would be 
difficult to regulate an economy that was socially decontextualized; hence 
there would be no protection for the casualties of market failure. Multi-
national companies would become transnational companies, or genuinely 
footloose capital, which would source the factors of production and carry out 
marketing at a global level. Hirst and Thompson dispute that the world 
economy is now beyond regulation and control, but accept that regulation is 
currently unlikely to happen, as the states which have the strongest economic 
power have divergent interests and the elites in the G3 countries (Germany, 
Japan and the USA) have an ideological preference for laissez-faire 
economic policies. It is for this reason that globalization is described as a 
'necessary myth' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 1 ). 
There is some truth in each of Hirst and Thompson's core arguments against 
the existence of globalization; and the case of Japan will show that 
globalization has both been pursued for political ends and used to rationalize 
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deregulation and flexibilization (see Chapters Four, Six and Seven). 
However, this does not necessarily mean that globalization is a myth. Each 
of Hirst and Thompson's main points are presented below (in italics). The 
extent to which each point is valid is then discussed. 
• The economy is no more integrated now than in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Industrial technology has permitted an 
international economy to exist since the 1860s, and in many ways, the 
present day economy is less international than that which existed between 
1870 and 1924. 
Though the world economy might have been integrated before 1914, today's 
integration is qualitatively different. Before 1913, integration, though 
extensive, was shallow and consisted of trade in goods and services and 
international movements of capital. Today's world is characterized by deep 
integration, where the production of goods and services is organized on an 
international basis. In other words there has been a functional integration of 
internationally dispersed activities (Dicken, 1998; Went 2000). When 
comparing trade statistics with those of the earlier era, one should also take 
the following facts into account: 
• The service sector now is much larger than in 1913 and non-financial 
services are largely non-tradeable21 • 
• Many trade-replacing investments are taking place. For instance, 95 
per cent of goods manufactured by Japanese multinationals in the US 
and the EU are also sold in the US and the EU. 
21 This observation is less true than it used to be. Advances in information technology now 
allow airline booking for passengers around the world to be carried out in the Caribbean, call 
centres for British, US and Australian firms to be operated in India, and secretarial work to be 
outsourced to anywhere with sufficiently skilled workers and adequate communications 
technologies. 
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• In 1913, most traded goods were raw materials, while today most are 
intermediate goods. 
• The truly transnational company is rare. Most companies are nationally 
based. They have one primary location, which permits them to trade 
multi-nationally. 
Even if TNCs have headquarters firmly based in one country, they have 
sufficient economic power to negotiate very favourable conditions with host 
nations. TNCs are often larger in economic terms than 'sovereign' nations. 
For instance, the annual turnover of General Motors, if assumed to be a 
measure of GOP would make it the 24th largest economy in the world. 
Similarly, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Toyota, would be the world's 3th, 39th and 
45th largest economies, respectively, while the Sumitomo Corporation, whose 
gendered employment practices are examined in more detail in Chapter Six, 
would be the 50th largest economy in the world (Went, 2000: 19). The top 
200 companies control half of the global trade in goods (ibid: 21). TNCs have 
the capacity to negotiate national boundaries to gain dominance in a global 
market (Sklair, 1997). Even if they form only a small part of the market, they 
can still intensify competition and force domestic firms to re-evaluate their 
deployment of labour. Yashiro writes of the copycat effect of even small-
scale foreign entry on service industries in Japan (Yashiro, 1998). TNCs can 
also extend their influence through forming networks and alliances with each 
other, with all levels of government, and with the subcontractors and smaller 
firms which supply them, arguably producing a new paradigm of 
'concentration without centralization' (Harrison, 1997: 9). Benedict Harrison 
draws on Porter's (1990) work to describe the advantages TNCs accrue by 
retaining a strong national base. These advantages include government-
supported technical institutes and links with the scientific community, as well 
as managers having shared social norms of behaviour with workers. Harrison 
concludes: 
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" ... the more the economy is globalized, the more it is accessible only 
to companies with a global reach ... Dressed in new costumes, and 
armed with new techniques for combining control over capital 
allocation, technology, government relations, and the deployment of 
labour with a dramatic decentralization of the location of actual 
production, the world's largest companies, their allies, and their 
suppliers have found a way to remain at the centre of the world's 
stage." (Harrison, 1997: 12). 
There has been a massive increase in international mergers and takeovers. 
Since 1990, mergers and acquisitions have accounted for a third to a half of 
all FDI flows (Held et ai, 1999: 243). International ownership of assets is 
facilitated by lower transaction costs, financial liberalization and deregulation. 
Between 1991 and 1996, 95 per cent of the 599 changes to national FDI 
regulations worldwide facilitated FDI in some way (ibid: 243). 
Even if firms continue to be domestically based, they may still be 
considerably affected by other firms' strategies of transnational production. 
There are many examples of companies which have remained domestically 
based, but which have invested heavily in capital equipment to replace labour 
and so reduce production costs to compete with firms using cheaper labour 
overseas (Ohmae, 1995). These replaced workers are therefore heavily, if 
indirectly, affected by the globalization of production. 
• Deregulation of capital, and subsequent capital mobility have not led to a 
transfer of resources from advanced economies to developing countries. 
Most FDI is highly concentrated in the First World and the NICs. 
Globalization has not produced a worldwide homogenous, integrated 
economy. Even proponents of a 'strong globalization' thesis admit the 
existence of the 'global triad' (Ohmae, 1995) of the EU, North America and 
East and Southeast Asia. This triad accounted for 87 per cent of world 
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manufacturing output and 80 per cent of merchandise exports in 1994, and in 
1993 provided over 90 per cent of world FDI (Dicken, 1998: 60, 61). The 
share of FDI received by developing countries has actually decreased from 
41 per cent in 1994 to 19 per cent in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2001: 6). 
Giddens also accepts that the development of globalization is uneven and 
'fragments as it co-ordinates' (Giddens, 1990: 175). Much of the African 
continent is excluded from the worldwide division of labour and the Asian 
NICs continue to have business systems, which are distinct from those 
prevalent in the West. In addition, three-quarters of world merchandise 
exports come from the world's core economies, and 60 per cent of this trade 
is conducted within these same countries. However, this economic 
imbalance does not reduce the effect of increasing integration on the affected 
nations. The fact that the vast majority of trade takes place in the North 
rather than the South merely demonstrates the relative wealth of the two 
regions (Mann, 1997). Furthermore, Williams has analysed the role and 
impact of the World Bank in Africa, making the case that it is a 'liberal 
imperialist' institution, which imposes neo-liberal and global integrationist 
policies upon Africa, albeit in an attempt to remedy that continent's poverty 
(Williams, 1999). 
• The world economy is regionalising not globalising, and the existence of 
regional trading blocs, such as NAFTA, the EU and ASEAN, proves that 
sub-global regions can control footloose capital. Trade, investment and 
financial flows are concentrated in the triangle of Europe, North America 
and Japan, referred to as "G3". If they did co-ordinate policies, the G3 
could powerfully influence financial markets and the international 
economy, as evidenced by the formation of regional trading blocs. 
Although regionalism entails a reconstitution of political borders, regionalism 
still implies territorially-based political projects. Globalization, on the other 
hand, implies the increasing irrelevance of geography. However, the 
distinction between regionalization and globalization is, in fact, a false 
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dichotomy. Scholte lists five ways in which regionalization has in fact 
facilitated the process of globalization: 
• Standardization and harmonization of technologies, procedures and 
documentation facilitates supraterritorial connections 
• Regional common markets provide convenience and economies of 
scale for distribution and sale of global products 
• Regional customs unions facilitate transborder production 
• Governance at the regional level is effective in administering global 
norms of, for example, human rights or technical standardization 
• The growth of transborder consciousness prepares people for the 
construction of suprastate frameworks 
(Scholte, 2000). 
In fact, the economic crisis in East Asia brought into question the extent to 
which regional powers other than the US can influence financial markets. 
Although Japan, the obvious regional leader, at first refused to help stricken 
East Asian economies by opening its markets, it did propose providing money 
to redeem the debts of the other nations through a new multinational financial 
institution. The realization of this proposal would have led to money being 
redirected away from loans to the US, and consequently to a large rise in US 
interest rates (Johnson: 1998:658). Japan also proposed the following 
measures: keeping economic and trade links in place until the East Asian 
economies had had time to recover; transferring technology to enable the 
affected countries to move up the production chain and out of direct 
competition with China; guaranteeing sovereign bonds from East Asian states 
and banks, without imposing IMF-like conditions (Hughes, 1999). At a 
meeting on 19 November 1997 in Manila, the embryonic Japanese institution 
was abandoned and the IMF was entrusted with finding a rescue package. It 
made sizeable loans to Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, on condition 
of austerity budgets, high interest rates and sales of local business to foreign 
companies. It also challenged the distinctive model of economic organization 
in those countries. The influx of untaxable funds undercut women's savings 
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investment co-ops in South Korea and food and fuel subsidies in Indonesia 
came to an end. These measures were completely in keeping with the 
laissez-faire ideology of the IMF22. Johnson claims there is 
"... almost no chance that the IMF one-size-fits all remedies would 
succeed. Its economic ideologues not only know nothing about East 
Asia, they believe there is no need for them to know anything." 
(Johnson, 1998:659). 
Though it may not be quite as economically powerful as previously, the US is 
still easily the most powerful single political and economic power in the world 
and the assumptions of US policymakers are embodied in the strategies of 
international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. These 
hegemonic institutions have the power to impose its 'solutions' on East Asia, 
even when these measures prove inappropriate. It seems, therefore, that 
even the powerful East Asian part of the triad has proved pOlitically incapable 
of bucking the trend of neo-liberal economic globalization while the US and 
the international financial institutions are opposed to doing so. 
In summary, globalization is clearly a genuine phenomenon, which has been 
gathering momentum in recent decades, even though it has roots in earlier 
economic and political processes. The internationalization of production and 
trade has lead to a rapid increase in transborder relations with respect to both 
extensiveness and intensity. Regionalization, rather than being an obstacle 
to globalization, has become a means of facilitating globalization. Although 
economic and cultural differences and inequalities persist between different 
regions and different countries within regions, these phenomena can be 
explained by viewing globalization as a continuing process rather than a state 
that has been reached. This is the position taken by advocates of the 
transformationalist thesis. 
22 There is a counter-example. In late 1998, the Japanese Miyazawa initiative did help the 
Malaysian government to reflate the economy and impose exchange controls against the 
expressed wishes of the IMF. 
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The transformationalist thesis 
Goldblatt et al (1997) define globalization as involving: 
"... a stretching of social relations across time and space such that 
day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening 
on the other side of the globe and the practices of highly localized 
groups and institutions can have significant global reverberations ... it 
is best thought of a multidimensional phenomenon applicable to a 
variety of forms of social action - economic, political, cultural or sites 
of social activity ... " (Goldblatt et ai, 1997: 271, my italics). 
Transformationalists, such as Held et al (1999), Went (2000), Mann (1997), 
Dicken (1998), Scholte (2000) and Appadurai (1990) argue: 
"We inhabit a globalizing rather than fully globalized world." 
(Scholte, 2000: 59, italics in original) 
Globalization is seen as an uneven rather than simple and linear, process. 
The different forms of globalization, including cultural, economic, or social 
processes, will have different geographical extensiveness, intensities, 
impacts, and degrees of institutionalization. This definition encompasses the 
differential integration of different nations into the world economy (Goldblatt 
et ai, 1997). As Appadurai states, individual state policy can playa role in 
regulating, and determining the nature and extent of the flows of people; 
images and information, ideas and ideologies and technology and capital 
(Appadurai, 1990). Japan, for example, has proved very receptive to ideas 
and new technology and has been a pro-active player in economic 
globalization, while being less receptive to immigration. For comparison, the 
opposite might be true of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, rather than promoting 
convergence among different parts of the world, globalization can lead, at 
least initially, to divergence. Mann notes that there are varied patterns in the 
extent to which aspects of globalization touch different areas of the world 
(Mann, 1997). He observes that states differ in size, power, geography, 
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degree of centralization, degree of democracy, level of development, 
infrastructural power, geopolitical power, and national indebtedness. As the 
state is still the main legal and pOlitical entity through which the forces of 
globalization are mediated, it is likely that the changes it brings will also be 
differently embodied. Chapters Six to Eight will show how the institutions of 
the Japanese national model of capitalism and the gender order in Japan 
combine with the pressures of economic and cultural globalization to produce 
a new gendered division of labour in Japan. 
Neo-liberal hyperglobalizers view globalization as proceeding from 
microprocesses, particularly advances in information technology (Castells, 
1996; Ohmae, 1995), which create reflexive global consumers and the 
technology to serve their needs. In contrast, Marxists tend to view 
globalization as the consequence of the logic of capital accumulation. 
However, those who do not believe that globalization is fully institutionalized 
tend to see a role for the agency of states, networks, social groups and 
transnational organizations in promoting globalization or shaping the way it is 
realized. Global economic change, for example, is partially attributable to the 
actions of states as they try to respond to domestic economic crisis (although 
it should be noted that these domestic economic crises often stem from 
external shocks over which states have little control (Weiss, 1998). Sklair 
summarizes the roles of transnational corporations, states and financial 
institutions and actors in driving globalization. These roles include 
introducing flexible production methods, integrating production into global 
commodity and production changes, integrating sourcing and location 
strategies and embarking upon strategic alliances with other firms (Sklair, 
1997). However, Sklair also posits the existence of a 'transnational capitalist 
class', made up of TNC executives, globalizing bureaucrats, politicians and 
professionals, and consumer elites, particularly merchants and media. 
Members of this class tend to consider themselves citizens of the world, 
rather than of their country of birth, and have outward-oriented global 
perspectives. They have often attended the same business schools, where 
they have absorbed the same approaches to economic management. This 
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class, he argues, exercise a disproportionate influence over the rest of 
society through their occupation of interlocking positions on the boards of not 
only companies, but also think tanks, charities, universities and sport, art and 
science bodies (ibid). The authority exercized by Japanese executives 
returning from US business schools with MSAs is an example of this influence 
(Dore, 2000). The 'hard' networks of international diplomacy are being 
bypassed by far more fluid and ongoing 'soft' networks of the officials of 
international bodies (Mann, 1997). 
Went goes further. He argues that the concept of globalization is 'abused' by 
the transnational capital class to legitimate and encourage more globalization 
(Went, 2000). For example, he describes politicians justifying harsh policies 
as necessary responses to an internationalized economy, even though these 
politicians have created the very requirements for the response (for example, 
the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria). They point to growing 
economic interpenetration to justify taking part in more international 
organizations like the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In other 
words, globalization is both a project and a discourse used to legitimize the 
adoption of laissez-faire economic policies. 
However, the use of the discourse of globalization by advocates of neo-liberal 
economic pOlicies, does not mean that the phenomenon of globalization does 
not exist. Even those opposed to 'globalization,23, such as protestors at the 
'Sattle of Seattle'., are taking advantage of global networks and ideas to battle 
23 Although dubbed 'anti-globalization protestors', it would be more accurate to describe the 
actions of these protestors as 'anti neo-liberal economic globalization'. The networks they 
establish are facilitated by the global processes described by Keck and Sikkink (1998) and 
Cohen and Rai (2000). Furthermore, their protests are aimed at pOlicies, institutions and 
companies, which they see as violating an (implicitly) global standard of human rights and 
working conditions, of the type described in the works of Keck and Sikkink (1998), Sassen 
(1996) and Neysmith and Chen (2002). 
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against what they see as non-democratic and unaccountable global 
institutions. 
2.2 The State 
This section will describe and assess the validity of the most important claims 
made about the impact of globalization upon the state. It will discuss the 
proposition that the state has less capacity to govern now than it did during 
most of the twentieth century and the reasons for this perspective. It will then 
look at the opposing contention that states can maintain their political 
centrality and economic position by adapting to changing economic and 
political circumstances. The final part of this section will show that state 
regulation of the economy and society continues to be entirely necessary, 
although the nature of that regulation has changed. 
The declining power of the state 
The modern state is characterized by a tightening of relations between the 
state and society (rather than just the state and elites), and the stretching of 
social relations over national, rather than merely local, terrain. This 
deepening and expanding of state power has been termed 'social caging' 
(Mann, 1997). The role and functions of the state, or to be more precise, the 
majority of states in the Northern hemisphere, increased exponentially during 
the twentieth century~ (The same generalization cannot made about states in 
the Southern hemisphere, many of which lack the capacity to govern the 
economy or society. Wars and ethnic conflicts in Africa have greatly 
stimulated transborder flows of people. Africa's refugee population grew from 
300,000 in 1960 to 3.5 million in 1981, Held et ai, 1999:301). From the time 
of the Great Depression of the 1930s onwards, First World states assumed 
responsibility for protection of their population's welfare and levels of 
employment against fluctuations in the international economy by employing 
various instruments such as economic protectionism externally and models of 
corporatism internally. The Bretton Woods institutions, developed after the 
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Second World War, attempted to prevent states from returning to 
destabilising economic nationalism. States became responsible to 
international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Sank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which were designed to enforce trade liberalization and maintain 
exchange rate stability. Domestically, however, states continued to employ 
different models of economic management (Cox, 2000; Gilpin, 2000). 
Different national models of capitalism emerged based on the institutions 
extant in each country: this will be explored further in Section 2.3. 
The stagflation of the 1970s showed the limits to state control over national 
economies. Furthermore, as Wallace argues, three recent 'divergencies' that 
have contributed to individual sovereign states being unable to control the 
trajectory of change in the world economy (Wallace, 1990): 
• Economic change has become decoupled from the demand for resources. 
The introduction of less resource-intensive production, overproduction in 
agriculture and the increase in the proportion of First World production 
accounted for by services rather than goods means that economic growth 
does not necessarily correspond to increased production of resources. 
• Production has become decoup/ed from employment. 
Manufacturing jobs are increasingly 'exported' to low-wage economies, while 
new jobs in First World countries are increasingly concentrated in the service 
sector. 
• Financial flows have superseded flows of goods 
Transborder flows of capital and credit have exceeded flows of goods and 
services since the 1970s, encouraging governments to manipulate exchange 
rates to gain comparative advantage. 
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The result is what Lash and Urry (1987) call disorganized capitalism; a 
system where labour and other practices are developed in 'global cities' and 
then universalized; state sovereignty declines and state policy instruments 
lose their effectiveness. This situation has been described as 'the retreat of 
the state' (Strange, 2000). There are at least two important caveats here. 
Firstly, economic development in the poorest countries has the potential to 
increase the capacity of the state (Mann, 1997). Secondly, even the most 
overtly neo-liberal states have failed to reduce the size of the public sector, 
cut their total budgets, or trim the scope of their regulation (Scholte, 2000). 
Not only do states appear to have a decreasing capacity for economic 
management, but non-state based identities are growing in importance 
among their citizens. The former satellite states of the Soviet Union, for 
example, have seen a huge growth in ethnonationalisms. Scotland, Corsica, 
and the Basque country too have substantial sub-state identity movements. 
This trend is encouraged by an increasing potential for independent 
economic viability, if, for example, the sUb-states are full participants in 
regional blocs, like the European Union. Improvements in information 
technology have made it easier for religious adherents, political activists, 
ethnic and sexual minorities, women, and others to share information and 
build solidarity with their counterparts in other countries. This development 
has not only grown organically out of technological change, but is also a 
pragmatic political strategy. Such groups might achieve a more sympathetic 
hearing at the international level rather than the national level, and combine 
to lobby at venues where transnational policies are developed. For instance, 
business lobbyists and trade unions keep offices near the IMF and the EU 
institutions; and anti-capitalist protestors won massive publicity for their 
actions in at the 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999, in Prague in 2000 as so much of 
the world's media was present to record, respectively, the meetings 'of the 
WTO; and the IMF and World Bank summit. 
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Again, though, it is important not to exaggerate the depth of these 
transborder connections. The vast majority of connections between 
individuals and groups take place within the nation state and the 
overwhelming majority of civic organizations are based within the state. What 
is more, the international connections between most anti-capitalist protestors 
quickly faded after the Prague and Seattle protests. Differences in opinion 
between members who appear to have the same interests often become more 
apparent as communications between them improve. Feminists, for instance, 
tend to be supporters of different types of feminism - liberal, radical, socialist, 
Black, eco (Scholte, 2000) - and some groups formed to advance women's 
rights eschew the label feminist altogethe~4. 
The 'myth of the powerless state' 
In The myth of the powerless state, Linda Weiss (1998) challenges the notion 
that globalization has rendered the state powerless. She uses evidence from 
East Asia, Sweden and Germany to support her thesis that the most 
economically successful states continue to be governed by state-embedded 
institutions. Furthermore, different state capacities will impact upon how 
states adjust to changes in the international economic environment. She 
disputes that the state is powerless in the face of globalization for three 
reasons. 
Firstly, Weiss shows that states have successfully adapted to changing 
circumstances, . adopting different pOlicies depending on the regime'S 
historical priorities and its capacity for transformation. As a supporting 
example, she cites the Japanese government's success in protecting 
24 The All China Women Federation and its local branches, for example, work on domestic 
violence in urban and rural areas; the employment problems of migrant women workers in 
Special Economic Zones and urban areas, and organize public education around the 
phenomena of female infanticide and the abandonment of baby girls. Yet they reject the 
label 'feminist' as being "Western" and inapplicable to China (China Rights Forum, 1995). 
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employment since the two oil crises of 1973 and the early 1980s. However, 
Chapter Four will show that this success was at the cost of the female 
secondary labour force and large-scale underemployment of women. 
Chapter Three shows that, in the late 1990s, achieving even full male 
employment has proved rather more difficult for the Japanese state. It is 
entirely likely though that individual states' ways of adapting to the exigencies 
of globalization should take different path-dependent forms (see Section 2.3). 
Secondly, the state is portrayed as the 'midwife' rather than the victim of 
globalization. Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, in particular, are 
offered as examples of states that have encouraged the offshore relocation of 
production plants, promoting alliances between domestic and overseas firms 
and creating incentives for overseas investment. Chapter Four will 
summarize the considerable evidence for this. Other phenomena that can 
be cited as examples include governments' attempts to encourage FDI by 
adopting various measures such as non-discriminatory treatment of foreign 
firms, deregulation of certain sectors, such as telecommunications, various 
financial and fiscal incentives and various types of employment and labour 
policy (Wade, 1996). In other words, the globalization can be seen as a 
political project, as well as a transformative process. 
However this paradox does not disprove the retreat of the state. A state 
choosing to constrain its freedom, or give up control of some of its functions, I 
nonetheless ends up with less freedom and control, in the same way that a 
debtor agreeing to a tough repayments arrangement ends up with less 
disposable income (Strange, 2000). In fact, globalization can undermine 
state autonomy and political effectiveness, while at the same time, leading to 
an extension of state intervention and regulation to promote competitiveness 
and marketization (Cerny, 2000). 
Thirdly, Weiss assumes the emergence of the catalytic state, which attempts 
to maximize control over its national economy through assuming a dominant 
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position in alliances of states, private sector groups and transnational 
institutions. Examples would include Australia's efforts to build the Asia-
Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC), in a way that would 
encourage other states to adopt its own relatively liberal approach to trade 
and industry, and the US's attempts to do likewise through NAFTA. Even if 
this does not indicate a decline in the role of the state, it certainly seems to 
indicate a transformation in the level of governance from a national to 
supranational level. 
In sum, . some states have been pro-active players in the furthering of 
globalization, although the impact of the strategies they have adopted 
produced different results domestically. It also limits their future freedom of 
action. Some states have also attempted to maximize their economic power 
by participating in transnational alliances. However this indicates a change in 
the shift in the level of governance of the nation state. Other transformations 
in modes of governance under globalization, all of which have implications for 
the state, are presented in the next section. 
The transformation of the state 
The first point that it is necessary to make is that the state and the market are 
not totally counterposed. Polanyi made a compelling case that, rather than 
being an organically ariSing and self-regulating mechanism, 
" ... the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent 
intervention on the part of the government which imposed the market 
organization on society for noneconomic ends." (Polanyi, 1944:250). 
Polanyi traced a 'double movement' of two organising principles of modern 
society. The first is the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at 
establishment of a self-regulating market, supported by the trading classes. 
These classes aim to achieve their goals by laissez-faire economics and free 
trade. The second organising prinCiple is that of social protection, aimed at 
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protecting man (sic) and nature, relying on the support of those adversely 
affected by capitalism, using protective legislation, restrictive associations 
and other means of intervention. Polanyi further argued that the classification 
of labour as a commodity, is, and always has been, fictive, and that working 
conditions, hours of work, and the basic wage are determined outside the 
market. (The alternative would be a situation of constant strikes, where 
workers refused to work until the market wage was reached). The different 
roles played by trade unions, the state and other public bodies in this process 
depended on the character of these institutions and the organization of the 
management of production (cf. Section 2.3). Polanyi added that without 
some state intervention in the form of central banking and the management of 
the monetary system, the capitalist system would be constantly under threat. 
The state also continues to have a crucial 'ordering role,' in conflict situations 
(Falk, 1997), although even warfare seems to be less and less often a conflict 
between states but within states, where national identification has broken 
down or where outside forces intervene to protect important economic or 
strategic interests. 
Furthermore, efficient production depends on workers being healthy and 
educated, with the state providing the public goods to ensure this. Even 
James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, has attributed steps taken 
to improve health and education, reduce poverty and promote gender equity 
Vietnam, China, Brazil, India, Uganda and Bangladesh 'first and foremost to 
action by the developing countries themselves' (Wolfensohn, 2002). This 
latter role for the state though is threatened by neo-liberal globalization, 
which creates downward pressures on public-sector welfare guarantees 
(Scholte, 2000). The state sector is not contracting. In fact there is a body of 
literature which positively correlates 'openness' (measured as share of trade 
in GDP) and the size of government and government expenditure. A high 
trade share make states very vulnerable to outside shocks, and they 
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therefore need a larger public sector to counterbalance the potential negative 
social effects (Evans, 1997). 
In spite of the need for state regulation, state sovereignty is in decline (Held, 
1995). F alk (1997) has gone so far as to declare 'an end to sovereignty'. 
Governance has become more multi-layered as policies are increasingly 
formulated at a SUb-state or suprastate level (Strange, 1995). The devolution 
of power downwards is demanded politically, as SUb-state nationalisms 
increase, or membership of a supranational organization, such as the EU, 
make devolved power more practicable. Regional governments, for example, 
lobby the EU directly rather than through their national governments. The 
most obvious example of the yielding of national economic power is the 
adoption of the euro in 11 European countries25• Multilateral regulatory 
arrangements do not only deal with economic questions though: challenges 
such as AIDS, global terrorism, and environmental protection can only be 
countered through transborder agreements and policing. 
In some cases the character of international organizations has changed in 
such a way that they have become global governance agencies (Scholte, 
2000). In 1994 signatories of the GATT, signed the Marrakesh agreement, 
which established the WTO. Articles XVI - 4 and XIV - 5 read as follows: 
"4. Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations 
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the 
annexed Agreements. 
5. No reservations may be made in respect of any provision of this 
Agreement [ .... J ". 
(World Trade Organization, 2001). 
25 The liberal intergovernmental position would argue that this is a positive sum game and 
that by 'pooling' sovereignty, states can act in concert to implement policies that they would 
have been unable to implement as individual units. However, this still implies a reduction in 
the power of action of individual states. 
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Similarly, the OECD operates a regime of 'policy surveillance', releasing 
authoritative assessment of the macroeconomic conditions for each of its 29 
members, and recommending policy adjustments. Perhaps reflecting the 
continuing validity of the 'double movement' model, the International Labour 
Movement (ILO) monitors the observance of its 174 Conventions and 181 
recommendations (Scholte, 2000). 
Not only are national states losing their power, as it is transferred to supra-
and subnational tiers of governance, but increasingly unelected groups and 
individuals are being formally and informally incorporated into the decision-
making process. Global firms and global civil society actors have become 
instrumental in policy-making process (Helleiner, 1996, Marchand, 2000). 
Business executives have participated in WTO talks, representing their 
governments (Scholte, 2000). The International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions and has agreed to work with the World Bank to monitor privatization 
programmes and to make suggestions about how to improve the protection of 
workers' rights (IFCTU, 2001). There is still a democratic deficit in the 
management of the global economy, for the following reasons: 
• The extent to which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
represent their constituencies is a matter of debate 
• Participation via electronic means is open to a tiny fraction of the 
world's population 
• The neo-liberal conception of· people exercising real choice, 
through increased individual freedom in the making of contracts 
and in purchasing, favour the rich and the skilled 
disproportionately. 
Held (1996) and Scholte (2000), among others, have proposed ways to 
democratize the supraterritorial bodies, but as Cerny (2000) points out, 
economic globalization has yet to produce political globalization. 
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Weiss, as stated above, introduced the conception of the state as a 'midwife' 
to globalization (Weiss, 1998). States have facilitated cross-border trade, as 
well as establishing free trade areas, customs unions, and a common market. 
It is one of the paradoxes of globalization that states attempt to cope with 
globalization by adopting strategies that promote it (Cerny, 2000). Cerny 
argues that the state is transforming itself from a nation state to a 'competition' 
state, which tries to maintain or improve its position in the world economy by 
making itself attractive to foreign capital. This seems undeniable, when one 
looks at the changes states made to their national investment regimes (Table 
2.1). Of 150 regulatory changes made by 69 countries, 147 made the regime 
more favourable to FDI. 
Table 2.1. National regulatoOl changes. 1991-2000 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of 35 43 57 49 64 65 76 60 63 69 
countries that 
introduced 
changes in their 
investment 
regimes 
Total number of 82 79 102 113 112 114 151 146 140 150 
regulatory 
changes 
Number of 80 79 101 108 106 98 135 136 131 147 
regulatory 
changes more 
favourable to 
FOI 
Number of 2 1 2 6 16 16 9 9 
regulatory 
changes less 
favourable to 
FOI 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001, Promoting Unkages, Box Table 1.1.1. p. 
6, including liberalizing changes of charges aimed at strengthening market functioning as well 
as increasing incentives including changes aimed at increasing control as well as reducing 
incentives. 
Cox takes the Gramscian conception of the state as a network of ideology and 
practices through which the elite wins support for its own agenda, and sees 
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3 
sees transnational organizations as based on the consent of such states. 
The logical conclusion of this argument is that states are increasingly serving 
a non-territorial constituency, as the state is converted into 
" ... an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to 
the perceived exigencies of the global economy" (Cox, 2000: 28). 
Generally, then, the state is continuing to exercize a vital regulatory role in an 
age of globalization, although some of its functions have shifted to the sub-
state or superstate level, leading to an increased salience of multi-level 
governance. Most states, under the direction of international financial 
institutions and multi-lateral trade agreements, are tending to move towards 
more neo-liberal policies and are seeing downward pressure on their ability to 
regulate. This encourages further globalization, as demands for regulation 
must then be addressed to supranational level. Suprastate levels of 
governance may be the only ones capable of dealing with the 
internationalization of finance and production, as well as environmental and 
human rights issues. However, supranational institutions have not yet 
democratized. 
Although this section has dealt with changes in the nature of the state 
generally under globalization, the same process of globalization affects 
different regimes in different ways, depending on several factors including 
their role in the global production process, the way in which the process is 
refracted through existing institutions and culture, and the strength of 
resistance to the process in civil society (Wade 2000). These observations 
are very pertinent to the argument of this thesis that: 
• The Japanese state has been instrumental in deregulating the 
Japanese economy; 
• International institutions and transnational activism have been of key 
importance in shaping Japanese domestic legislation. 
The next section will discuss the importance of national institutions during 
times of transformation. 
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2.3 Historical Institutionalism 
Social scientists have long been divided over the relative contributions of the 
actions of agents and of structural forces to produce social and political 
phenomena. Methodological structuralism explains socio-political 
phenomena by looking at the structures, which impact upon a society, 
including, for example, capitalist development or patriarchy. These structures 
shape the needs and desires of actors. Methodological individualism, in 
contrast, sees the decisions and actions of rational actors, such as firms, 
groups or individuals as being paramount. Social or political institutions, 
according to this perspective, are the equilibrium outcome of decisions made 
by these actors. For example, actors form different political parties as the 
best way to achieve their pOlitical ends. Structure and agency have usually 
been presented as antinomies. However, . there is a body of theory, 
sometimes described as the 'structuration postulate' (Giddens, 1979). The 
structuration postulate sees individuals and groups as making decisions 
and/or being formed within the context of existing structures of society,' but 
also as playing a role in reproducing or reforming structures, and choosing 
actions based on the structures within a society. 
Having developed in reaction to the excesses of rational choice theory and 
behavioural ism (Peters, 1999), the historical institutional perspective in 
political science falls within the structuration school. There is some debate 
among historical institutionalists about exactly what can be classified as 
institutions. However, theorists generally extend their analysis beyond the 
formal, constitutionally recognized parts of the polity, to those 
"... formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organizations ... [and] ... structure of the polity or 
political economy." (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938). 
Institutions are described as 
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" ... rang[ing] from specific characteristics of government institutions, to 
the more overarching structure of the state to the nation's normative 
social order." (Ikenberry, 1988: 226). 
Historical institutionalism does not deny the import of exogenous forces, such 
as class struggle from a Marxist point of view, but instead argues that 
institutions structure the way these forces impact upon different societies or 
polities. The impact of ideas in defining institutions and altering the basic 
and strategic preferences of actors is also taken into account (Hall and 
Taylor, 1998). Weir examines the impact of anti-statist individualism and a 
strong work ethic in shaping employment policy during the Reagan era (Weir, 
1992). Historical institutionalism differs from the work of new institutionalists, 
such as Aoki (2000, 2001), in that it emphasizes the inequalities of power of 
different groups to structure and operate effectively within institutions. Hall 
describes how novel economic ideas, combined with the relative capacities of 
the media and trade union movement, were refracted through the British 
political system to produce a framework in which monetarism was adopted as 
the solution to the economic difficulties of the 1970s (Hall, 1992). 
Explanations for the observation that, once an institution has been 
developed, it tends to. persist, fall into two categories: the rational choice, 
game theoretic or calculus approach and the cultural approach. In the former 
explanation, the existence of institutions helps agents to predict the 
behaviour of others. Actors are unlikely to deviate from norms of behaviour, 
as they will incur penalties for doing so (Aoki, 2002; Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
This is true up to a point. However, as some groups and individuals appear 
to have less favourable positions than others in the pre-existing institutions, 
and it seems an irrational choice for such actors to surrender the possibility of 
benefitting from change in the pre-existing order, in order to avoid short-term 
sanctions. A more convincing explanation is that of the 'culturalists', who 
argue that social norms facilitate the interpretation of events. In other words 
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"The values and preferences of political actors are not exogenous to 
political institutions, but develop within those institutions." 
(March and Olsen 1989: 40). 
Institutionalism generally has been an important tool for explaining the 
persistence of the distinctive features of East Asian, as opposed to Anglo-
American26, capitalism (Aoki, 2001, 2002; Dore, 2000). 
Because historical institutionalism emphasizes path dependency, it might be 
expected that it would not be able to predict change. Thelen and Steinmo, 
two of the main exponents of historical institutionalism, criticize some of its 
adherents for sometimes 'lapsing inadvertently into institutional determinism 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 16). They introduce the concept of 'institutional 
dynamism' to explain the changes that take place as institutions and political 
process interact cross-nationally and through time. They identify four sources 
of institutional dynamism: 
• Changes in the broad social and political context, where previously latent 
institutions assume a new importance27; 
• Changes in the socio-economic context or political balance of power, 
which produce a new situation where old institutions begin to serve 
different purposes as new actors gain a foothold within them; 
• Exogenous changes which produce a shift in the goals or strategies of 
existing institutions28; 
26 Anglo-American capitalism is typically characterized by being a purer form of liberal 
capitalism, that is driven by shareholder interests, as opposed to the East Asian development 
state model, which is driven by stakeholder interests (Dore, 2000) or the social market 
economy of European welfare states (Albert, 1998) 
27 Such was the case when the political events surrounding the Single European Act 
increased the importance of the European Court of Justice. 
28 Chapters Six and Seven describe how globalization has compelled Japanese corporations 
to alter their employment practice and how legislators have passed laws facilitating this 
change. 
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• Dynamic change, which occurs when actors adjust their strategies to 
accommodate changes in the institutions themselves 
(March and Olsen, 1989). 
The previous sections in this chapter have described the growing importance 
of international institutions and the declining power of the state. This chapter 
has also noted the increasingly rapid flows of ideas and ideologies in 
associated with the process of globalization. These changes offer new 
opportunities for activists to adapt their campaigning strategies. Working 
transnationally is a pragmatic strategy for activists in that it : 
• Multiplies the channels of access to the international system. 
• Makes international resources available to new actors in domestic 
political and social struggles. 
• Blurs the boundaries of the state, and therefore helps to helping to 
transform the practice of national sovereigntl9 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest that activism is most likely to be able to 
secure a transnational basis, where it is concerned with preventing physical 
harm or securing legal equality of opportunity. This is not as straightforward 
as it first appears. Definitions of 'harm' do vary considerably between 
cultures3o• Legal equality of opportunity is also open to debate: for example it 
could certainly be argued that in order for meaningful equality to be achieved, 
states should initiate affirmative action for traditionally disadvantaged groups. 
Some Japanese feminists have also argued that formal legal equality in the 
workforce between men and women has led to a worsening of women's 
working conditions as they are forced to adopt the 'male model' of working 
long hours (Ueno, 1996). 
29 As described in Section 1.3, footnote 7. 
30 President Jomo Kenyatta, for instance, famously defended the tradition of female 
circumcision/genital mutilation in Kenya (Greer, 2000). 
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There is little work in the historical institutionalist school that specifically 
addresses gender and the role played by the traditional composition of the 
household and reproductive economy in forming national institutions. 
However historical institutionalism does offer offers valuable insights to an 
analysis of how globalization impacts upon women working in Japan, insofar 
as it addresses the socially constructed nature of institutions, markets and 
economic processes. As Chapters Four and Five will show, Japanese labour 
institutions were formed in the context of the Cold War and of a homosocial 
norm. The economic and social changes wrought by globalization and 
refracted through the Japanese state are impacting upon the Japanese 
gender order (Chapters Six and Seven) and campaigners for Japanese 
women's rights are adjusting their strategies to accommodate institutional 
changes (Chapter Eight). 
2.4 Conclusion 
There has been considerable geographical reorganization of manufacturing 
production and consumption, resulting in global and regional reorganization 
of labour, as manufacturing employment is transferred from developed to 
developing economies. This has had reciprocal effects on the division of 
labour in developed countries. This reorganization is both the result of the 
logic of capital accumulation and of the political priorities of the world's core 
economies. The rewards of deregulation have been very unevenly 
distributed within and between societies. 
I 
The process of globalization, too, has not been uniform across the globe. The 
world economic system is not entirely 'globalized' but the integration between 
the leading economic regions in the world is having significant implications 
for the people who live there. In fact, one of the most striking geographical 
changes resulting from 'globalization' is the way that East Asia has increased 
its relative power in the world economic system. 
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The state continues to be a vital territorial unit in which most laws are passed. 
Furthermore nationality continues to be a core component of the identity of 
most people in First World countries. In fact, it is the activities of states in 
acting to re-re'gulate the economy that have been vital in facilitating 
globalization. Indeed, regulation has been shown to be essential for the 
continuance of any economic system. However, globalization has also 
produced changes in the nature of the state. States in general are losing 
power to supranational and subnational bodies, and policy choices are being 
constrained by the fear of losing foreign direct investment. Increasingly, non-
elected actors, such as business people, NGOs and other pressure groups 
are being incorporated into the policy-making process at all levels. Despite a 
hegemonic discourse in favour of free trade and laissez faire capitalism, the 
particular policy mix each state chooses varies according to its political, 
social and cultural complexion, as well as the demands made on it by non-
state actors. 
A state's institutions contribute to structuring the behaviour of actors within 
those institutions, and leading actors to continually reproduce those 
institutions. However, institutions can also be reformed by those actors 
within, or outside, the state. In times of flux, such as that occasioned by the 
dislocations of globalization, institutions may become dysfunctional, and at 
these times, are particularly likely to be reformed. The success these actors 
have in achieving reform will depend on their power and the strategies they 
employ. 
For the reasons stated above, the insights of mainstream literature about 
globalization, the state and institutions, are an important theoretical basis for 
this thesis. However, as I have noted throughout this chapter, this literature 
does not sufficiently take into account the importance of gender. 
Globalization, state policies, and social, political and economic institutions all 
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impact differently upon men and women. The following chapter will therefore 
critically review the theoretical literature about gender and globalization. 
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Chapter Three: 
Gender and Globalization: A Critical Review 
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3.0. Introduction 
The mainstream theories of globalization, the state and historical 
institutionalism discussed in Chapter Two, have paid little attention to gender. 
Globalization, however, has very different effects upon men and women, as 
this and subsequent chapters will show. Feminise1 critiques of global 
restructuring therefore fill important gaps in the mainstream literature on 
globalization. Evidently, women are not a homogenous group. As many of 
the theorists cited in this chapter have pointed out, the impact of globalization 
on individual women is mediated by social and cultural factors, such as their 
'race', class, education and I or national citizenship. This thesis is a case 
study of the gendered impact of the processes of globalization in one national 
context. 
One of the central aims of this thesis is to contribute to the feminist debate 
about the impact of globalization upon women by bringing insights from the 
case of Japan. Japan provides a unique and interesting case study of the 
gendered impacts of globalization. One of the most notable transformations 
associated with globalization is the increasing integration of Asian, and 
particularly East and Southeast Asian, countries into the global economy 
(Katz, 1998; Dicken, 1998; Arrifin, 1999; JETRO, 2001 )32. Consequently, 
many case studies of the relationship between globalization and gender have 
focussed upon this region (Lim, 1997; ILO/SEAPAT, 1998a, 1998b; Chang 
and Ling, 2000; Gills, 2001; Neysmith and Chen, 2002). Japan has been a 
pro-active player in the process of the globalization of production, which has 
had such profound effects upon the Asian continent. However, as Japan is an 
affluent, industrialized liberal democracy, the experiences of Japanese women 
31 I am aware that my use of the term 'feminist' to describe some of the analyses cited in this 
chapter, particularly those of male theorists, may be contested. To clarify: I am using the 
term 'feminist' to describe texts which put gender at the centre of any analysis of individual 
lives and economic, pOlitical, social and cultural institutions; which see most men as having 
more privilege and social power than most women within social groups; and appear to find this 
problematic. 
32 The reasons for this are examined in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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differ markedly from those of women workers elsewhere in Asia (even given 
that the rest of Asia is extremely diverse). The Japanese case also differs 
markedly from that of other First World nations. As historical institutionalism 
suggests, the specific economic, political, social and cultural institutions of 
Japan mean that it is adjusting to globalization in a way that is nuanced by its 
history. For reasons discussed later in Chapter Four, Japan differs from other 
First World states, in that it has followed a model of capitalism, which is 
markedly different from the Anglo-American model. In addition, such cultural 
phenomena as the persistence of the ideal of the three-generation family, and 
homosocial norms have a distinctive effect upon women's reproductive and 
productive work, and strategies of activism. 
In order to discern whether the impact of globalization on women working in 
Japan differs from or resembles the impact on women elsewhere in the globe, 
it is necessary establish the relationship between gender and globalization 
generally, and women in the labour market in particular. This chapter will 
therefore critically review attempts to 'gender' the analysis of globalization. 
The chapter also shows how feminist analysis augments and enhances the 
analyses outlined in Chapter Two. Sections 3. 1 and 3.2 develop the idea of 
globalization. Section 3.1 discusses the macro-level feminist critiques of 
globalization and the gendered discourse surrounding it. Section 3.2 
summarizes the claims made about the impact of globalization upon women, 
both generally, and in terms of their partiCipation in the labour force; as well as 
noting the role of the state in facilitating or controlling women's employment. 
Section 3.3 examines the strategies of activism employed by women in the 
changing governance structures emerging in the context of globalization. The 
existence of this activism shows how globalization is associated with attempts 
to establish a global standard of basic human rights, and of equality before the 
law; the sites of resistance chosen by activists demonstrate the changing 
position of the nation state in an increasing globalized political economy. 
Historical institutionalism is particularly relevant to those feminist analyses 
which draw out how global and local forces interact, and to case where the 
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experience of Japanese women appears to contradict general trends. The 
conclusion to this chapter, Section 3.4 
• lists general hypotheses about gender and globalization 
• discusses what gendered analyses of globalization add to the 
mainstream theories outlined in Chapter Two 
• suggests areas where the study of Japan can contribute to the feminist 
debate about the impact of globalization. 
The extent of the validity of these general hypotheses in the Japanese case is 
examined in later chapters. 
3.1. Macro-level feminist analyses of globalization 
Although some of the earliest examinations of the globalization of production 
were the work of feminist theorists33, there has until recently been a dearth of 
feminist work examining the phenomenon of globalization at the macro-level. 
This has been variously attributed to a feminist trend to examine more micro-
level concerns (Chang and Ling, 2000; Freeman, 2001; Eschle, 2002) or the 
desire to maintain a marginal and critical position with regard to masculine 
'grand theories of globalization that ignore gender as a critical tool' (Freeman, 
2001: 1007). However, feminists have increasingly recognized the importance 
of transnational corporations and international financial institutions on the 
world stage (Bergeron, 2001), and argued that as the globalization of 
economic relations proceeds, then there is an increasing need to examine 
women's issues from a global perspective (Waylen, 1999, 2000). Recent 
33 See, for example, Diane Elson and Ruth Pearson's 1981 article 'The subordination of 
women and the internationalization of factory production' and Patricia Fernandez-Kelly's 1983 
work For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier, focussing 
on women working for US companies in maquiladora on the US Mexican border. 
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years have therefore seen substantial 'gendering' of the analysis of 
globalization (see, for example, World Development, special issue, 1999; 
Meyer and Prugl 1999; Marchand and Runyan, 2000; Kelly et ai, 2001; Signs 
special issue, 2001; Peterson, forthcoming). 
These feminist macro-level critiques of globalization have focussed on two 
areas: 
• Critiques of neo-liberal economic globalization 
• Analyses of the gendered, and disempowering nature of the 
discourse around globalization. 
Nee-liberal economic globalization 
Feminist theoretical critiques of neo-liberal economic globalization are an 
extension of more general methodological and normative critiques of orthodox 
economic theory. The promoters of globalization argue for the free flow of 
goods, services and finance (though not of labour) across national borders, 
and deregulation of markets, including labour markets, within national borders. 
Essentially this is a neo-liberal agenda, associated with the laissez faire 
economic policies, which have became hegemonic since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Proponents of neo-liberalism typically subscribe to the 
assumptions of neo-classical economics (Spike Peterson, forthcoming), and 
many of the criticisms made of the discourse surrounding globalization can be 
and have been applied to feminist critiques of neo-classical economic thought 
generally (Brodie, 1994). The rational economic actor (homo economicus) is 
conceived as an independent, atomistic, self-interested acquisitional unit 
(Brodie, 1994, Marchand, 1996a, Peterson, forthcoming). This actor is based 
upon, and conceived of by 'a particular subset of humans (elite males) in a 
particular context (modern Europe) (Spike Peterson, forthcoming). Where 
women are considered at all in classical economic theory they are 
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seen as dependents (Pujol, 1995)34. This assumption allows employers to 
rationalize paying women lower wages than men, as it is assumed that their 
wages are only supplemental to those of a male breadwinner. 
Whereas, according to neo-classical economics, a less-regulated labour 
market should more accurately reflect the human capital and/or productivity of 
individual workers, in fact more market-oriented economies tend to have a 
wider wage gap based on gender35. In the absence of government regulation, 
cultural factors will determine the level of gender inequality in wages. If 
cultural influences lead some employers to discriminate against potential 
female employees, then the laws of supply and demand dictate that a wage 
gap will appear (Meng, 1996). Some commentators have even presented 
evidence that women tend to have higher productivity and lower wages than 
their male counterparts (Lim, 1997; Elson and Pearson, 1997). 
As neo-classical economics tends to be blind to the differential effects of 
laissez-faire policies on men and women, the dominant arguments in favour of 
neo-liberal global restructuring are made in gender-neutral terms, and speak 
of the aggregate benefits of an international free market. Marchand (1996a) 
in her analysis of NAFTA, argues that the faux objectivity of economics means 
that economic issues have often been decided on the basis of inconclusive 
34 More sophisticated analyses than this do exist within neo-classical economics, for example 
the collection of essays in Schultz's (1995) edited collection Investment in women's human 
capital. However they do not represent the dominant view in mainstream economics. 
35 Australia, France and New Zealand, for example, all require both public and private 
employers to write a plan outlining how they propose to attain gender equality among their 
employees. In all three countries women earn, on average, over 80 per cent of men's wages. 
In Canada, where the scope of equal pay legislation is far narrower, and women cannot, for 
example, ask for legal comparisons to be made between their remuneration and that of men 
working at a different branch of the same company, the ratio is only just over 60 per cent. In 
India, where, as in many other developing countries, women work in the informal sector where 
it is very difficult to enforce equal pay legislation, and, in the formal sector, small firms are 
exempted from compliance, this figure drops to 52.7% (M1HitUi, 1998). 
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econometric models which rely upon unrealistic assumptions, such as full 
employment. This is however rather an overstatement, as it is now generally 
accepted within neo-classical economics that there can be market equilibrium 
at less than full employment. 
Furthermore pitching analyses at an aggregate level has meant that the 
differential impact of free trade on men and women and on ethnic groups was 
hidden. Even where recent work has been carried out at the micro-level, in an 
attempt to analyse the relationship between income inequality and retarded 
economic growth, this has been measured at the household level. 
'Household' measures pool male and female incomes, thus obscuring any 
relationship between economic change and rates of income inequality by sex 
(Seguino, 2000). 
Another shortcoming of conventional economic analysis of the labour market 
is that it looks only at the 'productive' economy of paid work. It does not take 
into account the unpaid 'reproductive' labour, which is essential to the 
productive economy's efficient functioning. The reproductive economy 
includes all those tasks, largely performed by women, which are essential to 
the economy but nonetheless, are not formally included in national economic 
statistics. These include caring for and maintaining the labour force, bringing 
up and socialising the next generation of workers and improving the 
interpersonal skills of workers (Elson, 1999). The caring work Japanese 
women are expected to carry out for their own or their partners' parents can be 
added to this list. The time spent carrying out these tasks very much affects 
women's capacity to engage in formal employment. As a result of what critics 
see as the blindness of neo-classical theory to the importance of the 
reproductive work, the proponents of neo-liberal economic globalization do not 
take into account that it will be largely women's 'infinitely elastic' reproductive 
work, such as extra child and elder care, that will make up the shortfall in state 
provided services. This will, of course, further limit their capability to 
partiCipate in the paid labour market on the same terms as men. In Chapter 
Seven, I shall examine how norms about women's reproductive work in Japan 
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shape women's career opportunities and legislation around labour and 
welfare; and how the forces of globalization are interacting with these existing 
institutions. 
The discourse of globalization 
The previous chapter presented the views of Went (2000), Hirst and 
Thompson (1996) and Sklair (1997) that globalization is used in elite 
discourse to legitimate the adoption of neo-liberal policies. Feminist theorists 
have added considerable depth to this insight in their analyses of how 
gendered discourse is used to 'naturalize' neo-liberal economic globalization. 
This is an extension of an important insight from feminist poststructuralists 
who have observed that language that is based on oppositions (male/female, 
presence/absence, mind/nature) (Cixous, 1992). These oppositions are not 
only binary, casting maleness as the opposite to femaleness, but also 
hierarchical, privileging masculinity. While (most) people are born as one sex 
or the other, gender is entirely learned, socially imposed, and internalized, 
rather than given. Not only does gender describe the characteristics of 
individuals, but it also becomes embedded in social institutions. The 
conflation of sex and gender, and the ostensible 'naturalness' of dichotomized 
and hierarchical thinking is the key to naturalizing power relations between 
men and women, which are in fact the outcome of social processes. 
Furthermore, the presentation of a patriarchal order which places the feminine 
as subordinate to the masculine as 'natural' 
"serves as the model for depoliticising exploitation more generally ... 
The ostensible 'naturalness' of sex difference and masculine 
dominance is then generalized to other forms of domination, which has 
the effect of legitimating them as equally 'natural' hierarchies." (Spike 
Peterson, forthcoming). 
Although the hegemonic discourse on the advantages of global restructuring 
obscures its gendered impact, in other ways the language of those who make 
policy can quite overtly associate globalization with 'aggressive masculinity' 
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(Hooper, 2000) or 'technomuscular capitalism' (Chang and Ling, 2000). For 
example, David Mulford, US Under-Secretary of Treasury under the first Bush 
presidency, quite explicitly linked masculine/feminine and First Worldffhird 
World hierarchies, when he commented, 
"The countries that do not make themselves attractive will not get 
investors' attention ... This is like a girl trying to get a boyfriend. She 
has to go out, have her hair done, wear make up." (cited in Sisson 
Runyan, 1996: 238). 
A further example is the 1994 article the Economist magazine article which 
described Myanmar's natural beauty and undeveloped land as 'Ripe for Rape' 
(cited in Hooper, 2000). As not all states can compete in the process of 
globalization on equal terms, the use of such sexualized terms to present less 
powerful actors seeks to naturalize hierarchies (Hooper, 2000). 
J.K.Gibson-Graham (1996) criticizes the view that capitalist penetration is 
inevitable and natural. She36 compares the gendered language used in 
descriptions of globalization and capital penetration with those used in Sharon 
Marcuse's description of the discourse surrounding rape. Marcuse writes of 
the concept of a 'rape script', where victim and rapist are filling predefined 
roles, because they have been socialized to accept the idea of rape as 
inevitable and biologically-based. The discourse of globalization shares with 
'rape scripts' terms such as 'penetration', 'virgin' and 'invasion'. Gibson-
Graham challenges the presentation of globalization as inevitable, and argues 
that feminists should deconstruct the concept of the global economy, showing 
the many ways in which it is contradictory. For instance, she cites the 
observation made by Dicken (1998) that, of the four major sources of multi-
national investment, the UK, the US, Germany and Japan, the first three are 
also major hosts37• The discourse of globalization is also presented as 
disempowering: just as women circumscribe their activities as they become 
36 Although J.K. Gibson-Graham is a pseudonym for two writers, in their texts they refer to 
themselves using the first person Singular. I am therefore following their usage. 
37 The impact of unreciprocated FOI upon the Japanese national model of capitalism will be 
examined in Chapter Four. 
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more conscious of the possibility of rape, workers in TNCs curb their wage 
demands, for fear of capital abandonment. In fact, the power of capital to 
operate or locate anywhere on the globe is constrained by language, culture 
and law (Gibson-Graham, 1996). Implicitly, therefore, Gibson-Graham is 
accepting, and extending the view of globalization as project, as discussed in 
Chapter Two. Chapter Four will examine the way the discourse of 
globalization is used by key economic actors in Japan to legitimate economic 
restructuring. However, as the previous chapter has argued, globalization 
can be incomplete process, stemming in part from intentional activity by key 
political and economic actors, yet nonetheless be real (d. inter alia, 
Appadurai, 1990; Goldblatt et aI, 1997; Scholte, 2000). 
In summary, feminist macro-level critiques of globalization reveal some of the 
shortcomings of the arguments in favour of states' adjusting to economic 
globalization by adopting neo-liberal policies. Such critiques argue that not 
only does neo-liberal theory neglect to analyse much of women's contribution 
to the economy, but also that neo-liberal policies of rolling back state provision 
of welfare tend to increase women's productive and reproductive work. 
Proponents of neo-liberal economic globalization have presented global 
restructuring as a natural phenomenon, and, have presented it as a powerful 
and 'masculine' phenomenon. Acceptance of this analysis is disempowering 
to those who wish to challenge globalization or influence the shape it is taking. 
Writers on gender and globalization have therefore attempted to show that 
globalization is a mutable phenomenon, which can interact with local 
processes and be shaped by the agency of individual actors. The complex 
and contradictory impacts of globalization upon women will be examined in 
Section 3.2. 
3.2. The impact of globalization 
This section will examine how the trends associated with globalization impact 
upon the productive and reproductive work carried out by women. Where 
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integration into the global economy is leading to a state's economic growth, as 
appears to have been the case in East Asia38, the impact upon women can be 
significant. As the impact of capital penetration upon women is of marginal 
relevance to the case of Japanese women, debates about the extent to which 
'development' increases the income and raise the living standards of women 
in Third World countries will not be dealt with in any depth here. This section 
will however explain how: 
• Processes associated with globalization result in a feminization of 
waged labour in both North and South, 
• Marketization and other nee-liberal prescriptions increase women's 
reproductive labour 
• Increased migration impacts upon both women who migrate and 
women in host countries 
• Women of different ages, classes, and ethnic groups experience the 
effects of globalization differently 
• Local and global forces interact, so that the way in which the 
processes associated with globalization impact upon women in 
different countries depends upon cultural or institutional factors. 
The feminization of waged work 
One of the most remarkable effects of the globalization of the economy is the 
feminization of work in many (though not all) areas of the world. In both North 
and South, an increasing number of women are being drawn into the waged 
labour force for the first time, and for longer periods of time than in the past 
(UN, 1999; Sircar and Kelly, 2001; Bayes and Kelly, 2001). Furthermore, work 
itself has been feminized, in that flexible production and the global shift in 
manufacturing has meant that many men in First World economies are finding 
that their experience in the labour market is increasingly coming to resemble 
the typical pattern of 'women's work'. In other words, they can no longer 
38 This is also discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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assume lifetime employment and are experiencing lower paying employment, 
less job security, frequent job changes, part-time, temporary or home-based 
work (Standing, 1989; 1999; Bayes and Kelly, 2001). This section will discuss 
the reasons for the feminization of work, the likely reasons for this and the 
impact of this feminization upon gender relations. 
As more countries are drawn into industrial capitalist production, more women 
are drawn into waged labour39• It is noteworthy that no country has 
successfully industrialized without harnessing the labour of large numbers of 
female workers (Standing, 2000). Industrialising South Korea, for example, 
saw a massive growth in women's employment. The overwhelmingly female 
composition of the labour force of export industries led to women being called 
the 'industrial backbone' or 'industrial soldiers' of South Korea's economic 
miracle (Yoon, 2001). Women's employment was certainly central to Japan's 
state-led development strategy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, as Chapter Five will discuss. 
This is partly the result of stereotypical views held about women's work by 
government elites and corporate managers. The Newly Industrialising 
countries have been harnessing women's labour as a development strategy. 
The Malaysian government purposefully attempted to harness sexual and 
racial stereotypes to encourage foreign investment with the following 
advertisement: 
"The manual dexterity of the Oriental female is famous the world over. 
Her hands are small and she works fast with extreme care. Who, 
39 There are, however, exceptions to these general trends. Where countries have traditionally 
been highly regulated and women's economic and social rights have been well-established, 
such as Central and Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China, integration into the 
world economy has led to a decline of women in paid employment. Foreign firms entering the 
Czech republic, for example, have been reluctant to hire female employees (with the. 
exception of young women who are competent in foreign languages), as women take between 
two and four years maternity leave (True, 2000); Acsady (1999) points out that in Hungary, 
market liberalization, has led to a mass exit of women from full-time work. 
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therefore, could be better qualified by nature and inheritance to 
contribute to the efficiency of a bench-assembly production line than 
the Oriental girl." (Cited in Mies, 1986: 117). 
TNCs have also preferred to employ women workers because of a belief that 
they have nimble fingers, and are more docile, and hence less likely to 
challenge management and organize workers, than men (Bergeron, 2001). 
Women's reproductive work and the work they have carried out in the informal 
economy may also have permitted them to develop capacities of value in the 
manufacturing process. Women working in the electronics industry in 
maquiladora40 in Latin American and export processing zones in Asia have to 
pass aptitude tests; and women working in the textile industry have often 
already learned sewing skills at home (Elson and Pearson, 1997). In spite of 
this, women's work in manufacturing is frequently classified as 'unskilled'. 
This can be attributed to pre-existing gender norms. The labour market both 
reflects and influences what happens in other spheres; therefore: 
"To a large extent women do not do 'unskilled' jobs because they are 
bearers of inferior labour; rather the jobs they do are 'unskilled' 
because women enter them already determined as inferior bearers of 
labour." Elson and Pearson, 1997: 194) 
Apart from their fabled 'nimble fingers' and presumed doCility, there are other 
reasons why transnational corporations prefer female employees. Women 
appear more ready to tolerate low wages and poor conditions. (Meng, 1996). 
In fact, Gills (2001) argues that in countries where women are also carrying 
out subsistence production, it is possible for them to experience super-
exploitation, that is, because they are carrying out subsistence production, 
when this is combined with waged work it is possible for them to be paid less 
than the wages of reproduction. This articulation of subsistence production 
40 The word maquiladora is derived from the Spanish verb maqui/ar, meaning to submit 
something to the action of a machine. It usually refers to factories that import and assemble 
duty-free components for export. 
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and capitalist production makes Asian women's work extremely competitive, 
as the supplementary work they are doing makes it possible for them to accept 
wages which do not even cover their basic living costs. Even if aggregate 
national income increases as a country adopts neo-liberal policies, and 
becomes increasingly integrated into the world economy, this does not 
necessarily mean that women's income relative to that of men will increase. 
Seguino's (2000) positivist cross-country analysis of economic growth 
demonstrates a positive correlation between economic growth and gender 
inequality in wages, thus reinforcing the hypothesis that globalization has 
different impacts on men and women. However, globalization does not mean 
continued disadvantage in the workplace for all women. All of the Asian 
countries examined by Meng (1996) have seen an increase in women's 
representation in management. Similarly, Suarez Aguila (1999 in 
conversation with Scholte, cited 2000: 251) pointed out that in the 1990s some 
women rose to traditionally 'male' management positions in the maquiladora. 
This implies, that, for some women at least, globalization offers new 
opportunities for career progression. 
In First World economies too there has been an increase in female labour 
market participation. In OECD countries women were approximately half the 
labour force in 1997. The traditional masculine attribute of physical strength is 
less valuable, as blue-collar jobs are shifted overseas, or replaced with new 
technology. Traditionally 'female' skills, such as communication, teambuilding 
and networking are the focus of much management training. The overall 
effect of these changes is that 'masculinity' comes to be associated with power 
rather than individual men (Hooper, 2000). This does not mean that all 
women are likely to have access to this power, or that the jobs women are 
doing have equivalent rewards to those men have lost. States in the North 
have generally (Section 2.1) attempted to remain competitive by deregulating 
and 'flexibilising' the workplace, and women are disproportionately likely to be 
'non-regular', 'casual' or 'flexible' workers (see Section 2.1; for the case of 
Japan see Chapters Five and Seven). Even states that have been attempting 
a policy of equal opportunities in the workplace can find that as their labour 
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markets are increasingly flexibilized and casualized, it is difficult to ensure that 
labour regulations are enforced. Research shows that countries with 
centralized wage bargaining tend to have a smaller gender wage gap and that 
gender discrimination is less pronounced in countries where the government 
can exercize influence over enterprise wages (Meng, 1996). This positive 
association may be correlative as well as causal, but the implication of this is 
that with liberalization of the labour market, the gender wage gap will widen. 
In both First and Third World economies, women have also been propelled 
into the labour market by the decline of men's family wage (Fernandez-Kelly, 
2001 )41. This has been associated with the erosion of union power and neo-
corporatist wage bargaining and job protection agreements (Standing, 2000). 
The extent to which the relative strength of these institutions has been 
maintained in Japan therefore has implications for the extent of the 
feminization of labour there. 
As might be predicted by historical institutionalism, the degree to which 
feminization proceeds is somewhat path-dependent. All countries show a high 
degree of labour market segmentation by gender (United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, 1999). If women are employed primarily in 
sectors where their country has a comparative advantage, then they are likely 
to benefit in terms of increased job opportunities, at least initially. In South 
East Asia and the Pacific, the sectors of manufacturing, services, trade, 
tourism and entertainment have all seen a growth of women's employment 
(ILO/SEAPAT, .1998b). Increased international demand for Jordan's textiles 
and handicrafts has stimulated employment in these traditionally female 
sectors. A reduction in agricultural protectionism has stimulated the 
production of cash crops and led to an increase in the employment of rural 
women in the Third World (Beneria and Lind, 1995). There is an important 
41 As traditional 'male' jobs decline in number, some men are more willing to accept 'female' 
jobs. For example, in the early years of the maquiladora on the US-Mexican border, women 
accounted for around 85 per cent of the workforce. By 1975, that had fallen to 78%, and by 
1998 to 64% (Bayes and Kelly, 2001: 164). 
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caveat to this aspect of the feminization of labour thesis though. As countries 
develop and new technologies are introduced, then the gender composition of 
flourishing sectors can change. The introduction of Japanese Just-In-Time 
technology in Latin America has been accompanied by a 'defeminization' of 
manufacturing. Changing technology and work practices necessitated worker 
retraining, which management and male workers viewed as unsuitable for 
women, whom they regarded as secondary workers. Similarly restructuring in 
the Catalonian textile industry, particularly the introduction of night and 
weekend shifts, led to a decline in the number of women working in the 
industry (Beneria and Lind, 1995). 
Chapter Two notea that globalization makes countries increasingly subject to 
cyclical forces (Dicken, 1998: 429). When there is recession, where states 
maintain male preference in employment, women who have experienced 
waged work may be the first to lose their jobs. This was certainly true of 
married women in South Korea, when that country was forced to undergo 
massive economic restructuring to meet IMF conditions after IMF bailout in 
1997 (Yoon, 2001). This male preference can change though. The recession 
caused by the 1970s oil shock in Japan resulted in a downturn in female 
employment. However, such a downturn has not happened in the recession 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Chapter Five). 
State action can also impact upon the extent to which feminization takes 
place. Section 2.2 discussed how different state capacities impact upon how 
states adjust to changes in the international socio- economic environment. 
Dominant ideologies can lead states to negotiate a compromise between 
encouraging a neo-liberal form of globalization and maintaining the current 
gender order. For example, the Irish government negotiated with, and 
selectively funded, firms to encourage the employment of men rather then 
women to maintain a traditional nuclear family structure during the 1961-1981 
period of export-led development (pyle, 1990). Later chapters will show how 
the deregulation of employment in Japan and the incorporation into law of the 
ideal of equal opportunities - both effects, I shall argue, of political, cultural 
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and social trends associated with globalization - are profoundly shaped by the 
Japanese state, and social institutions. 
Women's reproductive labour 
Furthermore, when states are faced with economic difficulty, the impact upon 
women is often particularly harsh. This is exemplified, by the hardships 
wrought by 'the retreat of the state' (see Section 2.2). While some sectors of 
the state are actively engaging with the global economy, others, such as the 
ministries of health or welfare are increasingly 'feminized' and having the 
scope of their powers reduced (Marchand and Runyan, 2000). This may be 
either through the demands of structural adjustment policies in the South, or, 
in the North, through the desire to reduce state expenditure in order to 
maintain international competitiveness, or because of a normative preference 
for neo-liberal policies. IMF and World Bank conditionality agreements 
mandate Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which have led to cuts in 
social services in Third World countries, at a time when many women are 
increasing their participation in paid labour force to supplement the falling 
incomes of their partners. Diane Elson (1999) shows how World Bank SAPs 
assume that women's reproductive labour is infinitely elastic. The importance 
of the private sphere to the facilitation of restructuring, calls into question the 
exclusive focus on governments, corporations, and international institutions in 
mainstream works on globalization. A reduction in social protection is 
particularly important for women for the following reasons: women are more 
likely to be doing non-regular work, so are less likely to have work-related 
entitlements; usually they bear responsibility for caring for family members in 
ill-health; as women live longer they are more likely to need care in later life; 
social change has resulted in an increase in female-headed households; in 
the North, women are disproportionately employed in public services. 
(ILO/SEAPAT, 1998b, Young 2001). Needless to say, any shortfall in the state 
provision of welfare, is compensated for by the unpaid labour of women. 
Japan is an exceptional case in this respect. The model of state provision of 
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welfare in Japan is distinctive, in that it is predicated on the assumption that 
women will provide the bulk of reproductive work in three-generation families. 
This means that the restructuring of welfare provision, which is taking place in 
Japan as elsewhere, is taking place in a different context, and an analysis of 
its impact on working women will add special insights to these debates. 
Globalization and Female Migrant Workers 
The previous chapter mentioned globalization is characterized by growing 
transborder 'flows' of people (Appadurai, 1990). As globalization proceeds, 
migratory flows have become more· diverse and more feminized (Kofman, 
2000). The case of migration shows very clearly how globalization has 
profoundly different consequences for women of different national, ethnic and 
class backgrounds. 
Within the context of globalization, some educated, cosmopolitan women have 
undoubtedly been successful in taking on the 'maculinized' traits of 'high tech 
mobility, autonomy and challenging opportunities' (Chang and Ling, 2000). 
Unlike the Czech women who have seen their job opportunities diminish in the 
context of global restructuring, foreign women working in the Czech Republic 
have reported that being seen as 'foreign experts' means that they receive 
more advantageous career opportunities than would have been the case in 
their home countries (True, 2000). Even where women migrate as part of a 
family group, they may find themselves in a new context in which they are 
more likely to work. The shortage of skilled workers in some professions, such 
as the computer industry, has brought well-educated elite groups from the 
Indian subcontinent to the US. Indian women who have come to the US to 
support their partners have claimed that migration was empowering, 
particularly the opportunities it gives them for participation in the workforce 
(Sircar and Kelly, 2001). It seems logical to extrapolate from this that these 
women's experience in working in different cultures has encouraged reflexivity 
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about gender roles in their own. Japan is unusual among First World 
countries in experiencing net emigration. There are more Japanese women 
than men living overseas; one especially noteworthy trend is that the 
overwhelming majority of Japanese studying overseas are female. The next 
chapter will discuss the impact of this upon their later careers in Japan. 
Female migration facilitate the entry into the workforce not only of (some) 
migrant women, but also of middle class women in host countries. One 
consequence of female employment among the middle classes of the First 
World, has been that these women have had less time to carry out unpaid 
reproductive work. Consequently, middle class couples in the West and in 
several of the NICs, have been more inclined to spend their dual incomes on 
domestic labour. A counterpart to this 'cosmopolitan, postmodern, freeing' 
masculine form of Global Restructuring, described by Chang and Ling (2000) 
as GI, has been the emergence of a class of female overseas contract workers 
carrying out personal services, such as domestic labour for a cosmopolitan 
elite; a process which has been described as Global Restructuring 2 (Gil) 
(Chang and Ling, 2000). State policy can encourage, or discourage such 
migration. While states' ability to provide welfare to their citizens decline, the 
state continues to influence and benefit from women's labour. According to 
Chang and Ling, the state, 
" ... enjoys a renewed vigour in the regime of labour intimacy, e.g. the 
Philippines government supervizes, regulates, transports and taxes 
overseas contract workers." (Chang and Ling, 2000: 35) 
The 'regime of labour intimacy' implicit in Gil reinforces the stereotypes of, for 
example, Filipina women, as naturally subservient. As Chapter Five will 
discuss, Japan, unlike other relatively prosperous nations does not have a 
culture of importing domestic labour. Again, this thesis hypothesizes that this 
is due to cultural expectations of women's reproductive work. 
Nonetheless, globalization has impacted upon female migration flows to 
Japan. Sex workers have come to Japan, having been recruited in countries 
where Japanese companies have established overseas production sites. 
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Furthermore municipal governments in rural areas have sponsored the 
recruitment of women, mainly from the Philippines and Thailand, to marry 
farmers, and provide farm labour. The reasons for this can be directly 
attributed to the globalization of production and the spread of neo-liberal 
economic globalization, and the reciprocal effects of these phenomena upon 
Japan. This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Four, but, it is 
appropriate to note here that, while other developed countries have witnessed 
the phenomenon of migrant women providing domestic labour for middle class 
and elite women, in Japan migrant women tend to be providing services for 
men. To discuss this in any detail, would require the analysis of issues of 
'race' I ethnicity, colonialism and sexuality which are outside the scope of this 
thesis, so I shall discuss migration in Japan, only insofar as it is relevant or 
irrelevant to women working in the Japanese formal economy. 
Globalization and Difference 
Although globalization generally results in aggregate economic growth for 
newly-integrated economies, women, even those in the same country, do not 
benefit equally from global restructuring. The first analyses in the Gender 
and Development Community tended to present the young women employed 
in TNCs as a particularly vulnerable and exploited group. However it has 
since become' apparent that in reality TNCs tend to recruit from among the 
more educated sections of the population in Third World host nations 
(Marchand, 1996b). Older married women, and women with children in the 
host countries are more likely to work in the informal sector, where they can 
more easily combine their productive and reproductive roles. The nature of 
the informal economy means that it is far more difficult to research conditions 
of work for these women. 
Class, as well as age, affects women's experience of global restructuring. 
India's New Economic Policy of 1991 removed import quantity restrictions, 
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allowed foreign capital into the domestic market, and permitted the free flow of 
raw materials and intermediate and capital goods. The ensuing import of 
capital intensive technology destroyed many of the low-skilled and semi-
skilled jobs traditionally carried out by women, and led to increased 
competition with men for those low-skilled jobs which survived. Furthermore, 
as deregulation and liberalization have progressed, large manufacturers have 
turned to outsourcing and subcontracting to reduce costs. This segmentation 
means that it is difficult to enforce labour legislation (Dewan, 1991). 
Development efforts aimed at encouraging women's micro-enterprises may 
also be futile if these ventures cannot survive new competitive trade pressures 
(Beneria and Lind, 1995). 
Global restructuring also has different effects on women from different ethnic 
groups. As restructuring in the North leads to job losses, then women of 
minority ethnic groups, as well as refugees and asylum seekers are 
increasingly scapegoated, face racist attacks and are subject to stricter 
immigration controls. 
The interaction of global and local forces 
Globalization can help to weaken local patriarchal structures, although this 
can also weaken some of the protection from, for example, abuse that these 
structures provide (Young, 2001). The opening of export-oriented garment 
factories in Bangladesh led to the employment outside the home of women 
who, eighteen months previously had been in purdah. This was resisted by 
some Islamic fundamentalist groups, who issued fafwas against women's 
involvement in the export sector. However, women have been able to 
strategically employ social norms to maintain their employment, by adopting 
familial terms of address with male co-workers, thereby desexualising male-
female interactions in the workplace (Feldman, 2001). In India, entering 
waged labour means women can negotiate more control over household 
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economic resources and some sharing of household tasks by men (though in 
many cases social norms were such that men controlled income and did not 
share household tasks (Soni-Sinha, 2001). In the case of one migrant 
community, gender norms have changed to the extent that the age-old 
tradition of patrilocality has been abandoned. Female factory workers from 
rural Chinese families in Malaysia and Hong Kong have abandoned the 
patriarchal custom of living with their partners' families and have instead 
established conjugal households or moved back with their partner's and 
children to their own childhood villages (Gibson-Graham, 1996). 
'.' 
The increased demand for women's labour though, does not automatically 
lead to enhanced status within the home. This depends to a large extent on 
the pre-existing social institutions42 , including family structure and gender 
norms. While women in Asia seem to be given a greater say in family decision 
making if they go out to work (Meng, 1996), for some women, ironically earning 
an independent income can make them more subject to private patriarchy, as 
their family exercize more physical control over a valuable wage earner (Sen 
and Correa, 2000, Elson and Pearson, 1997). Women's ability to earn wages 
does not necessarily equate to social status either, where the cultural 
consensus is such that women's earnings are seen as secondary, whether or 
not this is truly the case (Steans, 1999). Wage earning can also be just one 
more burden to be added to the already considerable demands of domestic 
and family work. 
In cases where foreign firms produce directly in a host country, this can 
introduce new norms around working practices. Even though working 
conditions in TNCs in developing countries are generally less favourable than 
the conditions for doing the same work in the TNCs home countries (Beneria 
and Lind, 1995), employment in a TNC may be experienced by employees are 
42 Here I am using Hall and Taylor's definition of an institution, as cited in Chapter Two: • ... 
formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizations ... [and] ... structure of the polity or political economy." (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 
938), 
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more beneficial than the work they would previously have carried out in 
agriculture or family businesses. Although work in export-orientated 
industries is characterized by long hours, cramped dormitory style living 
conditions, extremely strict supervision of work, and, for many younger 
women, sexual harassment from male supervisors (United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, 1999; Bayes and Kelly, 2001), women 
themselves often consider the working practices of TNCs to be more 
enlightened than those of indigenous firms. One study of the maquiladoras 
found that two-thirds of domestic and electronics workers and more than half 
of all garment workers said they would keep working even if they did not need 
the money (Bayes and Kelly, 2001). The demand from foreign companies for 
female workers can also sometimes produce labour shortages in the local 
economy and lead to local firms, too, improving pay and conditions to entice 
female employees (Lim, 1997). 
Certainly, working for a foreign firm is a common ambition among Japanese 
women, who feel that these offer greater career opportunities for women than 
Japanese firms, and there has been some evidence of the indigenous firms 
showing an interest in examples of good practice to attract promising female 
recruits. These changes are discussed in Chapters Five and Six. 
To summarize Section 3.2, globalization impacts upon women in a variety of 
ways. Insofar as a country is benefiting from insertion in the world economy 
the opportunities available to women are likely to expand. However, insofar 
as globalization produces a decline in state-provided welfare, the burden of 
reproductive work on women will increase, and limit their ability to participate 
in waged work. Generally, globalization is associated with an increase in 
female labour force partiCipation, and a convergence of male and female ways 
of working, although some states and institutions have the ability to influence 
the extent to which this is so. Depending upon the resilience of social norms, 
women may use their economic power to achieve increased autonomy in the 
private sphere. 
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Globalization tends to increase inequality between women, as some women's 
traditional work is threatened by insertion into the world economy, while others 
benefit from new opportunities. The participation of elite women in 
professional occupations is facilitated by the service work of other women, 
particularly migrant women from poorer countries. Cleavages between women 
tend to fall around nationality, 'race', class, and age. 
Women though, are not just helplessly subject to forces of economic 
globalization and within the social and cultural structures in which they live, 
but are also actors in the global economy, who make choices about how to 
balance home and work, which work to do, and how to negotiate with their 
employers, families, polity and wider society. They are also agents who resist 
or transform the process of globalization, working within the new political 
spaces that the process has opened up. Women's activism in the context of 
globalization is examined in Section 3.3. 
3.3. Women's Activism 
This section considers the extent to which globalization has facilitated the 
development of a global women's movement. It then explores the political 
spaces in which activists for women's rights can press their case. Finally it 
describes the responses of women to some of the effects of globalization, and 
their potential for success. 
Globalization and the women's movement 
Section 2.2 documented the potential for non-state based identities to 
increase in salience in a globalizing world. In fact, feminists have long 
aspired to a notion of gender-based solidarity. Virginia Woolf famously 
claimed that, as a woman, "I have no country." There has been an 
international feminist movement since at least the nineteenth century. 
International networks supported claims for female suffrage in Europe, and 
against foot-binding in China (Sperling, Ferree and Risman, 2001). Feminist 
87 
campaigning at the Versailles conference secured women's representation in 
the International Labour Organization. 
Although other countries, such as Japan, had indigenous feminist movements, 
the three main international organizations, the Women's International League 
for Peace and Freedom, the International Council of Women and the 
International Alliance of Women, were dominated by European women. First 
wave Western feminism also arose alongside a virulent phase of imperialism, 
and sometimes replicated imperialist attitudes towards non-European women. 
Shohat (2001) however makes the point that Eurocentric versions of feminism, 
often present Third World women as victims, lacking any form of agency, and 
ignores the action that these women have taken, such as anti-colonial 
activism, because it is not overtly 'feminist'. Mindry also reveals that the 
ideologies used to enlist the 'help' of First World women for these 'victims' 
rely upon an essentialist discourse of women as naturally caring, and 
concerned about others simply because they are women. She further implies 
that this discourse patronizes the Third World recipients of 'sisterhood' 
(Mindry, 2001). 
Little attention was paid to differences between women, at least in Western 
feminism, until later writing, such as Robin Morgan's Sisterhood is Global, 
brought the voices of non-Western women to the attention of mainstream 
international feminism (Flew et ai, 1999).· While there is still concern among 
non-Western activists about the domination of Western feminists, aspects of 
foreign feminism have been adopted, if they are useful in a local context. 
"Women around the world are actively engaged in deciding and 
organising around their own local, national and global priorities and 
considering for themselves which feminisms are appropriate to their 
own context. Women's activisms take many different forms, derived 
from different temporalities of struggle." (Flew et ai, 1999:395) 
While globalization of communications may have facilitated development of 
transnational identities, these communities house considerable diversity. 
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There are multiple feminisms and some parts of the world women's 
movements have the eschewed label of 'feminist' altogether (China Rights 
Forum 1995; Eschle, 2000). This does not mean that there has been a lack of 
women's activism under globalization. 
Although women are disproportionately likely to be employed in non-organized 
sectors and non-unionized part-time, informal or home-based work, 
nonetheless the incorporation of women into the workforce has coincided with 
an increase in female activism for labour rights. Fernandez-Kelly (2001: 1248) 
writes: 
"Exploitation at least, entails a connection with the world of 
employment and, therefore, possible mobilization, resistance, and 
negotiation. Redundancy does not offer such possibilities." 
As women are increasingly concentrated in sex-segregated workplaces, this 
has led to groups organising around issues specific to women, even if they 
reject the label feminist. This can be either because feminism was associated 
with co-option into the former state apparatus, such as in Hungary (Acsady, 
1999) or because it is seen as a Western import. In South Korea, the rapid 
growth of women's employment (Section 3.2) was paralleled by a growth in 
women's labour activism. In defiance of Confucian expectations about the role 
of women, female workers were at the forefront of labour activism, demanding 
better conditions in general, but also reforms to improve the position of women 
in particular by calling for the abolition of sex-based job classifications. The 
clerical women's labour movement in South Korea was particularly 
successfully in winning reforms. 43 Furthermore, having entered the workforce, 
some South Korean women showed a distinct reluctance to leave (Yoon, 
43Korean female activists were successful in winning reforms in the changes to the customer 
of female workers in banks being required to sign a contract in which they agreed to leave 
jobs upon marriage, and to gender specific discriminatory retirement ages in 'women's jobs': 
28 for typists, telephone operators and assistant nurses, 20 for lift operators, and 25 for 
administrative assistants (Yoon, 2001). 
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2001). The custom of requiring married women to be the first to lose their jobs 
in times of recession led to the emergence of the IMF chonyo (IMF maidens), 
who delayed marriage, or lied about their marital status in order to continue in 
paid employment. Another case of women organising around gender interests 
is the case of Exportadora de Mano de Obra S.A, (EMOSA), a Tijuana based 
satellite of US based American United Global. Female employees of EMOSA 
mounted an international campaign against sexual harassment, after they 
were allegedly filmed during a bathing suit contest on a company trip (Bayes 
and Kelly, 2001). In many countries the growth in women's formal political 
representation has paralleled the rise in women's employment (Walby, 2000). 
Even where it is men who have become integrated into the world economy, 
this can have a politicising effect upon women: in areas of Mexico from which 
men have migrated to find work, women have also assumed economic and 
political responsibility, including holding political office (Gonzalez, 2001). 
The increased incorporation of women into the workplace associated with the 
processes of economic globalization has had a stimulating impact upon 
women's activism. However women have also had a new impetus to activism. 
The decline in state services associated with marketization has given them 
reason to protest or organize. For example, the stryctural adjustment 
programmes imposed upon Mexico in. 1982 mandated cutbacks in 
government welfare, privatization and increase in exports, in stark contrast to 
the postrevolutionary Mexican state's priorities. By the following year, the 
women in CONAMUP (Coordinadora Nacional de Movimiento Urbano Popular 
- National Council of the Urban Popular Movement) - had formed women's 
regional councils to obtain services including health centres, running water, 
schools, cooking gas, school lunches, cooperatives, and other economic 
amenities to help women fulfil household duties (Bayes and Kelly, 2001). In 
Russia a vast number of self-help groups and employment training 
organizations have grown up, trying to fill the gap left by the collapse of the 
welfare state. (Sperling, Ferree and Risman, 2001). Although a high profile 
way of continuing to show support for communal provision of services, this 
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nonetheless meant that it was still women who were bearing the cost of 
restructuring. As will be seen in Chapter Eight, women in Japan too have 
protested about shortfalls in state welfare provision. 
New possibilities for networking have arisen as national boundaries become 
more fluid. As women meet and network, this puts new issues on the global 
feminist agenda. Following the Beijing conference, for example, female MPs 
in Malaysia raised the issues of unmarried mothers, and the status of foreign 
partners, and government women's officers held seminars to try to improve the 
relationship between the government and women's NGOs (Ariffin, 1999). The 
Beijing Conference was catalytic for women groups in Japan too, as Chapter 
Eight will show. It also had an impact on the consciousness of individuals. 
Bayes and Kelly (2001) cite the case of young woman from a highland village 
in Thailand who returned from the Beijing Conferen,ce, and with her newly-
acquired status of international traveller, informed a village elder that it was 
not acceptable for him to beat his wife and that he should stop. Keck and 
Sikkink (1998) examine the way transnational activism has been instrumental 
in spreading concepts, and thereby permitting activists to articulate, 
problematize and campaign around issues: the case study they have chosen 
is domestic violence. However, the entry into the Japanese vocabulary of 
seku hara, from the English 'sexual harassment' is another pertinent example. 
Furthermore, new forms of technology have facilitated international networking' 
among women's groups, increasing women's ability to share information and 
campaigning techniques. Delegates from India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Japan, Cambodia, Korea, Kyrgystan, Laos, Burma and Thailand 
attended the Asia-Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development in 1999. 
The Conference Report noted: 
"In an ironic twist, globalization here was used to positive effect in 
expanding and strengthening the women's movement and the fight 
against transnational exploitative processes. This can be se~n through 
the exchange of business cards, addresses, phone and fax numbers, 
and e-mail addresses. This interchange, in part facilitated by the 
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globalization of communication technologies, travel, and information will 
contribute no doubt, to a stronger network of women's organizations 
across the globe." (Costa, 1999:69) 
Of course, the ability to travel internationally and network in cyberspace is 
open only to comparatively few women. 
In summary, feminists have always aspired to a global women's movement, 
but the nascent international movement of first wave feminism was strongly 
dominated by the concerns of European women. Globalization has drawn 
more women into the workplace, and, with this, into activism for labour rights. 
Furthermore the exigencies of globalization have propelled women to defend 
the gains of state feminism. The fluidity of national boundaries has also 
allowed for women to share concerns and to network to build alliances with 
women in other countries. 
Sites of activism 
If globalization is impacting upon the women's activism, it is also impacting 
upon the institutions and political structures which women attempt to influence. 
This section will describe how the geography of political activism is changing. 
It will first examine the state, as, even though its role is changing (Section 2.2), 
states continue to be major players in their own right or as part of regional 
trading blocks (Bergeron, 2001). It will then go on to look at the local, 
transnational, and global political spaces, which have opened up or assumed 
greater importance under the process of globalization. 
Feminists have tended to have a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the 
national state, and of course, states take different forms in different historical 
contexts44• The German feminist movement, for example, tended to present 
44 Rai and Livesley (eds.) (1996 ) offer wide-ranging treatment of the relationship between the 
state, women's organizations and women's struggles in Women and the state: International 
Perspectives, London:Taylor and Francis 
92 
the state as an instrument of patriarchal control; in the UK some feminists 
tended to see it as an arm of the capitalist class, mediating patriarchy and 
capitalism (Rai, 1996). Feminist activists in Japan too have, until recently, 
tended to eschew parliamentary pOlitics (Mikanagi, 2001). Scandinavian 
feminists, in contrast, have chosen the path of 'state feminism' (Young, 2001). 
The post-revolutionary Chinese state promised, and largely delivered, equal 
pay for equal work, educational parity between the sexes, public health and 
childcare provision. The marketization of the Chinese economy has resulted 
in high unemployment and poor labour conditions for women, lack of 
protection for rural migrants, and the commercialization of femininity. However 
the formal state ideology of gender equality is still a tool for legitimating 
struggles for women's rights (Chun, 2001). 
Globalization is often presented as accountable democratic bodies being 
superseded by the unelected forces of transnational capital. However, at the 
level of formal democracy, at least, globalization has seen a 'third wave' of 
democratization. Women can now exercise effective electoral choice in the 
new post Cold War multi-party democracies, and women's representation in 
the existing parliaments has increased. Furthermore, a higher proportion of 
countries have democratically elected assemblies today than 20 years ago, 
which itself increases the number of elected women representatives (Walby, 
2001). This in itself implies an impact upon policy. A 1991 study by the 
Centre for the American Women and Politics at Rutgers University found that, 
regardless of party or ideology, female politicians tend to have a different 
agenda to men (Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda, 1995: 373). However, the 
gains of state feminism, such as well-funded welfare programmes are now 
under threat from exigencies of globalization (Simms, 2001). 
The power of globalized capital has called into question the nation as a site of 
collective identity and the state as a force that can serve the collective 
interests of those who reside within the nation. It is one of the paradoxes of 
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globalization that national legislatures are becoming more representative, just 
as those legislatures are losing effective power (Held, 1995; Falk, 1997; Gilpin 
2000). However, the decline in state sovereignty is by no means unanimously 
viewed as detrimental to women: feminist scholarship has noted that the 
principle of non-intervention in sovereign states leaves women vulnerable to 
abuse and injustice (Sassen, 2001). 
Globalization presents new opportunities for feminist politics as well as new 
difficulties. In times of change social movements can identify potential allies 
and note where elites are vulnerable to challenge. The 'global imperative' 
view says targets should be global and that there is a 'new geography of 
power' composed of TNCs, financial markets, insurance and information 
networks (Bergeron, 2001; Youngs 2001). Women are reacting by 
establishing a strategy that is Simultaneously localized, regionalized and 
globalized (Chin and Mittelman, 1997). 
Section 2.2. explored the notion that one of the trends associated with 
globalization was the increasing trend towards multi-level governance, which 
more formulation of policy at sub-state levels. Many women activists have 
therefore chosen to work at local levels. Yoon (2001) describes how, in the 
early 1990s women's organizations, in South Korea, began to seek women's 
representation in formal politics, particularly at the local level, where they have 
continued to work for legal and institutional change. Women in Africa have 
also formed local women's groups, including rotating saving SOCieties, co-
operatives and day-care associations is response to austerity measures and 
the reduction in male employment (Tripp, 1997). 
The establishment, and increased profile of global institutions of governance, 
such as the UN, has been strongly associated with a raised international 
profile of women's rights, particularly through the series of international UN 
women's conferences from Mexico City in 1975 to Beijing in 1995 (Flew et ai, 
1999; Ariffin, 1999; Marcos, 1999; Mbire-Barungi, 1999) and the development 
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of a nascent set of international norms as embodied in UN and ILO resolutions 
and agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against women (CEDAW). Transnational networks 
composed of non-state actors, notably the UN and women's non-governmental 
organizations have been instrumental in the diffusion of 'gender 
mainstreaming' (True and Minstrom, 2001), that is, state policy to take into 
account the differential impacts of all policies according to gender. It is 
important to note that the institutional characteristics of some states are 
sufficiently strong that the states refuse to accept these global norms. Arat 
(2002) has noted the tendency of some Muslim states to express reservations 
about global norms, or to seek exemptions to parts of international 
conventions, based on their interpretations of religious law (despite modernist 
or feminist interpretations of Shar'ia, which stipulate sexual equality). 
Women use international law and transnational organising to negotiate with 
national states and individual TNCs for recognition and reinforcement of 
women's human rights. For example, some export-oriented firms in Mexico, 
have tried to avoid hiring pregnant women, to whom they would have certain 
legal obligations. They have adopted such practices as giving women 28 day 
contracts (to coincide with their menstrual cycle), or requiring women to show 
proof of menstruation. If a woman becomes pregnant she is not rehired. As 
ILO and UN agreements to which Mexico is a signatory, forbid discrimination 
in hiring on grounds of sex, some NGOs, representing these women's 
interests, have filed a complaint about this kind of pregnancy testing against 
Mexico with in the National Administrative Office (NAO) of the US Department 
of Labour. The subsequent publicity led two US firms, General Motors and 
ITT Industries, which operated in Mexico, to voluntarily agree to discontinue 
the process of pregnancy testing (Bayes and Kelly, 2001). 
As well as facilitating the application of transnational pressure, the prestige of 
the UN has lent credibility to national attempts to improve women's situation. 
The Russian women's movement, for example, purposefully adopts the 
language of international documents, such as International Labour 
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Organization and UN resolutions in its struggle against sexist discrimination 
(Sperling, Ferree and Risman, 2001). Japanese campaigners too have 
deliberately adopted a boomerang strategy (see footnote eight) to pressurize 
the Japanese government to enforce equal opportunities legislation. 
This section has noted that globalization is resulting in women working for, 
and achieving, greater representation at the national level. However, this is of 
limited utility, as the power of the national state retreats. As more power is 
devolved to the local level, some feminists have focussed their efforts there. 
However, of perhaps more significance is the emergence of a global standard 
of sexual equality, although the extent to ~hich this can be used to put 
pressure on individual states varies according to their history and political 
culture. 
Modes of response 
Having noted the different levels of governance that can be targeted by 
campaigners, I shall now explore the different strategies campaigners employ. 
The strategies adopted by women in responding to some of the processes 
associated with globalization will be partially determined by the structures in 
which they are operating. Tripp (1994) notes that in Tanzania, which has a 
history of local women's organizations, women's reaction to austerity 
measures was to start collective economic strategies, for example, a sewing 
project that used the money they made to start a co-operative flour mill. 
Women in Sri Lankan, Malaysian and Philippine free trade zones have used 
their wages to build women's centres that provide legal and medical 
assistance, library services, training, co-operative housing facilities, and food 
co-operatives, thereby using multinational capital to provide alternatives to 
capitalism (Rose, 1994, cited in Bergeron, 2001). Women have also 
effectively made use of culture-specific shaming strategies. In the case of 
women's campaigns for Y.H Trading Company and Dong-il Textile in the 
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Republic of Korea, protestors took off all their clothes to block riot police and 
corrupt male union leaders (Yoon, 2001). 
The internationalization of production means that some women are able to 
enlist help in their struggles from more powerful groups in foreign countries. 
The EMOSA women described earlier in this section, who complained of 
sexual harassment, were all laid off, and the plant where they worked was 
closed, without compensation. The Support Committee for Maquiladora 
Workers based in Tijuana and San Diego contacted the United Auto Workers, 
whose employers has subcontracted work to the maquila where the women 
worked. United Auto Workers has an agreement with Ford, GM and Chrysler 
which said that the companies would not use parts made under unfair labour 
practices, and, after 8 months of legal action and campaigning, 118 workers 
received acceptable severance pay (Bayes and Kelly, 2001). 
The women who can afford to travel to the UN, or who work in 
professionalized NGOs are an elite and not representative of the majority of 
the world's women. Some feminists have criticized the Beijing conference for 
excluding the poorest women (Bergeron, 2001). Other theorists have warned 
that those who engage with states and corporate interests risk being co-opted 
and encouraged towards conformity (Cox, 1999). Nonetheless, feminist 
activism has become 'more NGO-ized' (Sperling, Ferree and Risman, 2001). 
Those who have engaged with international bodies, have u ••• countered the 
prevailing view that state commitments in the United Nations involve mostly 
lofty talk or mere lip service." (Suriyamongpol, 2002: 3). 
Campaigners at this level have typically mixed scholarship and activism. 
Diane Orentlicher (cited in Bayes and Kelly, 2001 :156) argues that human 
rights methodology 'promot[es] change by reporting facts'. To hold 
governments accountable 
"requires NGOs to: 
a) carefully document alleged abuses; 
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b) clearly demonstrate state accountability for those abuses under 
international law and 
c) develop a mechanism for effectively exposing documented abuse 
nationally and internationally." 
Campaigners have therefore attempted to find facts, build consensus 
internationally and locally and create mechanisms to explore abuse and bring 
international, national and local pressure to bear (Bayes and Kelly, 2001). The 
Women in Development movement is global advocacy network, engaging with 
international bodies and national parliaments (Walby, 2001). As a result of 
the work of Schools of Women in Development and Gender and Development 
a) .International agencies now pursue as a matter of course, research 
upon the gendered impact of pOlicies. 
b) Nation states 'mainstream' women's policy agendas through official 
programs promoted by advocacy administrators and 'femocrats'. 
c) Feminist organizations engage regularly with the state, particularly 
though elected female representatives. (Staudt, Rai and Parpart, 2001). 
The strategy of collecting information to bring international pressure to bear on 
a national government has been adopted by an increasing number of national 
women's groups who provide alternative reports to the UN on the extent to 
which their State has implemented CEDAW's provisions. 
A type of resistance at the opposite end of the spectrum to this highly-
organized and academic strategy, is what James C.Scott (1990, cited in Chin 
and Mittelman, 1997) has named 'infrapolitics'. This refers to everyday forms 
of resistance exercised by individuals or groups, which fall short of openly 
declared contestations. Infrapolitical activities range from footdragging, 
squatting, and gossiping to the development of dissident subcultures (Chin 
and Mittleman, 1997). In keeping with the dictum that the personal is political, 
feminists have not just limited their descriptions of responses to global 
patriarchy to the actions of formal groups, but have examined the actions of 
individuals and informal social groups. Filipina maids in Hong Kong, for 
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example, confined to the house for most of the week, gather in public spaces 
to socialize and share information, sometimes to the concern of the local 
media (Youngs, 2000). Workers go to work, sometimes in the face of 
opposition from men or local cultural traditions; passively resist managers, by 
using gender stereotypes, such as women needing unique rest periods (Ward, 
1990). Minority women in Silicon Valley have turned managers' stereotypes 
against them, by, for example, refusing to work with solvents on the grounds 
that it would ruin manicures for a special occasion, or bringing a child to work 
on the grounds that the child's mother would be too tired to play with him after 
work (Hossfeld, 1990). In Chapter Six, I describe the infrapolitical resistance 
of Japanese 'office ladies' (OLs). 
Women then employ a variety of protest strategies. These range from 
engaging with international and state bodies in a highly professionalized way 
and using their own modes of discourse to campaign for better conditions, to 
."'. 
linking with other women and other workers in transnational campaigns, 
through to using traditional feminized methods of protest, and employing 
'infrapolitical resistance'. 
3.4. Conclusion 
Several general hypotheses about the relationship between gender and 
globalization can be extrapolated from the accounts described in this thesis: 
• Globalization is presented in a gendered and natural phenomenon in 
political discourse, in a way that suggests nation states are powerless 
to resist its exigencies. 
• States respond to the challenges of globalization by marketization and 
the adoption of neo-liberal policies. These policies have impacts, which 
increase the reproductive work of women. 
• Globalization can weaken local patriarchal structures by exposing 
culturally-specific practices to global scrutiny, while flows of information 
and ideas increase reflexivity within cultures. 
99 
• Dominant ideologies can lead a state and existing institutions to 
negotiate a compromise between encouraging change and maintaining 
current gender orders. 
• There has been a 'feminization' or waged work, as an increasing 
proportion of jobs are taken by women, and an increasing proportion of 
jobs are irregular, part-time and/or service sector jobs which have 
typically been filled by women. 
• The entry of the workforce of many First World women into professional 
positions, is facilitated by the domestic work of poorer migrant women. 
Whether these hypotheses are valid in the case of Japan, and how the case of 
Japan can contribute to the feminist debate about the impact of globalization 
upon women will be examined in the following chapters. 
Feminist accounts of the multi-faceted nature of globalization significantly 
enhance our understanding of this phenomenon, as well as to the way states 
and institutions nuances its effects. They show that globalization is a deeply-
gendered phenomenon. It impacts differently upon men and women. Macro-
level analyses, which view the phenomenon through the lens of gender, show 
that attempts by states to respond to the challenges of economic globalization 
by marketization and the adoption of neo-liberal policies increase the 
reproductive work of women. They have also shown how the gendered 
discourse surrounding neo-liberal economic globalization (wrongly) constructs 
it as natural and irresistible, adding support to the hypothesis that 
globalization is not only a process but also a project. 
Generally, in both North and South, processes associated with globalization, 
such as foreign direct investment and the desire to employ more non-regular 
workers, draw more women into waged labour, although and in some cases 
this changes as development proceeds. Although women experience the 
changes brought about by global processes very differently according to their 
age, class, ethnic background and national culture, most women usually work 
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under different conditions to those enjoyed by most men. The work that 
women do is usually relatively poorly-paid, and has less security than their 
male fellow workers have traditionally enjoyed. This can be partially attributed 
to institutional factors, such as a country's gender norms. However the 
increase in women working also has the potential to alter gender norms. For 
this reason, most women seem to prefer waged work, and employ strategies to 
keep their jobs when threatened with removal through restructuring or societal 
and familial opposition. Women may benefit in terms of health and education, 
if capital penetration results in successful development, However, the 
marketization occasioned by globalization, increases women's work in the 
home and reduces their availability in the labour market. A minority of elite 
women have found that globalization offers them opportunities for travel, and a 
professional career, comparable to that of elite men, but only if other women 
provide domestic labour for them. 
An increase in women in the workforce and the adoption of a global norm 
around the idea of gender equality, has led to an intensification of women 
workers' struggles for labour rights. Women have succeeded in gaining a 
more equitable representation at state level, but as the state has lost some of 
its capacity, women focussed their attention upon new institutions of global 
governance. 
At the firm, local, national, regional and global level women have pursued a 
number of strategies of resistance, ra'nging from combining scholarship and 
activism to campaign upon an international stage; to using the wages from 
global companies to build community services; jointly campaigning with 
women and workers from other countries and employing the passive 
resistance known as infrapolitics. 
In some instances a study of the case of Japan exemplifies and enriches 
points made by feminist theorists about the relationship between gender and 
globalization. Claims made by representatives of the Japanese state do 
present neo-liberal economic globalization as natural and inevitable, and 
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thereby justify the proposed restructuring of the labour market to respond to its 
exigences. Japanese women are entering the labour force in greater numbers 
than previously, although the work they are carrying out is less secure than 
jobs than those held by the majority of men in the post war period. Through 
their exposures to nascent norms around sexual equality, and experience of 
migration, some Japanese women are becoming increasingly reflexive about 
work and gender roles in Japan. Japanese women have been long been 
involved in transnational feminist movements, and the strategies of resistance 
they employ both share ideas and methods of resistance for actors in other 
countries, and use strategies appropriate to Japanese social and political 
institutions. 
In other instances though, analyses of gender and globalization do not fit the 
Japanese case so well. Expectations about women's role in the reproductive 
economy, and particularly in the three-generation family, have implications for 
female migration, for the impact of the retreat of the state in Japan, and for 
women's capacity to undertake full-time work. Furthermore, men and women's 
expectation of women's role in the labour force is influence by the changing, 
but still distinctive, features of the Japanese national model of capitalism 
(examined in Chapters Four and Five). 
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Chapter Four: 
The Japanese Model of Capitalism and the Globalization of 
Japanese Production 
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4.0. Introduction 
This chapter explains the development of the Japanese model of capitalism, 
and thereby provides an essential background to understanding women's role 
in that model, which will be explored in more depth in Chapter Five. The 
chapter goes on to show how the globalization of Japanese production has 
facilitated the changing division of labour firstly in the East ASian45 region, and 
then globally; and how this is having reciprocal effects upon that model, which 
will be explored in Chapters Six and Seven. 
Chapter Two has argued that the state and national institutions play important 
role in both facilitating the processes associated with globalization and 
determining the manifestation of globalization in different national contexts. 
This chapter provides specific information about the role the Japan state and 
Japanese companies have played in facilitating the global organization of 
production and the reciprocal effects this has had on the Japanese national 
model of capitalism generally. In order to contextualize changes in the 
Japanese model of capitalism, it is first necessary to gain an understanding of 
this model, and the way that it was forged. Section 4.1 therefore describes 
how the conditions of international political economy led to a rebuilding of the 
Japanese economy after the Second World War, and a reshaping of its 
institutions. Section 4.2 deals with the security concerns, economic 
dependence and political considerations, which prompted Japan to direct aid 
and investment to the rest of East Asia, and how this interacted with the 
economic development policies of other countries in the region. This is 
important historical background to any understanding of the globalization of 
Japanese production, because, as this chapter will show, globalization of 
Japanese production followed on from the globalization of Japanese capital. 
4S There are various definitions of the East Asian region, but, where the phrase is used in this 
thesis it refers to the Newly-Industrializing Countries, NICs (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and South Korea), the key members of ASEAN (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Indonesia) and China and Burma/Myanmar. 
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Rapid advances in information technology, transport and communications 
made it possible to organize production on an international basis. Economic 
and political expediency has produced the incentive for Japanese companies 
to undertake this reorganization. However there have been four key 
discontinuities in postwar international political economy, which have added a 
great deal of momentum to the process. These are the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971; the Plaza Accord in 1985, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1989 and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. These events, and 
their historical context, will be dealt with in Section 4.3. The reciprocal effects 
of the globalization of Japanese production will be summarized in Section 4.4 . 
4.1. International Political Economy and the Emergence of the 
Japanese National Model of Capitalism 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, US foreign policy strongly 
supported the idea of Japan as a 'bulwark against communism'46. 
Relationships with the Soviet Union had deteriorated and civil war had broken 
out in China, so that plans to radically restructure and democratize Japan's 
economy were quickly shelved in the interests of rebuilding an economically 
robust anti-communist ally. 
The first US administration in Japan after the Second World War was 
dominated by New Dealers47. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 
46 This phra~e was used explicitly by the US Secretary of War in a speech in January 1948 
(Itoh, 2000). 
47 In 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had introduced a range of economic and social 
reforms, aimed at regulating the markets, and targeted at improving the conditions of lower 
income groups. These policies were collectively known as the 'New Deal'. New Deal ideals 
are evident in Article 25 of Japan's Constitutional Law, promulgated in 1946, which declared: 
-All the members of our nation have the right to enjoy healthy and civil minimum life. The 
State must endeavour to elevate and improve social welfare, social security and public health 
in every aspect of life: In fact welfare concerns came to be overtaken by the pOlitical priority 
of economic reconstruction, and in the US too indeed, support for New Deal initiatives among 
the US political elite withered after Roosevelt's presidency. 
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(SCAP), Douglas MacArthur, was particularly keen on economic 
democratization, as a way to develop Japanese civil society. The SCAP-
initiated Land Reform of 1946-47 had the twin goals of eliminating the 
'landlordism' which the Supreme Command blamed for the jingoism of pre-
war Japanese society, but also removing the causes of rural radicalism which 
was a potential source of support for the left. 
SCAP planned to break-up the large family-owned conglomerates known as 
zaibatsu, as these commercial empires had, during the 1930s, joined the 
military in supporting overseas expansion. However priorities changed with 
inception of the Cold War. Mao attained power in China in 1949, and when 
the Chinese and Soviet governments formed an alliance in 1950, Truman 
reacted by appointing John Foster Dulles as advisor to Japan. US policy, as 
outlined in National Security Council Reports of the time encouraged the 
rebuilding of the Japanese economy, the re-arming of Japan, and also the 
intensification of Japan's links with the other East and Southeast Asian 
countries. This would buttress Asian anti-communist regimes (Suehiro, 1999) 
and integrate these nations into the capitalist world. Root and branch 
economic reform came to be blocked by policy adviser George Kennan, 
whose National Security Council directive NSC 13/2 of 1948 took into account 
the role the US felt it was desirable for Japan to play in the Cold War. Kennan 
portrayed MacArthur's anti-monopoly plan as likely to remove the main 
obstacle to Soviet penetration in Asia (Schaller, 1999). Mitsui, Mitsubishi and 
Sumitomo "therefore survived, reorganized themselves into industrial and 
financial corporate groupings known as keiretsu, which are a key feature of 
Japanese capitalism. 
Gerlach identifies five characteristic features of keiretsu: transactions are 
conducted through alliances of affiliated companies; relationships between 
such companies are based upon longevity, stability and mutual obligation; 
relationships are characterized by cross-shareholding and personal 
relationships; relationships have symbolic significance which maintains links 
even in the absence of formal contacts; bilateral relationships take place 
within a wider 'family' of firms (Gerlach, 1992: 4, cited in Dicken, 1998: 224). 
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The large companies at the 'top' of keiretsu were able to externalize through 
these intricate vertical relationship with small and medium sized 
subcontractors. The subcontractors, which are almost entirely dependent on 
the larger company and provide flexible pricing and production and even 
absorbed surplus employees of the company in times of economic difficulty. 
This system was instrumental in producing a dual labour market. In firms at 
the 'top' of the keiretsu, as Abegglen wrote, 
"At whatever level of organization in the Japanese factory, the worker 
commits himself on entrance to the company for the remainder of his 
working career. The company will not discharge him even temporarily 
except in the most extreme circumstances." (Abegglen, 1958: 11) 48 
However, the stability of in large firms (see Section 1.1) was guaranteed by 
the flexibility of smaller ones49• 
To encourage the rebuilding of civil society in Japan, under SCAP's influence, 
trade unions were legalized in 1945 (Lehmann, 2000). The new Constitution 
of Japan recognized the right to organize as an essential right (Art. 28) and, 
following this recognition, trade union membership and activity expanded 
rapidly. Membership rose from virtually zero to almost six million in the first 
two years of the Occupation. Although trade unions had scarcely existed 
before legalization, those that were formed in Japan had several distinctive 
48 Examples of rare sackings that he cited were a man who had been absent for several 
weeks, following a series of similarly lengthy absences, and another accused of repeated 
thefts. 
49 The precarious position of smaller companies has been evident in recession caused by the 
East Asian crisis. Forty-seven per cent of employees laid off for bankruptcy or restructuring 
between 1996 and 1999 worked at companies with less than 30 staff, while workers at firms 
with 500 or more staff accounted for only 14 per cent of layoffs (Nihon Keiza/ Shimbun, 27 
November, 1999). Employees of small and medium-sized enterprises also tend to receive 
lower wage rises in times of economic hardship than their counterparts in larger companies. 
In 1999 the average wage rise of workers in the former was 2.21 per cent compared to only 
1.67 per cent in the latter (Labour Relations Bureau, 2000). Furthermore wages and age 
have traditionally not been so closely related as in larger companies (Matsushima, 1966: 75). 
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characteristics. These unions were notable for their enterprise base and their 
cross-class membership, both legacies of workers' experience of the 
Industrial Patriotic Society (Sangyou Houkoku Ka/). Enterprises branches of 
the Industrial Patriotic Society, which comprised both white-collar and blue-
collar workers, had been formed to raise the spirits and provide mutual aid for 
the families of drafted employees. 
In protest at inflation and unemployment and, with the leadership of socialists 
and communists who had returned from exile, and active members of the 
Industrial Patriotic society, working class militants organized a wave of strikes, 
mass demonstrations and factory occupations (Megarry, 1995). The 
administration was again alarmed and the Labour Relations Adjustment Act, 
which banned strikes in certain key industries, was passed in September 
1946. A proposed general strike of the six million members of the Industrial 
Union (Sanbetsu Kaigi) and General Council for Trade Unions (Sohyou) for 
February, 1997 was called off after the personal intervention of urging of 
General MacArthur. 
As well as being based in enterprises and uniting blue and white collar 
workers, Japanese trade unions were characterized by the way they played a 
role in co-determining company policy. The invention of the tradition of family-
like business, where capital-labour relations were always harmonious did not 
occur until around the time that Factory Acts and legislation recognising trade 
unions were under discussion in the 1940s (Clark, 1979). Business 
organizations resisted the application of aspects of the ILO convention, 
arguing for very weak union rights legislation "appropriate to our nation's 
feelings". Gordon (1998) has shown that, in fact, during the early days of 
Japan's industrial revolution, systems of management most resembled those 
of the advanced factories of Europe or North America. However, unions 
were able to adopt the ideology of co-operative labour-management relations 
to argue that unions and management should have a say in deciding 
company practice. Co-operative labour-management relations had numerous 
benefits for male regular workers. Both blue-collar and white-collar workers 
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received employment security, high quality training and payment according to 
salary. Company welfare benefits, such as grants on marriage, childbirth, 
illness, death, provision of company housing, and subsidized shopping 
facilities added to the cost of lifetime employment for companies 
(Matsushima, 1966). These high fixed costs prompted firms to seek numerical 
flexibility by using a secondary (and largely female) workforce, who did not 
have the same job security or fringe benefits of male regular workers50• 
After Truman's election in 1948, Detroit banker, Joseph Dodge was appOinted 
to Tokyo as 'economic czar', whose brief was to build a strong Japanese 
economy. Japan would therefore be a robust ally against communism in Asia. 
Dodge, adopted a strategy of central planning ('The Dodge Plan'), which was 
aimed at maximising production for export, while minimising production for 
domestic consumption. One of the immediate effects of Dodge Plan was 
large-scale layoffs. Between 1949 and 1950 around 700,000 workers lost their 
jobs (Halliday, 1995: 350). This severely weakened the union movement, as 
union membership fell by 880,000 between 1949 and 1950. As jobs became 
more scarce and union membership fell, union leaders acceded to the 
demands of management that, rather than representing all workers in a plant, 
unions represent only the 'labour aristocracy' of those regular workers that the 
management would want to retain even in a period of maximum retrenchment 
(Halliday, 1995). Further strikes in the 1950s and 1960s, following proposed 
lay-offs resulted not only in huge financial costs for the companies concerned, 
but also in bad labour/management relations, low morale among workers and 
a public relations disaster for the affected companies and damaged public 
image, as well as huge financial losses to large companies. The 
consequence of this period of industrial relations was that a tacit 
understanding developed between labour and management that lay-offs of 
regular workers should be avoided as far as possible (Inoue, 1999). 
However, this 'lifetime employment' would be the prerogative of only those 
full-time regular workers that had union representation. This became 
recognized in law. Although Japanese company law is very similar to that of 
so This will be explored in Chapter Five. 
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the UK and the USA in its view of the supremacy of shareholders, rather than 
other stakeholders in a company, actual practice has meant that 'lifetime' 
employment for regular male workers has become institutionalized. Case law 
has come to support the institution of lifetime employment. Employees can 
claim unfair dismissal if a firm cannot demonstrate that it has, for example, 
explored all reasonable market opportunities for diversification, before 
resorting to layoffs (Dore, 2000). If a firm cannot continue to employ a regular 
employee, it is common that the employee will be provided with extra training 
and the company will assist in finding the employee a new position. 
Dodge strongly supported the creation of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MITI), which was to encourage export-oriented production by large, 
integrated firms (Schaller, 1997). As well as providing aid to rebuild the 
Japanese economy, the US pegged the yen at a rate of 360 yen to the dollar: 
a low rate which made it easier for Japan to export to the non-communist East 
Asian countries. Special procurements from the US in 1950-53 during the 
Korean War were a further stimulus to Japan's economic development. 
In April 1949 the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was 
granted complete control over Japanese industrial policy. MITI used the 1949 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law to allocate foreign currency 
to Japanese firrris and control all foreign exchange (a policy which continued 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s). This was in effect to impose a quota 
system to control imports (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000). Without this 
protection they might well have suffered in the same way as the fledgling 
Japanese auto industry that was almost wiped out by a surge of European 
imports during an experiment with free trade in 1953 (Katz, 1998). MITI 
chose to license foreign technology rather than permit foreign direct 
investment. It played an important role in identifying strategically important 
industries, and the Bank of Japan guaranteed large scale commerce. As 
Cerny (2001) has observed, late industrialising states do not typically wish to 
see capital flowing freely over borders; they wish to keep it at home. Early 
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infant industry protectionism therefore strengthened Japanese capitalism and 
proved highly successful at transforming Japan from a low-skill, labour-
intensive economy to a highly-skilled high-value added one. In its rejection 
of free flows of capital and technology, and its restrictions on imports the 
Japanese model of capitalism differed greatly from the Anglo-American model 
of capitalism, and resembled more its East Asian neighbours at the time. 
SCAP had expected the Japanese economy to adopt a strategy of 
specialising in low value added production at competitively low wage rates. 
Instead Japanese companies adopted a mode of production based upon the 
'3Ks': keiretsu, kanban and kaizen. Keiretsu have been defined in the 
previous section, but Kanban refers to the just-in-time system aimed at the 
elimination of 'waste' within companies, that is, the minimum amount of 
equipment, materials, parts, space, and worker's time, which are absolutely 
essential to add value to the product. By reducing costs inventories and fixed 
assets, the argument went, the return to capital employed would be 
increased. The establishment of lifetime employment for male company 
employees gave companies every incentive to ensure that workers were 
multi-skilled and flexible. These multi-skilled workers were created through 
the practice of continuous improvement (kaizen). Many of these innovations 
were originally adopted from American management ideas, especially the 
thought of Edward Denning on Total Quality Management (Schwartz, 2000). 
However, the adoption of these ideas by large and successful Japanese 
companies meant they became synonymous with Japanese management 
(see, for example, Abbeglen 1958, Dore, 1973, 1996, 1998, 2000). These 
production methods appear to have been successful. Japanese 
manufacturing productivity rose annually by an average of 9.7 per cent during 
the period from 1955 to 1970, real wages rose by an annual average of 5.7 
per cent in the same period (Itoh, 2000: 4). Exports grew 17% annually in the 
1960s (PBS Online, 2002a). 
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The reconstruction of the Japanese economy was a top political priority for the 
Japanese government, as it was for the US. Development policy 
concentrated on heavy industries and chemical production, and between 1955 
and 1970 there was no increase in social welfare spending. In 1951 the 
Social Security Advisory Council recommended that the Japanese 
government introduce a comprehensive social security system, which would 
provide social insurance, social welfare and public hygiene. However the 
government failed to implement this. The 1949 Second Plan for Economic 
Reconstruction maintained "there was a vital need to consider accumulating 
as much capital as possible by slowing down the rise in living standards, 
which was vital for a while even though it was expected to cause hardships in 
people's everyday life.b (cited in Takeda, 2002: 163). This policy of 
prioritising economic over social development has been instrumental in 
shaping expectations of women's productive and reproductive labour, as 
women tend to 'fill the gaps' in state-provided welfare. Furthermore, in Japan, 
there are legal, as we" as social, pressures to provide care for family 
members. From April 1961, a universal health insurance and pensions 
system were put into effect, and in 1973, a year referred to in Japan as the 
"First Year of the Welfare Era," older citizens were exempted from health care 
fees. Nonetheless, the Civil Code continues to state that those who are in a 
lineal family relation, as we" as siblings, are responsible for supporting and 
caring for each other. Blood relatives are obliged to pay for the care services 
for members of their extended family even if they do not or cannot provide 
care for themselves (Clinical Geriatrics, 2000). As Takeda (2002: 164) 
observes: 
"in this sense, ideas from the previous family system were utilized 
through remodelling in appropriate ways for the period of high 
economic growth, and functioned as a substitute for a public social 
security system, which was given only secondary importance after the 
economic policyb (Takeda, 2002: 164) 
However, even in 1996 Japan paid only 67.5 trillion yen in 1996, or 17.2 per 
cent of the national income, in social security benefits, compared to national 
income proportions of 18.7 per cent in the United States (1992), 33.3 per cent 
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in Germany (1993), 37.7 per cent in France (1993), and 53.4 per cent in 
Sweden (1993) (Japan Access, 2002) This formal assumption of reproductive 
work being the responsibility of family members continues to be embodied in 
Japanese policy pronouncements, as Chapter Seven will show. 
The early postwar period then established a dual model of employment in 
Japan. A division was made between security and conditions of work in 
larger and smaller firms. A division was also established between those full-
time workers, who were enterprise union members, and received a virtual 
guarantee of lifetime security, combined with payment by seniority and a raft 
of company provided welfare benefits. Those in non-regular employment, 
who were not union members, did not have such guarantees. In large firms, 
innovative production systems, such as kanban, led to impressive growth in 
production. The Japanese national model of capitalism was initially 
characterized by administrative guidance and control of capital flows,. This 
proved to be successful in effecting the take-off of many of Japan's successful 
export industries. While the state was given responsibility for economic 
development, the provision of welfare was formally considered to be the role 
of the family. As noted in the previous chapter, reproductive work carried out 
within the family is overwhelmingly carried out by women. 
4.3 The Globalization of Japanese Capital 
As stated above, MITI controlled imports and outward foreign direct 
investment. However there was tension between the desire to keep capital 'at 
home' and pragmatic political concerns about rebuilding relationships between 
Japan and the rest of Asia. Bilateral, as well as global, politics and traditional 
geo-political security concerns were also instrumental in encouraging a flow of 
funds from Japan to the rest of Asia. 
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Because of its vital strategic role as a US ally in Asia, Dulles aimed to station 
US troops in Japan. Article 9 of the Japanese postwar constitution, drawn up 
by SCAP, was essentially a pacifist constitution. Article Nine stated: 
"1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. 
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, 
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of aggression of the state will not be recognized: 
(Japanese Constitution, adopted 3 November 1946) 
The article received much popular support within Japan. Stationing troops on 
Japanese soil was therefore controversial within Japan. It was even more 
unpopular in former Japanese colonies. Dulles was to placate those countries 
in the region that objected to this by promising war reparations from Japan. A 
Newsweek article of 1951, which was reputedly written by Dulles, 
recommended that Japan look to Southeast Asia as a source of raw materials 
formerly imported from China. Japan had of course had long-standing 
economic relationships with other countries in the region, some of which date 
back to the Meiji era (1868-1912). Japan is poor in natural resources, having 
only 37 per cent of capacity to feed itself in terms of calorie intake and 27 per 
cent in terms of grain intake (Arimura, 1996). Japan imports the majority of its 
energy and natural resource needs. 
Akaha (1999) suggests that the ideological divisions of the Cold War and the 
US's prioritization of the nurturing of Japan as its principal ally in the region, 
meant that, unlike Germany in its relations with Europe, Japan did not need to 
reach full reconciliation with its neighbours. However, while the military 
security need may not have been urgent, the economic rationale for rebuilding 
first trade, then investment, then production links with Asia certainly was. 
Colonized China, Manchuria and Korea had provided the Japanese empire 
with raw materials and markets for its manufactured products. Japan was. 
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keen to rebuild its manufacturing industry, and so in the post-war period Japan 
had every incentive to rebuild economic partnerships. 
From 1950, under the premiership of Yoshida Shigeru, Japan adopted a policy 
of co-operating with the US to develop South East Asia. There were several 
Japanese political leaders who made efforts to rebuild relations with former 
colonies. For example, PM Kishi Nobusuke's made two rounds of visits to 
countries in Southeast Asia. The 1966 Ministerial Conference for the 
development of Southeast Asia was the initiative of PM Satou Eisaku. 
Diplomatic relations with South Korea were restored in 1965 and Sino-
Japanese relations were restored in 1972. 
Reparations to the region were paid in kind - firstly by services and then by 
capital goods, which have made it relatively easy for Japanese companies to 
establish cross-national production. Japan supplied nearly 946 billion yen to 
various Asian countries, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea, in reparations and other payment 
(Umezu, 2000). Reparations payments were always made in combination 
with loans for economic co-operation and development (Suehiro, 1999). 
Yoshida Shigeru told Dulles, 
"Reparations are a kind of investment. If we can contribute to the 
economic development of Southeast Asia in the name of reparation 
payments, we can help prevent the propagation of communism. With 
reparations, we can kill two birds with one stone." (cited in Suehiro, 
1999: 88). 
Japan also cultivated links with countries to which it did not have a duty of 
reparation including India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (which was then known as 
Ceylon) (Suehiro, 1999). In 1954, it signed up to the Colombo Plan, to help 
with the socio-economic development in Asia. 
From the 1960s onwards corporations put pressure on MITI to permit more 
FDI (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2000). As the post-war austerity plans were 
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replaced by the income doubling51 plans of the 1960s, Japanese firms began 
to locate some actual production overseas as a reaction to the increased 
salaries at home (Mackie, 1999). 
Political change in 1965 was a watershed for Japanese relations with East 
Asia. That year saw the outbreak of the Vietnam War, a military coup in 
Indonesia and the signing of the Japan-South Korea Treaty, normalising 
relations between the two countries. The political instability of Asia in the late 
1960s and early 1970s led to the formulation of the Fukuda doctrine, an 
explicit articulation of the idea that aid and investment to the rest of Asia were 
essential to the defence of Japan's national interest. Prime Minister Takeo 
Fukuda, in 1977, recognized Japan's unique position as a developed 
industrialised economy in the region, and spoke of the need for Japan, as an 
'advanced country' to take responsibility for stabilizing the region, which was 
the source of so many of the raw materials needed by Japanese 
manufacturing. Public support within Japan for aid to Asia, was, and 
continues to be, considerable: it is perceived as ethical because of Japan's 
relative wealth, its role as a bridge between Asia and the West and its need to 
be seen as responsible nation (Preston, 2000). This is particularly significant 
as Japan is the top donor in the world in terms of net ODA (Overseas 
Development Aid) disbursement (Japan International Cooperation Agency 
2001) and a disproportionately high proportion of Japanese ODA is given to 
the Asia region (see Figure 4.1). 
51 In 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda was sufficiently confident of the strength of the Japanese 
economy that he announced a National Income-Doubling Plan. Industrial policy would be 
used to funnel investment finance into high growth, export industries. Throughout the 1960s 
investment rates represented around 20% of income, and produced high real growth 
throughout the decade (Shea, 2001). 
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Figure 4. 1 Japan's bilateral aDA (Fiscal Year 1996) Allocation by region 
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Most Japanese aDA was, like reparations, 'tied'. Japanese trading 
companies are involved from the project planning stage, and attach conditions 
aimed at maximising their own business opportunities. Thus ODA, in effect, 
subsidized the multinationalization of Japanese firms (Itoh, 2000). 
In summary, for reasons of political pragmatism, from the 1940s onwards 
capital from Japan entered the rest of East Asia. These funds strengthened 
links between Japan and the rest of the region, and, when Japanese business 
were looking for ways to cut production costs, moving some production to East 
Asia was an obvious strategy. 
As the rest of this section shows, East Asia was not the sole recipient of 
Japanese FDI. Political pragmatism, and economic rationalism encouraged 
Japanese FDI flows first to East Asia, then Western, then Eastern Europe, and 
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the former Soviet Union, and also, to a certain extent, to the US. Japanese 
companies were increasingly persuaded to produce outside Japan as a result 
of four key discontinuities in the developing international political economy, 
and the international political climate in which they took place. The rest of this 
section will explore the impact of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, 
the Plaza Accord, the end of the Cold War and the East Asian financial crisis 
upon the investment and production decision of key economic actors in Japan. 
The Collapse of the Bretton Woods System 
Although Japanese companies had begun to locate some production overseas 
as far back as the 1960s, the 1970s acted as a spur to increase this trend. In 
1971 the Bretton Woods system broke down (see Section 2.1) and between 
1971 and 1974 the yen rocketed from 360 to 290 against the dollar. By 
October 1978, it had risen to 110 yen to the dollar. This made Japanese 
products increasingly expensive and wages in the rest of East Asia cheap 
relative to those in Japan. An extra incentive to produce overseas was that 
the Japanese economy was also suffering as a consequence of changing 
international political relations. US recognition of China in 1971 under the 
Nixon administration (1969 - 1974) downgraded the importance of the US's 
relationship with Japan. The US administration had been worried for some 
time about the mushrooming costs of containment in Asia. The link with 
Japan became less and less strategically important with the opening to China, 
arms limitations treaties with the Soviet Union, and the end of the Vietnam 
War. It was also under Nixon's presidency, that Japanese imports to the US 
were restricted. 
These factors combined to increase the pressure on Japanese firms to invest 
abroad, as it was becoming increasingly difficult to export to the US from 
Japan: the rising value of the yen, the phenomenon known in Japan as 
endaka, inevitably raised the cost of Japanese exports; and because, following 
endaka, the rest of the world's prices for land, labour and entire corporations 
has, for Japanese buyers, fallen dramatically (Pempel, 1999). 
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As new social movements reacted to several industrial pollution incidents, 
firms had an additional reason to locate overseas. Almost 100 female 
environmental activists, complaining of industry's contamination of Japan's 
waterways were elected to local and municipal government (Arimura, 1996) 
and Japanese government increased state regulation of environmental 
matters (Mackie, 1999), and laws became more effective after the creation of 
the Environment Agency in 1971 (Kelly, 1998). Companies were also 
encouraged to invest overseas by Japan's relatively high corporate taxes. 
(Corporate taxes today account for around 24 per cent of Japan's tax 
revenues). 
Large corporations had in fact long pressured the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI)52 to be able to invest directly abroad. Large-scale 
production had resulted in Japan's domestic markets becoming saturated with 
consumer durables and given Japan's high saving ratiO, led to firms turning to 
world markets. However, it was only in 1971, with the added spur of the 
collapse of Bretton Woods, that the Japanese government abandoned its 
previous policy of only allowing Foreign Direct Investment (FOI) which was in 
Japan's long-term interest, to allowing unlimited investments abroad. 
The growing desire of Japanese firms from the 1970s onwards to produce 
overseas articulated with the desire of East Asian economies to attract foreign 
direct investment. Japan's rapid economic growth encouraged other East 
Asian states to copy the Japanese development model, a policy known as the 
'Look Easf or the flying geese model. There was a spate of such 
programmes, including Singapore's 1978 'Learn from Japan' initiative; 
Malaysia's 1981 'Look Easf policy and Philippines sources urging the country 
to become more like 'Japan Incorporated' (Katz, 1998). Postwar East Asian 
economies had hitherto generally attempted to develop economically by 
adopting import-substitution policies. A corollary of the abandonment of such 
52 As a result of government restructuring on 6 January 2001, MITI has been replaced by the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
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strategies in favour of export-oriented development was that East Asian 
governments adopted export policies to encourage foreign capital. This led to 
the building of export zones (EZs), which, by the mid-1970s existed in Taiwan, 
South Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Later China adopted the same 
policy. Typically workers in these export zones did not have the trade union 
rights and freedoms of their counterparts in Japan. This lack of union rights, 
and the low wages of export zone workers made them an attractive labour 
force for foreign investors. Under Malaysia's Look East Policy, for example, 
Mahathir Mohammed curbed workers' civil and political rights, banned the 
unionization of certain industries and imprisoned political and labour militants 
under the Internal Security Act (Arrifin, 1999). For workers in EZs, one 
positive effect of the globalization of production was that the details of their 
dissatisfaction with working conditions reached an international community. 
This globalization of production facilitated the development of transnational 
activism (see Section 2.1). As labour disputes became more frequent in 
Japanese companies in Asia during the 19705, the Japanese union, IMF-JC 
(International Metalworkers' Federation - Japan Council) laid the foundations 
for the formation of the Trade Union Committee on Multinationals (TCM), 
which has since played a central role in negotiating with parent companies 
experiencing local labour disputes. 
The Plaza Accord 
The model of capitalism which emerged in the late 19405 and 1950s proved to 
be a very successful foundation for Japan's export-oriented economic 
development. 
, t 
By 1985 the US was suffering from record trade deficits with Japan. 
Consequently representatives from France, Germany, Japan, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom came together at the Plaza Hotel in New 
York where they reached agreement to drive down the price of the dollar. The 
aim of the Plaza Accord was to make Japanese imports more expensive and 
US exports cheaper, hence redUCing trade balances. The dollar consequently 
fell 30 per cent over the next two years. The corollary rise of the yen from 
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260.24 yen against the dollar just before the agreement to a high point of 80.3 
yen in 1995 of course provided a further spur for Japanese companies to cut 
production costs by producing overseas. Japanese companies also 
attempted to cut production costs with the introduction of factory and office 
automation and an intensification of labour discipline through the introduction 
of QC (Quality Control) circles and the principle of ZD (Zero Defects) (Itoh, 
2000). Company-based trade unions co-operated with the introduction of new 
technologies, as long as their members kept their jobs. This permitted the 
decline in the size of the regular workforce over the years, through natural 
wastage. 
The export-oriented development strategy that Japan had pursued was 
severely undermined by the Plaza Accord, as the rising value of the yen made 
Japanese exports more expensive. Steven (1996) argues that domestic crisis 
is one of the main motors driving the globalization of Japanese production. 
He notes that in the Japanese mode of production, wages are downwardly 
flexible (that is, can easily and legally be reduced by employers), as up to a 
third of the annual pay of core workers comes in the form of yearly bonuses 
and higher paid workers can be replaced by irregular workers (see Chapter 
Five). Japanese producers then concentrated on manufacturing producer 
goods purchased by Japanese capital rather than consumer goods for 
consumption in the domestic market. Japanese consumer goods could not be 
absorbed by the domestic market, and were exported. The rise in the 
exchange rate of the yen, following the Plaza Accord severely damaged this 
strategy by leaving Japanese wages "simultaneously both too high and too 
low": too high to produce cheap goods and too low for workers to buy all that 
they produced (Steven, 1996: 58). By the second half of 1993, Japanese 
prices were 1.72 times US prices, while real wages were less than 60 per cent 
of US real wages (Steven 1996: 58). This made producers more likely to 
move overseas to cut production costs and make it more affordable for those 
outside Japan to buy goods produced by Japanese companies. 
Further globalization of production was encouraged by bilateral relations with 
the US and the EU. Following trade friction with the US and the EU, during 
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the first half of the 1980s, Japan had agreed to voluntary export restrictions on 
steel, television and car exports and MITI even opened an import promotion 
office. However these could be circumvented if the goods were produced 
elsewhere. For example, when limits were imposed on cotton from Japan, 
Japanese firms pragmatically shifted cotton production to other Asian 
countries, while diversifying into synthetics at home (Schwartz, 2000). 
Japanese firms had an incentive to invest in Europe to enjoy the intra-
European trading advantages of EU firms. In the late 1980s particularly there 
was a massive surge in Japanese investment in preparation for the end of 
1992, when Europe became a unified free trade zone. In 1989 Japanese 
investment in the European Community reached a peak of US$752,OOO,OOO 
(JETRO, 1997)53, 
The End of the Cold War 
As Section 4.1 has shown, US political priorities during the Cold War, led the 
US to assist in Japan's economic recovery and to enable Japan to integrate 
its production with that of its Asian neighbours, The end of the Cold War 
meant that US political priorities shifted sharply. Fujio Cho, senior managing 
director or the Toyota Motor Corporation, observed that: 
"The end of the Cold War shifted American policy priorities from 
strategic to economic issues. Faced by challenges from the mature 
Japanese economy and the intensely competitive East Asian 
economies, the United States has intensified its pressure on Japan to 
open the country for the second time54, In other words we are under 
53 After a slump until the mid-1990s, EU investment again began to rise, reaching US$ 
25,191,000,000 in FY 1999 (fig. 4.9), 
54 Cho appears to be making a veiled reference to the 'first time' the US had pressurized 
Japan to 'open up', From the early seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, Japan was a 
'closed country', Foreign ships were not allowed to dock at Japanese ports, and Japanese 
people were not allowed to leave Japan. In 1853 the 'Black Ships', a small fleet of American 
warships commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry landed at Edo (now Tokyo) to 'open 
trade' with Japan, Japan capitulated and signed a trade treaty with the US, and then, during 
the next five years, signed trade treaties with Great Britain, Russia, France, and Holland. 
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intense pressure to dismantle the uniquely Japanese system built 
during the Cold War years and no politicians or bureaucrats seem to 
know what to do." (cited in Fukai, 1999:217) 
Although the Plaza Accord had the effects of changing Japanese production 
techniques and encouraging Japanese firms to produce overseas, it had not 
put an end to the US's persistent trade deficit with Japan. Although by the 
end of the 1980s Japan actually had lower formal barriers to imports that most 
of the US's other trade partners, the first Bush administration began the 
Structural Impediments Initiative, which Upham (1996: 264) describes as 'the 
first explicit attempt to reshape a trading partner's domestic institutions in the 
name of free trade', adding' 
[T]he argument was, the expansion of free trade and global welfare 
depended precisely on the creation of a universal trading culture and 
the dismantling of parochial institutions and customs that hindered the 
interpenetration of economies." 
Examples of the deregulation that has taken place include the reform of the 
Large-scale Retail Stores Law, facilitating the entry of large discount foreign 
stores into Japan; Big Bang, the 1998 deregulation of Japan's financial 
markets, subjecting Japanese banks to increased competition from the likes 
of Merrill Lynch and eitibank; and the deregulation of the airline industry. The 
gendered impact of globalization upon the banking and airline industries in 
Japan will be explored in Chapter Seven. 
Although these changes ostensibly came about as a result of 'gaiatsu' 
(pressure from outside), there was behind-the-scenes support for them from 
groups within Japan. For instance, discount stores supported the overturning 
of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law - and paid back the US for its support 
during the yen rise of the early 90s when they increasingly stocked relatively 
cheap imports. Similarly, managers of corporate pension funds, which 
received comparatively low returns in Japan, were more than happy with the 
1986 negotiations which opened the Japanese pension market to US 
securities firms (Katz, 1998). 
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The Clinton administration continued with Bush's plans to exert pressure for 
internal restructuring and deregulation of the Japanese economy. The Clinton 
Administration was eager to open Japanese markets and resist trade 
imbalance. Between 1998 and 1999 the US imposed 'anti-dumping' duty on 
imports of Japanese hot-rolled steel and other products. In 1999 the US 
emphasized that the recovery of the Japanese economy should be based 
upon domestic demand and made plain its expectation that Japan should 
continue to deregulate and open markets (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2000). 
Japan's dependence on the US both for security and as a vitally important 
export market continued to make it particularly susceptible to US pressure for 
deregulation (Carlile and Tilton, 1998). 
The end of the Cold War has also opened the possibilities for establishing 
overseas production and trade links with the former Communist bloc as well 
as expanding the global market. After President Clinton announced the end 
of the US boycott of Vietnam in February 1994, Japan began to invest heavily 
there (Preston, 2000). Japan has had limited transborder projects with 
Russia, since Japan set up a consular office in Khabarovsk. Generally the 
expansion of the global market from 2.7 billion consumers in the mid-1970s to 
around 5.5 billion after the switch of socialist economies to a market economy 
(Takenaka, 1998) has expanded export opportunities for Japanese firms. 
However, this has not necessarily increased job opportunities within Japan. 
While the collapse of the Berlin Wall enabled an influx of cheap labour from 
East to West in Europe, Japan's restrictive immigration codes meant that 
Japanese companies had to go overseas in search of cheaper labour (Fukai, 
1999). With the collapse of actually existing socialist regimes in Eastern 
Europe, Japanese firms are increasingly investing in the region. In Eastern 
Europe, they can enjoy the triple advantages of a highly-skilled workforce, low 
wages and, since the mid-1990s association agreements with the EU, access 
to the EU markets. Certain countries in the East are particularly attractive 
because of 'sweetener' deals. For example, Poland exempts foreign firms 
from corporation tax for their first ten years in the country (JETRO White 
Paper on Foreign Direct Investment, 2001). Although Japanese direct 
investment in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary fell by two-
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thirds between FY1995 and 1996, it has again been climbing since 1997, and 
in 1999 FDI inflow into eight countries in Central and Eastern Europe rose 
29.3 per cent from the previous year to a record US$16.9 billion (ibid: 34). 
The East Asian Financial Crisis 
A third discontinuity which led to the increased globalization of Japanese 
production was the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The results of 
the changes in East Asia's policy towards foreign penetration, described 
above, have been striking. East Asia is host to more than 300,000 foreign 
companies (fig. 3.6) and has produced an increasing share of the world's 
manufactured goods. In 1963 East and Southeast Asia produced 1.5 per cent 
of the world's manufactured goods, while in 1995 this had risen to 19.9 per 
cent (Dicken, 1998: 36). However the region's high dependence upon foreign 
investment made it particularly vulnerable to capital flight, and a speculative 
boom in the early 1990s was rapidly followed by speculator panic and capital 
flight. The depreciation of the Thai baht set off a contagion effect on the 
currencies of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and then South Korea. In 
these five countries, net private inflows fell from 93 billion US dollars in 1996 
to an outflow of 12.1 billion in 1997 (Radelet and Sachs, 1998: 65). 
This had particularly important consequences for the Japanese economy. As 
East Asia's prosperity has grown, it has become advantageous for Japanese 
companies to be situated near their new major markets for consumer 
electronics. The Japanese government has developed a range of policy 
instruments to encourage firms to invest in the Asia-Pacific region, including 
low interest loans for overseas investors and foreign investment insurance 
(Hatch and Yamamura, 1996: 123). Before their collapse the Asian market 
accounted for nearly 45 per cent of Japan's exports (Economist, 1998, 
September 26: 17). 
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The increasingly international division of labour between Japan and East Asia 
during the 1990s is evident from growth in the trade of intermediate goods 
(Figure 4.2)55. 
As noted earlier in this section, East Asian countries had established policies 
of attracting FDI from the 1970s, with the adoption of the 'flying geese' model. 
In the years immediately preceding the East Asian financial crisis, an 
ideological underpinning of this policy gained increasing resonance. The idea 
of a shared Confucian heritage was the basis of Singapore and Malaysia's 
campaign for the so-called Bangkok declaration of March 1993, which 
rejected 'Western' conception of universal human rights, in favour of so-called 
'Asian values,56. 
55 Notes to Figure 4.2: 1. Because of data restrictions, 1992 data for China and Hong Kong 
and 1991 data for the Philippines have been used for 1990. 
2. The figures below country names indicate share as a percentage of Japan and East Asia 
trade share. 
3. The figures within brackets for the NIEs and the ASEAN 4 indicate trade in Intermediate 
goods within these groupings. 
56 This is quite a dubious proposition. East Asia is characterized by enormous social, 
economic and political diversity. Although there are some similarities (e.g. export-oriented 
development, Free Trade Zones to attract foreign capital) in the development strategies they 
have adopted, East Asian economies continue to have significantly divergent models of 
capitalism. There is huge intra-regional income disparity; a diversity of socio economic 
organization (Korea is dominated by the chaebols and has few independent small and 
medium sized industries, while an abundance of these characterize Taiwan); the Communist 
Party is illegal in Islamic Indonesia, while it dominates China and Vietnam, albeit combined 
with a market economy, and North Korea, which attempts to maintain a centrally planned 
socialist economy. Itoh (2000: 127) even expressed doubts whether ." "the Asian flying 
geese belong to the same species", 
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Figure 4.2. Expansion of intermediate goods trade in Japan and East 
Asia: Share of machinery parts in machinery as a whole 
1990 
1998 
EJ 
Source: From METI White Paper on International Trade 2001 : Key Points: 2001 :5 (Source of 
figures: AIDXT [Institute of Developing Economies) 
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Japanese production became even more closely integrated with the region. 
In 1990,42 per cent of machinery exports to Japan from the NIEs consisted of 
machine parts. This figure had increased to 57 per cent by 1998. The 
equivalent figures for exports from the ASEAN 4 went from 24 per cent to 58 
per cent, while the share of machine parts in total Chinese machinery exports 
to Japan doubled from 32 per cent to 64 per cent. 
As might be expected, the collapse of countries that were both major markets 
and major sites of investment for Japan had negative repercussions for the 
Japanese economy. Predicted growth for FY 1998 had been 1.9 per cent. 
There was actually negative growth of 1.9 per cent. In March 1998 Japanese 
GOP was 1.8 per cent less than in March 1997; the larger ever fall in one year 
(Pont, 1998). Initially Japanese banks reacted by repatriating funds to pay for 
domestic debts. However, the damage to the Japanese economy gave 
Japanese companies extra stimulus to reduce production costs by locating 
overseas, and by FY 1999, overseas investment was higher than it had been 
before the crisis (Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3 FDI outflow from Japan by destination (based on reports and 
notifications; Units: US$ 1 million) 
FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 
World 53,972 40,747 66,694 
North America 21,389 10,943 24,770 
U.S. 20,769 10,316 22,296 
Europe 11,204 14,010 25,804 
EU 10,963 13,850 25,191 
U.K. 4,118 9,780 11,718 
Netherlands 3,295 2,118 10,361 
Germany 732 553 649 
France 1,736 521 1,127 
Source: JETRO White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment, 2001 
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Investment in East Asia were facilitated by a raft of measures to further 
liberalize trade and inward investment. The Second Information APEC 
Economic Leaders' Meeting in Indonesia had ended with the production of the 
1994 Bogor Declaration, which stated these countries intention to reduce 
barriers to trade and investment. This was given extra impetus by the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. Countries cut tariffs and reduced or removed a 
wide array of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Examples are given in Figures 4.4 
and 4.5. Significantly, in the first three quarters of 1999, Japanese investment 
in China was 25 per cent more than in the same period the previous year, a 
much faster investment growth rate than its investment in other regions 
(People's Daily Online, 25 November, 1999). 
The apparent benefits of overseas production have persuaded Western 
companies as well of the benefits of investment in East Asia; and, particularly 
since the East Asian currency crisis they have been quicker at undertaking 
M&As (mergers and acquisitions) than Japanese companies, who prefer to 
establish direct subsidiaries (Figure 4.7). Between 1990 and 1999 the 
proportion of direct investment in East Asia accounted for by Japanese capital 
fell from 26 percent to 8 percent. This means even more competition for 
Japanese companies, as competitors from other developed countries can also 
produce at lower costs 
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Figure 4.4 Examples of reduced or eliminated East Asian investment 
barriers 
Economy Reduced or eliminated tariff barriers 
China Permission for certain foreign banks to operate RMB business 
in Pudong, Shanghai (1998) 
Hong Kong Formulation of new patent and trademark ordinance and 
tightening the legislative framework against bootlegging 
activities (1998) 
Indonesia Elimination of local content programme for motor vehicle 
producers (1999) 
Formulation of anti-monopoly and unfair competition 
prevention laws (1999) 
Korea Formulation of Foreign Investment Promotion Act to promote 
foreign investment in Korea by liberalising foreign investment 
in principle (with the exception of some industries, simplifying 
procedures and providing a one-stop service (1998) 
Malaysia Complete import tax exemptions for raw materials and 
intermediate goods used in the manufacturing industry, 
regardless of whether the final product is exported or sold on 
the domestic market (1999). 
Elimination of local procurement requirements related to 
preferential investment treatment (1999) 
Philippines Permission for foreign capital participation in retail businesses 
in some industries given certain conditions (2000). 
Singapore Elimination of foreign investment restrictions in the banking 
and communications sector (1999). 
Permission to establish joint ventures with foreign companies 
in judicial services (1999) 
Taiwan Administrative procedures law introduced to ensure fair and 
transparent administrative procedures (1998) 
Thailand Elimination of local content conditions on car engines and 
motorcycles manufacturing (1998) 
Establishment of one-stop service for visas and work permits 
(1997). 
Source: METI White Paper on International Trade 2001: Key Points: 2001:8 
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Figure 4.5 Examples of reduced or eliminated East Asian non-tariff 
barriers 
Economy Examples of reduced or eliminated non-tariff barriers 
China Eliminations of import quotas and import licences for 13 items, 
including heavy machinery, and optical instruments (1997) 
Hong Kong Relaxation of requirements of registering as rice stockholders 
in order to import rice (2000) 
Indonesia Reduction of export tariffs on leather, cork, ore and waste 
aluminium products (1998) 
Elimination of subsidies for fertilisers and aviation fuel (1999) 
Deregulation in regard to care import licence requirements 
(1999) 
Korea Elimination of the Import Diversification Program (1999) 
Malaysia Elimination of import licences for polyethylene, polypropane, 
and diamonds (1996, 1997) 
Philippines Elimination of all import licences except for coal, coal 
derivatives and those which have to be maintained for health 
safety or national security reasons 
Singapore Nothing in particular 
Taiwan Elimination of import licences for 24 items (1999) 
Thailand Elimination of regulations on import licences for vinyl chloride 
monomers, benzine, engine fuel, kerosene, high-speed diesel 
fuel naphtha LNG and other fuel products (1998) 
Source: METI White Paper on International Trade 2001: Key Points: 2001:8 
4.4 The Reciprocal Effects of Globalization on the Japanese 
National Model of Capitalism 
As Section 4.2 has shown, Japan has played a significant role in stimulating 
the internationalization of manufacturing production. This has resulted in 
'reciprocal dynamics' (Hasegawa and Hook, 1998): forces which have 
implications for the survival of the Japanese national model of capitalism. 
Three interrelated trends are particularly apparent: increased competition from 
other countries; the liberalization of the Japanese economy, and migration to 
and from Japan. 
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Increased competition for the Japanese model 
Japan's economic engagement with the rest of Asia has been encouraged by 
economic rationalism and political pragmatism. Japanese desire to cut costs 
by producing overseas has been complemented by the desire of other Asian 
countries to encourage foreign direct investment and technology transfer. 
Through its engagement with the rest of Asia, Japan has been instrumental in 
creating industrial competitors. 
Unlike Japan, East Asian governments chose to develop through taking steps 
to attract inward foreign investment, and they have been very successful in 
this goal (as Figure 4.6 shows). As the phrase 'flying geese' suggests, East 
Asian governments were keen that their countries should follow the 
development trajectory of the Japanese economy. Paradoxically, their 
copying of that model threatens to undermine the Japanese economy. In 
1963 East and Southeast Asia produced 1.5 per cent of the world's 
manufactured goods. In 1995 this had risen to 19.9 per cent (Dicken, 1998: 
36). They also increased their share of total (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) DECD exports from 5.7 per cent in 1979 to 8.8 
per cent in 1993 (Dicken, 1998: 39), and, significantly these exports were of 
high-value added manufacturing goods. 
The technology transfer that results from high value-added FDI needed to 
manufacture high technology goods, has enabled other Asian countries to 
develop their own indigenous companies, so that Japanese companies come 
to face ever increasing global competition. For example, in the 1990s a 
number of Chinese companies, which had originally been engaged in 
technology transfer agreements with Japanese firms, began to produce colour 
televisions themselves. Their local production networks, price 
competitiveness and after-sales service meant that they quickly overtook 
these Japanese companies. In the two years from 1996 to 1998 Japanese 
affiliate companies went from being the top-ranking sellers of colour 
televisions, to not being in the top four companies in terms of sales (METI 
White Paper on International Trade, 2001). 
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Figure 4.6. Trends in number of foreign companies by country region 
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As other industrialized countries have seen the benefits that result from 
offshore production, they too have been attracted to investment in East Asia, 
especially after the East Asian financial crisis reduced the cost of undertaking 
mergers and acquisitions in the region (Figure 4.7). 
Imports of manufactured goods from the emerging Asian economies 
increased sharply in the first half of the 1990s caused concern about a 
possible 'hollowing out' of the entire Japanese manufacturing industry. There 
were numerous closures of small businesses and cottage industries, as well 
as a significant deterioration in the local industries in some areas. This was 
because the distinctive character of keiretsu meant that, if the 'head' company 
in a vertical chain went overseas, the entire market of the smaller supplier 
companies disappeared. 
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Figure 4.7. Cross border M & As in five Asian Countries most affected by 
the currency crisis 
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These developments in East Asia have had the effect of making Japanese 
goods less and less competitive. The Global Competitiveness Report 1996 of 
the World Economic Forum ranked Japan as 13th in a comparison of global 
competitiveness, shocking many in Japan as for the previous ten years Japan 
had always been top-ranking (Kojima, 1996). This in turn provides further 
incentive for Japanese companies to produce at a lower cost overseas. 
According to JETRO (Japan External trade Organization): 
U Japanese firms faced growing competition in Asia, including the 
Japanese market, due to the liberalization of trade and investment 
ushered in by the WTO and AFTA [American Free Trade Association], 
the rapid emergence of Chinese firms ahead of China's accession into 
the WTO, the continuing development of information technology, and 
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the growing presence of European and U.S. firms in the region. 
Japanese firms, especially electrical and electronic firms, sought to cut 
costs further and increasingly shift production bases to countries in, for 
example, the ASEAN region. "(JETRO White Paper on Foreign Direct 
Investment, 2001: 39). 
The international competitiveness of products manufactured in Japan has 
been further undermined by the marketization and growing dynamism of the 
Chinese economy. Japan's trade surplus with China of 700,700,000,000 yen 
in 1986 changed to a negative trade balance of 2,223,200 yen in 1998 
(Ministry of Finance, 1999). FDI-Ied investment in China has led to 
remarkable growth, both in absolute terms but also relative to the rest of East 
Asia. China's share of East Asian GDP rose from 25 to 37 per cent between 
1980 and 1999, and it accounted for around 40 per cent of East Asian growth 
in the 1990s (METI White Paper on International Trade, 2001: 11). By 1998 
China's GDP was the seventh largest in the world, and over the last decade 
Chinese exports have quadrupled, so that by 1999 it was the world's ninth 
largest exporter (ibid). Japan supported China's early accession to the WTO 
(Diplomatic Bluebook, 2000), which took place on 10 November 2001. 
Increasing production in China, with its lower wages and growing local 
markets, is also likely to prove irresistible, as communications technology 
continues to improve. In fact, in December 1999, Citizen watches, which has 
for some time been assembling the largest number of its watches in China, 
but continuing to assemble high value added watches in Japan, announced 
that changes in the environment in China and better Internet and other 
communications made it possible to take advantage of lower costs and shift 
100 per cent of production overseas. The economic liberalization and 
development policies of China poses a particular challenge. China is both far 
larger and rather more protectionist than other East Asian countries (though 
tariff rates have fallen rapidly in recent years as Figure 4.8 shows). The rapid 
development of China's manufacturing sector raises the question, "How much 
space is there in the market for countries in the same region producing the 
same goods for export?". 
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Figure 4.8: Average tariff rates of East Asian countries (1988-2000) 
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The competitiveness of the Japanese national model of capitalism has been 
undermined not only by cheaper production in developing countries, but also 
by more efficient production in developed economies. The distinctive mode of 
production which had assisted Japan's post-war production was gradually 
studied and adopted in some of Japan's industrial competitors. Schwartz 
writes: 
"Just as production innovation in the US and Germany undercut the 
basis for British hegemony in the 1890s, innovation in Germany, and 
particularly Japan undercut US dominance in manufacturing and thus 
eroded US hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s." (Schwartz, 2000: 281). 
And the apparent success of Japanese management, as shown by high levels 
of productivity and apparently low levels of industrial strife resulted in much 
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academic and popular interest in the possibilities of adopting key points from 
this model. 
Ford Motor Company's alliance with Mazda enabled the former to increase its 
productivity to the levels of the latter. By 1992, General Motors had 
established its 'Saturn' division, which used kanban and kaizen principles 
(Schwartz, 2000). This process was not always unproblematic: Fucini and 
Fucini (1990) describe resistance to Japanese production techniques at the 
Mazda plant in Detroit, as does Graham's account of worker resistance at the 
Subaru-Isuzu Automotive plant in Indiana (Graham, 1994). Rinehart et al 
(1994) also describe a level of resentment to kaizen in Canada. However 
Mary Saso (1990) writes positively of the acceptance of Japanese 
management techniques among women in Ireland and Britain and Dedoussis 
and Littler (1994) write of the way techniques have been adapted in Australia. 
Hatch and Yamamura (1996) examine various case studies which suggest 
that it was somewhat easier to 'clone' Japanese practices in Asia, either 
because of cultural similarity or because East Asia and the US were at 
different stages of economic development. Nonetheless, Japan's competitive 
advantage was slowly disappearing, and by 1999, a heavily indebted Nissan 
was forced to seek financial assistance from Renault. 
Liberalization of the Japanese economy 
The Japanese state has attempted to regain its former competitiveness by 
introducing more liberal economic policies. It is important to set this in 
context. In recent decades the world has seen a massive expansion of free 
trade and deregulation, achieved through the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GAIT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO); 
regional trade agreements have been promoted in the form of the North 
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the 
Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC), as well as bilateral 
negotiations on trade. Stephen Gill (2002) condemns the emergence of non-
democratic and unaccountable global governance, and argues for the need to 
137 
recognize the influence of neoliberal ideology in shaping state policy (see 
Section 2.1 for a fuller discussion of this). Ideology, Gill argues, is 
instrumental in the states' decisions to adopt policies of deregulation, the 
liberalization of domestic markets, and the privatization of state services and 
social services. All of these tendencies have been evident in Japan. 
The Japanese state began to undertake neo-liberal administrative reform, 
beginning in the early 1980s. The second Blue Ribbon Commission of 
Administrative Reform submitted a series of recommendations in 1981, which 
were, according to Itoh (2000), overtly influenced by Thatcherism and 
Reaganomics. Following these recommendations, three nationalized 
industries, Japan National Railways (JNR), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
Public Corporation (NIT) and the Japan Tobacco and Salt Company were 
privatized in 1985. During the privatization process prominent trade unionists 
lost their jobs (ibid). 
The late 1980s saw a proliferation of the terms 'internationalization' 
(kokusaika) and 'globalization' (gurobaruka), which increasing appeared in 
slogans of Japanese corporations, ministerial directives and governmental 
and quasi-governmental organizations (Sedgewick, 2001) and have now 
achieved popular currency in Japan (Menju, 1999). 
Section 4.2 has shown how Japanese companies and government policies 
have greatly facilitated the globalization of Japanese production and neo-
liberal economic reform. Chapter Three cited Gibson-Graham's (1996) 
analysis that globalization is presented in a gendered and natural 
phenomenon in political discourse, in a way that suggests nation states are 
powerless to resist its exigencies. In the discourse of political elites in Japan, 
globalization is often presented as an unstoppable outside force to which 
Japan has no option but to submit. Government Council Reports such as 
Strategy for the Rebirth of the Japanese Economy (26 February 1999) and 
Plan for the Next Ten Years (Nikkei 14 April 1999) argue in favour of domestic 
adjustment towards a neo-liberal economy to fit with changing global 
conditions (Hook and Hasegawa, 2001). 
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Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) was established in 
1946 as a nationwide business association, and its membership includes 
1,007 leading corporations as well as 116 industry-wide groups representing, 
inter alia, manufacturing, trade, distribution, finance, and energy. Keidanren 
Chairman Takashi Imai, and Vice Chairman, Josei Itoh have written and 
campaigned extensively for neo-Iiberal reforms, presenting them as an 
inevitability in a globalized world. Imai wrote in January 2001.: 
"With globalization and network building accelerating ever faster, 
making an all-out effort jointly by the government, industry and the 
general population to implement economic structural reforms, and to 
build the foundations for sustainable growth are the duty imposed upon 
us." (my italics) (Imai, 2001,) 
In 1995, the Japan Federation of Employers' Association (Nikkeiren) 
published an "Employment portfolio" recommending a shift towards new 
Japanese style management'. They argued that the workforce should be 
divided into three types of labour power: the core workforce, which would as 
now, receive all the benefits of security of tenure and seniority wages but 
would be much reduced in size; specialists who would be hired for short term 
contracts and paid according to merit rather than seniority and a third group 
should be used for numerical flexibility. This is in line with the current trends 
in economic globalization and its flexibilization of the workforce. As the next 
chapter shows these changes have different implication for men and for 
women. 
In 1997, in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, the use of stock options 
as a form of payment was legalized. Dore (2000) attributes this measure to 
the desire to encourage directors of firms to identify with their shareholders, 
instead of prioritising continued employment for all regular employees (see 
Section 4.1). Josei Itoh, Vice Chairman of Keidanren wrote, in a similar vein: 
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"Japan's prosperity, seen as a gloriously successful example of 
capitalism with socialist elements, was once the focus of international 
attention. Yet, as the rate of economic growth slowed, the nation's 
image began to lose its former splendour. .... A firm commitment is 
also needed by Japanese corporations to undertake internal reforms. 
With the globalization of the economy, management practices that 
place the priority solely on the expansion of one's own company are no 
longer in step with the times. Companies must now earn the trust of 
their stockholders while creating new business operations, increasing 
earnings by cutting costs and other means." .... (my italics). (Itoh, 
1997,). 
The attempt to cuts costs have included the downsizing of the regular 
workforce and an increase in the hiring of non-regular workers. The Japanese 
government has also passed a raft of legislation, including the liberalization of 
temporary employment agencies, and the facilitating of part-time work in an 
attempt to make the Japanese workforce more numerically flexible. While 
forced layoffs are still rare, even male regular workers can be strongly 
encouraged to accept redundancy, and, older male regular employees, 
because their seniority-related wages make them so expensive are more 
vulnerable than younger regular workers. In December 2001 the 
unemployment rate in Japan was 5.5%, the highest figure since records began 
in 1953, and there were 440,000 men between the ages of 45 and 55 without 
a job (BBC, Fir 28 December, 2001). 
In sum, in the context of a hegemonic neo-liberalism, Japan is moving away 
from its post war model of capitalism which was characterized by support for 
banks and large firms, relative income equality and a guaraQtee of security for 
regular male workers. 
Deregulation, though has not so far had the effect of attracting much foreign 
business to Japan (although the exception of banking is discussed in Chapter 
Seven). Wages in Japan are high. Furthermore, few Japanese, including 
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business and political elites are fluent in English (Lehmann, 2000), and 
Japanese is rarely taught as a second language overseas. Taken together, 
these factors mean that Japan is an unattractive environment for foreign direct 
investment. As Cho from Toyota notes, Japanese markets are unattractive to 
FOI, so if companies go abroad it is unlikely that foreign firms will enter Japan 
to replace them. This supposition is amply borne out by the experience of the 
deregulation of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which was followed by an actual 
drop in trading. Foreign firms and traders were discouraged by the high cost 
of doing business in Japan, including wages, rents, fees and corporate taxes; 
differences in accounting systems and other drawbacks such as lower living 
standards and the complexity of the Japanese language (Takenaka and 
Chida, 1998). 
Japan has the lowest transnationality index of any developed economy 
(figureA.9). This lack of transnationality means that the leakage of jobs and 
investment from Japan has not been compensated for by an increase in jobs 
and investment from foreign companies in Japan. However, as Yashiro 
(1998) points out, even the minor presence of a foreign firm in a market can 
introduce new ways of working. The implications of this for women will be 
examined in Chapter Five. 
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Fig. 4.9: Transnationality index of host economies, 1997 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2000: Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions and 
Development 
(UNCTAD's transnationality index (TNI) is a composite index of three ratios: foreign 
assets/total assets; foreign sales/total sales; and foreign employmenUtotal employment)51. 
51 Figure 4.9 uses an average of the three shares: FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed 
capita l formation for the past three years (1995-1997); FDI inward stocks as a percentage of 
GDP in 1997; value added of foreign affiliates as a percentage of total employment In 1997. 
Only the economies for which data for all these these shares are available were selected. 
Data on value added are available only for Finland (1996), France (1996), Italy, Japan, 
Norway, Portugal (1996) , Sweden (1995), the United States, China (1994). For other 
economies, date were estimated by applying the ratio of value added of United States 
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Globalization and Japanese migration 
A third impact of the globalization of Japanese production is the increase in 
inward and outward migration. Japanese immigration laws are strict and 
Japan still has the lowest proportion of foreign residents of any major 
industrialized country (Sellek, 2001). However, during the Bubble economy58 
boom, there was a surge of foreign, unskilled (and largely undocumented) 
workers entering Japan to solve Japan's labour shortage. To cope with this 
influx, the Japanese government amended the existing Immigration Control 
Act, and new regulations came into effect on 1 June 1990. Although the 
general prohibition of unskilled foreign workers remained, the government 
attempted to solve the problem of labour shortage. by allowing Nikkeijin (South 
Americans of Japanese descent) and an increased number of foreign trainees 
to enter Japan. Despite the Japanese recession, the number of foreign 
residents with alien registration permits increased by 60.7% between 1988 
and 1998, in which year their numbers reached 1, 512, 116 (Sellek, 2001: 9). 
The globalization of Japanese production has encouraged emigration as well 
as immigration. The export of Japanese production has necessitated the 
growth of Japanese business communities in cities as diverse as Beijing, 
Taipei, Seoul, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Singapore, Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
New York, London, Paris and Dusseldorf. These are often serviced by a 
community of more long-term residents who provide services such as the 
provision of Japanese food, schools and hairdressers. Of course this makes 
life more comfortable for Japanese executives, students and other Japanese 
living outside Japan. When these short-term overseas residents return to 
affiliates to United States outward FDI stock to total FDI stock of the country. Data on 
employment are available only for Austria, Denmark (1996), Finland, France (1996), Germany 
(1996), Sweden (1996), the United States, Brazil (1995), China, Hong Kong (China), 
Indonesia (1996), Mexico (1993) and Taiwan Province of China (1995). For other economies, 
data were estimated by applying the ratio of employment of German and United States 
outward FDI stock to total inward FDI stock of the economy. 
ssrhe Bubble economy refers to the period from 1980 to 1989 when large scale bank lending 
to companies, guaranteed by the extensive use of land, at inflated prices, as collateral, left 
financial institutions very exposed to asset price deflation. The Bubble burst in 1989, leaving 
many banks with unrecoverable loans. 
143 
Japan, they bring with them the ideas that they have encountered overseas: 
many young economists returning to Japan with PhDs in economics, and 
diffusing the neo-liberalism that they have learned in the US through their 
teaching; while the greatly increased number of business executives who go 
the States to study for MBAs cannot fail to be exposed to US conceptions of 
the firm and the economy (Itoh, 2000; Dore, 2000). However the contacts 
between Japanese expatriates and short stay residents can also prove a 
conduit for the transfer and sharing of deeper cultural values and a way of 
organising cross-nationally. For example, following the well-publicized case 
of a culture of sexual harassment at Mitsubishi in the US, the US Pan Asian 
American Chamber of Commerce presented a seminar on diversity for the 
benefit of their executives at Mitsubishi, Sony, Honda, Marubeni, Toyota and 
other companies (Lim, downloaded 2001). The case also received much 
publicity in Japan and was used by feminist campaigners to some effect (see 
Nakayama 1996). 
The comparative wealth of Japan, resulting from its economic 'miracle' has 
also permitted - not for reasons of economic need - the relative economic 
equality in Japan means these opportunities are not restricted to a small elite. 
While Japan is host to far fewer migrants than other advanced industrial 
economies, Japanese people are increasingly going overseas for educational 
or business purposes. This results in the development of a more 
cosmopolitan and reflexive Japanese elite, who have been exposed to 
different models of work and gender relations. 
4. 5. Conclusion 
Japanese post-war economic recovery was heavily aided by the US in the 
context of post-war politics. This resulted in the development of a very 
successful model of production, characterized by a dual labour market, where 
lifetime employment, yearly negotiated pay rises and continuous training was 
guaranteed to regular workers in large export-oriented firms. The same 
guarantees were not available to non-regular workers, nor were they available 
to the same extent, to workers in small and medium sized enterprises. Initially, 
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the state gave guidance to and facilitated the growth of enterprises in targeted 
sectors producing for export. The government pursued a policy of licensing 
foreign technology and controlling inward and outward flows of capital in order 
to protect infant industries and convert Japan into high skill, high value-added 
economy. 
Despite government attempts to control the flow of capital inside and outside 
Japan, trade with and aid to the rest of Asia have gradually escalated. 
Security considerations in the 1970s provided further encouragement to 
Japan to invest in the region, helping to stabilize it and ensure a continued 
supply of raw materials to Japanese industry. Furthermore, Japan's 
economic success made FDI host countries receptive to the idea of learning 
from Japan. Japanese policy-makers have come under pressure from both 
inside and outside Japan to allow firms to produce overseas and to allow 
entry of foreign companies into the Japanese domestic market, and, as the 
yen has become stronger relative to the currency of other East Asian 
countries, it has become economically rational for Japanese firms to produce 
overseas. The collapse of Bretton Woods, the Plaza Accord and the East 
Asian financial crisis were key breaks which increased the momentum of this 
process. The end of the Cold War has also increased the possibilities of 
overseas production. 
The strategy of overseas production undermined the success and stability of 
the Japanese model however by 'hollowing out' Japanese production. Goods 
came to be produced more cheaply elsewhere and undercut the prices of 
Japanese exports: at the same time, wages in Japan were not suffiCiently high 
for workers to consume Japan's surplus in manufactured goods. Innovations 
in production, such as the 3Ks, have to some extent been copied by Japan's 
competitors. 
The success of newly-industrialising countries in developing high-value added 
manufacturing industries, and Japan;s increased acceptance of the principles 
of free trade means that there has been a flow of imports into Japan, there 
has bee very little inflow of FDI. New flows of jobs and finance, therefore, 
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appear to be leaving Japan. Japanese industry has tried to counter this 
challenge by attempting to cut the costs of domestic production, by reducing 
labour costs and making the workforce more numerically flexible. In Japan, 
as elsewhere (see Section 3.1) elite discourse around globalization presents 
the phenomenon as an irresistible outside force, to which Japan has no 
choice but to submit, in order to continue to be competitive with the Anglo-
American model of capitalism. Typically globalization is presented as 
requiring the Japanese model to adopt neo-liberal prescriptions of 
deregulation and a diversification of the labour force. 
The effects of this for women will be examined in later chapters. As well as 
the apparent economic effects of the globalization of production, there has 
been some incremental socio-cultural change: Japanese managers and 
students today have more diverse experiences through work overseas, this 
leading to an exposure to different models of capitalism and different models 
of workplace social relations, including relations between men and women. 
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Chapter Five: 
Women Workers in the Post-War Model of Capitalism in Japan 
- Continuity and Change 
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5.0. Introduction 
In order to show how the various facets of globalization are changing the 
position of working women in Japan, it is first necessary to understand what 
role women have played in the Japanese model of capitalism. This chapter 
therefore discusses the position of women in the Japanese labour force from 
the end of the Second World War, showing the patterns of continuity and 
change. This provides vital background for examining the impact of 
restructuring upon women's work in Japan. As Chapter Four has 
demonstrated, many of the distinctive aspects of the Japanese national 
model of employment arose in the unique circumstances prevailing in the 
immediate postwar period. It was, I have argued, the specific context of the 
Cold War, the changes made to Japanese institutions by the Occupation 
forces, the development priorities of the Japanese state, and the actions of 
the Japanese trade union movement that led to the emergence of the 
distinctive Japanese model of capitalism. 
The position of women within that model, has variously been attributed to the 
late impact of capitalist relations and the persistence of Confucian ideas in 
Japanese society, through the influence of the household or ie as the 
fundamental unit of domestic and economic organization (Clark, 1979; 
Stockman, Bonney, and Xuewen, 1995; Tsukaguchi-LeGrand, 1999) or of 
continuity from rural patterns (Abegglen, 1958; Dore 1973). This chapter will 
argue that the position of women in the Japanese model of national 
capitalism, far from being the continuation of consensual patterns of social 
organization with deep roots in ancient Japanese culture, was in fact a break 
with prewar patterns, shaped by the interaction of Japanese post war 
institutional arrangements and state regulation. To show that this is so, 
Section 5.1 outlines the role that women played in Japanese industrialization 
before the Second World War. Section 5.2 then shows how the specific 
institutions of the Japanese national model of capitalism, which arose in the 
post war period, most notably lifetime employment enterprise unions and 
payment by seniority, interacted with political priorities, legal change and 
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social expectations about women's reproductive work, to create demand for a 
female secondary labour force. Institutions though, do evolve (see Section 
2.3). Social and demographic change, an increase in educational provision 
for Japanese girls and women, women's activism and, in the context of 
globalization, the increased acceptance of the ideology of equal labour rights 
have meant that the situation of women in the Japanese workforce has 
gradually altered. Section 5.3 examines patterns of continuity and change 
in women's employment in postwar Japan, thus setting providing background 
information to meet the thesis aim of : 
• Examining impact of restructuring upon women's employment in 
Japan. 
Section 5.4 introduces the changes globalization is causing to women's 
position in the labour force generally, thereby contributing to the thesis aims 
of: 
• Contributing to the feminist debate about the impact of 
globalization upon women by bringing insights from the case of 
Japan into the wider academic discourse. 
Chapters Six and Seven explore in more depth the particular implications that 
globalization is having for women in the regular and non-regular workforces 
in Japan. 
5. 1. Women's role in Japanese industrial development 
It was observed in Chapter Three that no country has successfully 
industrialized without a large-scale incorporation of women into the labour 
force. Japan is no exception. Japanese women have long been active in the 
labour force, albeit in subordinate positions, whether in domestic service, 
agriculture, or industry. The first phase of Japan industrial development 
began towards the end of the nineteenth century. In this period, even in non-
manufacturing sectors, it is apparent that there was nothing unusual about 
women entering the workforce. 
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The ie, or household, was the fundamental unit of economic organization of 
pre-industrial Japan. The household rather than the individual was the legal 
unit; everyone had to register as a member of a household; and all were 
subordinate to the male head of that household. Merchant houses recruited 
extra staff through the adoption of young men, and the master of the house 
assumed parental responsibility towards them. Although women in the 
merchant class followed different routes, they too might enter the household 
of another (Bacon, 1902, cited in Stockman, Bonney and Xuewen, 1995) to 
learn feminine skills, such as flower arranging and tea ceremony (which they 
could later teach), or as servants. However, whether they were servants or 
blood relatives of the head of household, in accordance with Confucian 
teachings, their position was formally and actually subordinate. Among the 
peasantry, it was the norm for women of all ages to work. In fact, since the 
1930s more women than men have worked in the agricultural sector (Hunter, 
1993). At the end of World War Two, the proportion of working women in the 
total population was arguably the highest of all developed nations, because 
of Japan's still heavily agricultural labour force (Iwao, 1993: 154).59 
The paid and unpaid labour of women was vital to Japan's successful 
industrialization. Samurai and government officials patriotically sent their 
own daughters to work in the first state-run silk factory at Tomioka, which 
opened in 1892, after rumours that the French specialists working there 
would suck the blood of employees deterred farming women from applying 
(Matsumoto, 1976). In pre-war Japan, women frequently worked in sales, 
domestic service, factory work and cottage industries. Uno (1993) has 
probed the lives of female pieceworkers, entrepreneurs, workers in family 
businesses, and employers in the early twentieth century. In 1939, women 
over 25 were ordered to work in coal mines (Paulson, 1976) and from the 
early 1940s unmarried girls were drafted to work in factories. Table 5.1 
59 In 1950 more than 60 per cent of working women were engaged in agriculture. (Japan 
Institute for Workers' Evolution, 2001 a: 1). 
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shows the number and distribution of 'gainfully employed' women in 1906, 
1916, 1926 and 19366°. 
It is true that there were some state attempts to restrict and redefine the role 
of women. The definition of the ideal role of woman as ryosai kenbo (good 
wife, wise mother) emerged in Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, in 
tandem with the rise of modern Japanese nationalism, which sought to 
modernize the state and strengthen it against Western imperialism. The 
kazoku kokka (family-state) exalted the family as the foundation of the nation, 
and filial piety was seen as analogous to loyalty to the emperor. A woman's 
role was essentially home-based. She was to provide her husband with 
comfort, care for the old, raise loyal and patriotic subjects and manage the 
household (Uno, 1993). The 18805 and 1890s saw laws passed stifling the 
emerging women's suffrage movement and excluding girls from advanced 
education, such as the college preparatory course in which female students 
had been enrolling since the 1870s. The 1898 Civil Code placed nearly all 
women under the authority of a male head of household. Though a central 
part of official discourse, ryosa; kenbo did not achieve hegemonic status as it 
demonstrably did not reflect the reality of the lives of factory workers and farm 
workers particularly. The term fell out of use after 1945 because of its 
associations with imperialism, but the assumption of women's tokuse; (special 
character) has continued to influence official policy. 
Despite the long traditions of women working in Japan, in the years following 
the Second World War, Japan was unique in the developed world in seeing a 
decline in the number of women working outside the home. The proportion of 
women of working age holding a job was 57 per cent in 1955, 51 per cent in 
1965 and 46 per cent in 1975 (Woronoff, 1982: 138). The next section will 
describe why this participation rate fell, and how the nature of women's 
employment changed, after the Second World War. 
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Figure 5.1 The distribution of gainfully employed women, 1906-36 (per 
cent) 
Industry 1906 1916 1926 1936 
Agriculture and forestry 65.5 63.2 60.5 57.4u 
Fisheries and salt making 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Mining and quarrying 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.2 
Construction 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Textile industry 6.4 7.8 8.8 8.9 
Clothing industry 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Wood and bamboo products 2.0 1.3 1.1 0.6 
Food and beverage industry 1.2 1.4 1.8 0.9 
Other manufacturing and utilities 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Commerce 9.9 10.5 7.5 7.3 
Domestic Service 7.7 7.9 5.2 8.0 
Hotel, restaurant and others 
- -
6.3 8.1 
Other tertiary industry and nowhere 2.8 3.5 4.4 4.2 
else classified 
Total (actual figures) 100.00 100.00 100.1 99.8 
(9,920,000) (9,988,000) (10, 436,000) (11,691,000) 
Source: Odaka, 1993: 18 
5.2. Women's Employment and the Japanese National Model of 
Capitalism 
The fall in female participation in the workforce 
Figure 5.2 shows the fall in women's overall participation rate between 1955 
and 1975. The decline in women's full time employment can be attributed to 
a range of institutional and social factors, all of which combined to limit the 
choices of most women to providing a temporary assistant workforce, before 
61 This statistic is exceeded by the later figure indicated in footnote 53. This probably 
indicates a rise in employment in agriculture during the War. 
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retiring to provide reproductive labour within the home. This section will 
explain how Japan's changing international position, legal change, and lack 
of union protection led to an immediate and dramatic fall in women's 
employment in the years immediately following the end of the Second World 
War. 
Figure 5.2 Women's Participation in the Labour Force (1955-1995) 
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Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Labour Force Survey Annual Report 
From 1945 onwards, Japanese women came under pressure to leave the 
jobs they had occupied during the war. Most of the seven million demobilized 
servicemen were unemployed (Brown, 1998:131). The end of the war had 
also resulted in the end of Japanese colonization of other Asian countries. 
Many Japanese expatriates had returned from former colonies. The 
government tried to secure jobs for these men. The 1947 Employment 
Security Law set up a network of public employment offices and prohibited 
'worker-dispatching,62 activities to ensure the employment security of workers. 
Between February 1944 and December 1945 the number of women 
employed (excluding those employed in agriculture) fell from 5.25 million to 
2.31 million (ibid: 58). 
SCAP's plan to democratize Japanese society included raiSing the status of 
women. Article 14 of the new 1947 Japanese Constitution, which was largely 
62 i.e. the setting up of employment agencies to supply casual or temporary labour. 
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drawn up by SCAP, guaranteed women equal legal rights and freedom from 
discrimination in political, economic or social relations. The Constitution also 
sought to dismantle the ie and to secure equal treatment between the sexes 
in the household. However, SCAP did little to counter the mass replacement 
of working women with demobilized soldiers, possibly because in the US, 
women were coming under the same pressure to leave their wartime 
occupations. Widows in particular complained that they were often rejected 
for jobs because they had children, and were therefore in receipt of family 
allowances (Ogawa, 1997). The assumption that women's earnings were of 
secondary importance to those of men led to more women than men being 
dismissed in the recessions of 1949-50 and 1952-1953. 
Another element of SCAP's 'democratization', the legalization of trade unions, 
did not advance, and sometimes retarded, the case of women wishing to 
remain in employment. After the deflation of the 1940s, and the Dodge Plan 
(see Section 4.1), union leaders agreed to the demands of management that 
unions moved from including all non-managerial employees to a membership 
limited to those whose job security was assured. (The corollary of this is that 
as non-standard forms of employment have increased, the proportion of 
labour which is unionized has fallen: from around 33 per cent in the 1960s 
and 1970s to 22.4 per cent in 1998 (Rengo, 1999: 5). In some cases, trade 
unions even acted to reduce the level of women's employment. In 1966, 
Tokyu Kikan Kogyo (an engine manufacturer) changed its retirement age 
from 50 years for both men and women to 30 years of age for women only, a 
result of an agreement between management and an a"-male delegation of 
labour representatives (Shinozawa and Hiroki, 1998). 
Many women also lost their jobs because the legislation that was intended to 
protect them was either ineffective or counterproductive. The Labour 
Standards Law, imposed upon the Japanese government by the US 
Occupation Forces in 1947 (Roberts, 1994), institutionalized several 
provisions for the 'protection of motherhood', including six weeks maternity 
leave both before and after childbirth; the right to request leave for child care, 
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paid menstruation leave (seiri kyuuka, literally 'physiological leave'); 
restrictions on overtime and a ban on night work. Carney and O'Kelly (1990) 
argue that this institutionalized the contingent and marginal character of 
women's work, noting that thousands of women workers in railway transport 
and similar occupations immediately lost their jobs when Labour Standards 
law came into effect. The rights were in effect difficult to exercise. Courts 
upheld a firm's right to refuse a bonus - which could be worth several months 
salary - to employees who took menstrual leave. 
Article Four of the Labour Standards Law also specified that men and women 
should receive equal pay for equal work. However there was no obligation to 
treat women equally with regard to recruitment, hiring, promotion, fringe 
benefits and retirement (Asakura, 1998). Until 1966, the Ministry of Labour 
took the view that terminating a woman's employment upon marriage did not 
violate the Labour Standards Law. 
State policy, lack of union protection, and legal change then led to a drastic 
fall in the proportion of women in the workforce. The next subsection 
describes how the emergence of a model of employment with high fixed 
costs, and state development policy priorities, combined with social 
expectations about the role of mothers, to give women a position in the labour 
force, which, though changing over time, remained largely marginal to that of 
men. 
Women as peripheral labour force 
Chapter Four described the postwar capital-labour 'bargain', whereby union 
members in large firms, whether blue collar or white collar employees, would 
enjoy the benefits of lifetime employment and payments according to 
seniority, but that only 'regular' workers would qualify for union membership. 
These 'regular' workers included men and women, but as women customarily 
retired from their positions upon marriage or childbirth, the overwhelming 
155 
majority of such workers were men. The 'classical Japanese model' of the 
firm as community, worker commitment and flexibility in exchange for 
employment security, the seniority-plus-merit (nenko) principle in pay and 
promotion and enterprise unionism (Kato and Steven, 1993) though only ever 
pertained to a minority of workers. Large corporations were able to afford 
these benefits for their workers, by external ising risk, and requiring firms 
further down the keiretsu subcontracting chain to provide flexible pricing and 
production. A higher proportion of women than men were employed within 
these small and medium-sized companies. Women were and are also more 
likely to work in those other groups of non-regular workers excluded from the 
Japanese employment system, such as contract workers, temporary workers, 
family workers, part-timers, agro-industrial workers, and homeworkers. 
Women were not only more likely to find themselves in the peripheral labour 
force, but to have a peripheral position in the core labour force. The whole 
system of payment by seniority, described earlier was dependent upon the 
'early retirement' of female employees. Even within large companies, 
supposedly permanent women workers would usually retire upon marriage or 
the birth of their first child. In fact without women's short tenure and 
confinement to lower level positions, it would not have been possible for men 
to rise upwards through the company and take on more responsibility as the 
nenko system required. Some firms even specified retirement upon marriage 
in female employees' job contracts (Kawashima, 1995). Rohlen (1988) 
shows how the number of women employed in manufacturing fell rapidly in 
the first two years following the 1973 oil crisis and how 'natural' wastage, as 
women left at time of marriage, made possible the continuation of permanent 
employment policies for company 'core' workers even in time of recession. 
Other strategies employed by companies in the 1970s included laying off 
(predominantly female) part-time workers and suggesting that because of the 
special economic circumstances, women give up work even before they 
married or had children. Approximately 700,000-800,000 women left the 
labour force between 1974-1975 (Fox, 1999:2). 
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The reciprocal social effects of women's role in the Japanese national 
model of capitalism 
Labour markets operate at the intersection of the productive and 
reproductive63 economies (Elson, 1999). In the postwar period in Japan, the 
relationship between the productive and reproductive economies changed. 
Part of Japan's 'normative social order' (Ikenberry, 1988: 226) has long been 
the expectation that children will care for their elderly parents. In the 'ideal' 
ie the eldest son would take his elderly parents into his home, where they 
would be cared for by his wife64• In a family, which had no sons, the eldest 
daughter's husband would be formally adopted as a son (Martin and Tsuya, 
1991). Urbanization, and industrialization during Japan's economic miracle 
were accompanied by moves towards a nuclear family structure (although the 
proportion of three generation households in Japan still exceeds the 
proportion in other First World countries). This meant that for many middle 
class women, there was less help with childcare and housekeeping from 
relatives. 
Chapter Four explained that although the US supported the rebuilding of 
Japanese manufacturing industry, between 1955 and 1970 there was no 
increase in social and welfare spending, therefore women's caring work in the 
family took the place of social welfare (Fujita, 1987). The rapid rise in men's 
incomes also meant that it became economically possible for a family to 
manage on the wages of a sole breadwinner. As the chances of finding 
outside childcare decreased, there was a concomitant social pressure for 
mothers not to work outside the home, while their children were young. 
Working mothers became the focus of popular debate in the late 1950s, when 
63 A fuller explanation of these concepts can be found in Section 3.1. 
64 In reality, life expectancy in prewar Japan was so low, that it seems unlikely that much of 
women's reproductive labour was accounted for by caring for the elderly. Life expectancy at 
birth stood and 47 years for men and 50 years for women in 1935 (Ministry of Health, Labour 
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the women's magazine Fujin Koron (Women's Opinion) launched a 
discussion on whether women had the right to pursue a career other than that 
of wife and mother: the magazine's readership generally sided with 
arguments for the priority of motherhood (Buckley, 1993). A 1963 White 
Paper on Child Welfare claimed that "a deficiency in the level of nurturing is 
creating a risk for the children of this generation" and linked "the decline in 
child welfare" and "women's increased penetration of the workforce" 
(Buckley, 1994: 155). Cases of death due to improper care or staff shortages 
in public daycare centres also made the headlines (Knipe Mouer, 1976). 
This moral panic succeeded in stimulating guilt in at least two of the women 
who answered questionnaires in my survey in my 1996/1997 pilot survey. A 
60 year-old'S answer to a question about whether she had faced any 
problems on returning to work after having children wrote: 
"My children became what is called "door key" children (kaggiko) , 
because there was no-one who could take care of them after schooL" 
A 39 year-old employee of a multi-national corporation responded to a 
questionnaire about problems experienced when returning to work after 
having children: 
"In the beginning it was only four hours a week, so there was no 
difficulty with the children. The only one difficulty was during the 
weekend, there is no ... it is not certain that I will be able to get days off 
in the weekend, so the children are here alone and I have to work 
outside, and the children get a little bit embarrassed about the 
situation." 
and Welfare, 2000). As life expectancy has lengthened, 50 has the nature and extent of care 
required, as Chapter Seven will explore more fully. 
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Japanese society is often described as being characterized by 'educational 
credentialism' (gakureki shugl) (Choy, 1999). Exam success determines 
which schools, universities, and later, companies, men, at least, can enter. 
As this puts pressure on parents, and on mothers in particular, to devote 
much time and energy to providing assistance to their children. Mothers are 
considered to be almost wholly responsible for ensuring that their children 
succeed at school (Imamura, 1993). Mothers commonly help children with 
their schoolwork. They may spend time watching educational TV 
programmes; attend school or local government sponsored classes for 
educating mothers; or undergo instruction from their child's class teacher in 
the topics that the child is studying (Lebra,1984). There is now rather 
widespread and high quality childcare provision in Japan, with subsidized 
preschools serving 40 per cent of three year-olds and 90 per cent of 4 and 5 
year olds. Evidence suggests though that the expectation, established in the 
few decades after the Second World War, that mothers of young children will 
have a full-time role in the reproductive economy means that the raison d'etre 
of these institutions is more to socialize children than to relieve mothers. 
Nursery and primary schools place significant burdens on mothers' time. 
Working or not, mothers may be expected to attend regular parent-teacher 
meetings, provide highly elaborate o-bento (Iunchboxes) according to school 
recommendations and arrange for children to follow specific timetables, even 
during the vacations (Allinson, 1996). 
As the organization of work and the demands made of workers become 
institutionalized they affected what happened and 'in a more general way, the 
attitudes and principles and patterns of social relations found in the 
workplace are likely to have a certain congruence with those shown in other 
social spheres, simply because of the tendency towards conSistency in 
individual personalities and sets of values." (Dore 1973:280). From 1969 to 
1989 homemaking courses in schools were compulsory for girls. After this 
date, and much vigorous campaigning from the Women's Action Group and 
the Association for the Promotion of the Study of Homemaking by Both 
Sexes, homemaking courses became a requirement for boys too. It has been 
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noted by several commentators that Japanese parents' educational 
aspirations for their sons tend to be rather higher than for their daughters. 
Brinton (1993) attributes this to parents choosing to invest more in sons' 
education as, in keeping with the tradition of the three-generation household, 
they may expect financial help from sons in later life, and are also aware of 
the discrimination women face in the labour market and so consider money 
spent on a four year university education to be wasted. As recently as 1994, 
only 40 per cent of women in tertiary education were attending four year 
universities, compared to 96 per cent of men entering tertiary education. The 
remainder entered two-year junior colleges. (Fujimura-Fanselow and 
Kameda, 1994:46). Women anxious to have a career might of course make a 
rational decision to curtail the length of time they spend in higher education. 
As the expected tenure of women workers was so short, companies often did 
not hire female four-year university graduates, who, they expected would stay 
in the workforce for an even shorter period of time than their junior college 
peers. Brinton cited the comments of a mother, in the 1980s, who was keen 
for her daughter to go to a university: 
"Now my daughter is debating whether to go to junior college or 
university education. She says that getting a university education will 
be a handicap (fun) when she looks for a job; it's true that the situation 
for women university graduates is very bad and close to 100 per cent 
of junior college graduates can get jobs. But even so, I think she 
should go ahead and go to university. It's a hard situation and it's hard 
for me to give advice to my daughter." (Brinton, 1989:552) 
However, as graduation from a four year university is the usual requirement 
for a management position with a large company, the different educational 
paths typically followed by young men and women in Japan has had an 
impact of the effectiveness of equal opportunities legislation (This impact will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter SiX).65 
65 The increased education attainment of Japanese women, and its relationship to social and 
legal change wrought by globalization will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
160 
The previous paragraphs describe how the social expectations that women 
carry out all reproductive work have been, and continue to be, a factor in 
women's exit from the labour market. However, even this may to some 
extent be institutionally determined. In the case of Japan, it is evident that 
the long hours worked by Japanese company men means that they are 
unlikely to share housework or service themselves regarding the cleaning of 
clothes and provision of meals, nor to playa major role in childrearing. 
In summary, legal change and the political conditions at the end of the 
Second World War led to an exodus of women from the workforce, and state 
policy and the organization of work combined with expectations of women's 
role in providing reproductive labour combined to mean that most female 
regular workers provided a temporary, peripheral labour force. These 
expectations became institutionalized and reflected in the education system 
and other social institutions. As a result of social expectations, their 
husband's long working hours, and the move to a nuclear family, most 
Japanese women in most of the post-war period have had little alternative to 
leaving work while their children are young. Section 5.3 will examine the 
nature of women's employment, and the extent to which it has changed or 
remained constant during the post war period. 
5.3. Women's Work in the Postwar Japan: Continuity and 
Change 
The gendered nature of work. 
The jobs that men and women do reflect the positions of men and women in 
society generally. Particularly the work that women typically carry out in the 
reproductive economy has been reflected in the tasks assigned them in paid 
employment. In white-collar jobs in the years following the Second World 
War, it was common practice for male employees to expect female workers 
to serve tea, clean the offices and even polish their shoes. These menial 
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tasks have, increasingly, become a focus of resentment among some female 
employees. Serving tea in particular seems to have attained a certain 
symbolic importance. In a 1984 article Susan Pharr describes the prolonged 
resistance to tea pouring among female employees of Kyoto city government, 
as an example of 'status conflict' in Japan. Although it is highly unlikely that 
today a female office worker would be expected to clean her male co-workers' 
shoes, it appears that carrying out gendered tasks is still an integral part of 
the positions filled by women employees. Although no questions were 
specifically asked about this, many survey participants spontaneously 
mentioned such tasks among their dislikes. For example, a 25 year old 
medical clerical worker wrote: 
"My position as a medical clerical worker is lower than that of a 
pharmacist and I have to do chore work like cleaning the office. [My 
duties include] Calculation, computer operation, remuneration of 
medical charges, work in the office (including serving tea, cleaning the 
office, taking care of the office plants)" 
An employee of non-profit making organization said: 
''They treat me as a girl. They think serving tea is a women's job" 
Female office workers were commonly referred to as 'office flowers' (shokuba 
no hana6\ with the strong implication that their presence was decorative, 
and short-term. This has been reflected in recruitment practice. For 
example, in February 1983, newspapers reported that the labour union at 
Kinokuniya bookstore was protesting against a memo sent to branches and 
sales office throughout Japan, which advised against the employment of full 
time women workers who were "Ugly, short, unsophisticated, or wear 
glasses." (Shiozawa and Hiroki, 1988:26). 
Chapter Three cited Feldman's observation that some women strategically 
employ social norms to maintain their employment (Feldman, 2001). Women 
66 Today this term is only likely to be used ironically. 
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in Japan also, in certain circumstances, use the discourse of femininity and 
gendered work to justify their employment in certain, high status careers. 
Writing in the 1970s, Dilatush (1976) noted the relatively high proportion of 
female professionals, compared to women in management) (see also 
Shinotsuka 1994). Saso (1990) also notes that some women have been 
successful in rising in the professions or the civil service. However, she 
convincingly attributes this to the relative gender-blindness of these areas of 
employment, which rely upon competitive examination for entry. Success in 
competitive examinations can be one way for women to establish a paid 
career: Shinotsuka (1994) notes that a greater proportion of women (13.8%) 
than men (11.3%) work as specialists67, and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that this a route being purposefully chosen by an increasing number of 
women (see Chapter Six). Nonetheless, women's professional success in 
these areas has often been attributed, in public discourse, to stereotypicallY 
female qualities68• Even in the area of dentistry, which does not have 
immediate nurturing associations, a female dentist, close to retirement age 
told me: 
"If you're a woman you can talk to children more easily. I can say, 
"There, there. It's okay." I feel that the nature of women - to be gentle 
and caring. That sort of thing is very suitable for my job. So 
concerning the occupation I feel that I am happy because I am a 
woman and I feel happy in my job because I am a woman. In my 
ordinary life occasionally, well often actually, I have had the feeling 
67 'Senmonka' is often translated as 'expert' or 'specialist' , but tends in practice to mean 
someone with a skill, often a certified skill, and would include people who carry out 
professional work such as accountants, computer programmers or translators. 
68 From 1884 women were allowed to become doctors through taking the national licensing 
exam in Medical Arts. This was seen as appropriate to women's supposedly natural 
'nurturant' qualities. Fifty three per cent of working women who were college graduates in 
1965 worked as teachers (Iwao: 1993). Knipe Mouer refers to the debates of the early 
twentieth century, where the increaSing number of female teachers was controversial, but 
gradually accepted as, those who favoured their employment argued, 
•.... their gentle and patient dispositions make them perfectly suited for teaching'- (Knipe-
Mauer, 1976:163). 
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that I would like to be a man, but as far as my occupation is concerned 
I have never had that feeling and I am happy to be a woman." 
Women's tenure in the regular workforce 
Although a series of court judgements from 1966 onwards formally outlawed 
the practice of companies requiring women to retire at marriage, informally, 
social expectations and the culture of the workplace continued to lead to 
women leaving work upon marriage or pregnancy. Women's jobs outside the 
home were referred to as an koshikake (temporary seat), where women could 
observe social life (shakai kengaku) , before retiring upon marriage (kekkon 
taishoku) taking up lifetime employment (eikyuu shuushoku) in the home 
(Iwao, 1993; Woronoff, 1982). A trading company employee told me of the 
practice of one large firm that would only take on women who lived with their 
parents. Parents were expected to attend the firm's welcome ceremony for 
new employees and told it was their responsibility to ensure that their 
daughters retired at marriage. 
As women were expected to retire, they did not receive the same high quality 
on-the-job training as their male co-workers. Even now women's training is 
often limited to instruction in how to properly greet customers and speak to 
colleagues A 27 year old insurance clerk, who responded to my 199617 
survey, when asked if there was any difference in the training she and her 
male co-workers received, answered: 
uYes, male staff [ ... ] have training for two months at head office just 
after being taken on, but female staff [ ... ] have no training and are 
posted to general clerk [work]." 
Many companies took on board assumptions that women are essentially 
short-term workers, unlikely to have, or to be interested in acquiring, skills 
useful to the company. It is interesting to read the recruitment literature of 
some of the larger Japanese corporations that stresses the opportunities for 
female employees to acquire what might be described as human capital for 
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the marriage market. Brother, for example, in the late 1980s, emphasized the 
opportunity to learn tea ceremony at the company dormitory and claimed that 
learning bookkeeping at the company would be useful because it would help 
women learn how to do household accounts. The ideal path for a female 
employee was shown in cartoon form: at eighteen she enters the company; at 
nineteen she prepares for marriage by undergoing bridal training, taking 
company-provided classes in cooking, sewing, knitting and becoming 
onnarrashii (feminine or womanly); at twenty she dates, and by twenty-one is 
at the altar in a wedding dress, quitting the company and using her savings to 
set up home (Lo, 1990). This indicates something of a mismatch between 
the expectations of companies and those of their female employees: the 
average age of marriage is for women today is 26.8 years. In 1990 at the time 
Lo was writing, it was around 25.8 years (Japan Insight, 2002a). 
Despite the assumptions of companies, women's tenure in the regular 
workforce has lengthened. The average number of years women worked 
continuously in 1960 was four years while men worked, on average, for eight 
years. The average number of years women worked had come to exceed six 
years by 1980, and in 1996, 8.2 years. In 1996, 28 per cent of women had 
been working for more than 10 years, and 9.2 per cent for more than 20 
years. The average length of time women had worked was almost eight years 
(Japan Insight, 2002). This can be attributed to increased longevity; a 
declining fertility rate, an increase in housing and education costs, the return 
of 'baby boom' wives to the labour market and changing social attitudes about 
women's place in society (Whittaker, 1990). 
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Figure 5.3 The Average Age of Male and Female Regular Employees and 
A Y fS' veraQe ears 0 ervlce 
Avera e Age Average working years 
Year Women Men Women Men 
1949 23.8 32.5 3.2 6.6 
1954 25.4 33.2 3.6 7.2 
1960 26.3 32.8 4.0 7.8 
1965 28.1 33.2 3.9 7.8 
1970 29.8 34.5 4.5 8.8 
1975 33.4 36.4 5.8 10.1 
1980 34.8 37.8 6.1 10.8 
1985 35.4 38.6 6.8 11.9 
1990 35.7 39.5 7.3 12.5 
1994 36.1 40.0 7.6 12.8 
Source: Ministry of Labour Research, Japan Insight, 2002b 
Of course, doing monotonous work, with little chance of advancement hardly 
encouraged women to stay on at work, but if they did, the system of payment 
by seniority could mean that long-serving female employees were paid more 
than the limited jobs they were given merited. Some companies had different 
formal retirement ages for men and women: 
[X company] had a rule for women to quit the job by 25. So I quit when 
I was 25, regardless of whether they were married or not. Well, you 
could continue to work for the. company, but the working conditions 
and payment would not be the same level. 
Home-based kimono-wearing teacher, in her fifties, describing her 
earlier career. 
Even when there was no official policy, tacit pressure meant many older 
questionnaire respondents had felt under psychological pressure to leave. A 
49 year old clerical worker commented: 
In my case, when I was pregnant, as I did not have a jOb-related skill, I 
had no choice but to retire, because around me no women took 
maternity leave. But later I often regretted that. I shouldn't have 
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retired from a responsible job. So if my daughter-in-law hopes to work 
all her life, I'll help her." 
Even in the 1980s and 1990s when women stayed in the workforce longer 
than their employers had envisaged, subtle and not-so-subtle pressure could 
be brought to bear.59 Ms. Shirafuji, whose lawsuit against her employer, 
Sumitomo Electric has been continuing since 1995, described how at every 
year end party her boss would ask the women what their plans were for the 
next year, implying that there was no expectation that they would stay with 
the firm. Another employee of the Sumitomo group claimed that on returning 
to work after giving birth: she was segregated from other office workers, 
placed at a desk by the window sitting alone behind her boss and given no 
work to do for six years (sic). This case also offered an interesting example 
of infrapolitical resistance. The woman continued to go to work, where she 
kept busy reading the company handbook and watering the plants. She 
received tacit support for her persistence from one male co-worker who gave 
her chocolates on Valentine's Day. This was not a romantic gesture: it is 
normal practice in Japanese offices for women to give girichoko (obligation 
chocolates) to male co-workers they respect. 
69 Companies are really exercising statistical discrimination here (KOike, 1995). Statistical 
discrimination refers to the case where an employer does not have, and finds it prohibitively 
expensive to find about, the attributes of a particular member of a social group, and believes 
that members of that group are, on average, less desirable employees in terms of 
qualifications, reliability, tenure of employment et cetera (Phelps, 1972). On this basis, the 
employer might treat all members of this group less favourably than other groups either by 
not hiring them, or by hiring them under less favourable conditions. In this case, the 
employers take into account that most women will leave work after a short period and are 
therefore treating all women as short-term employees, although some individual women will 
wish to work for considerably longer periods than the average. Koike (1995) feels that a 
potential solution to this problem, which suits both the companies and more tenacious 
women, has been the introduction of promotion tests and tracking systems within larger 
companies. In the dual-tracking system most women are placed in short-term semi-skilled 
positions, but particularly gifted women who express an interest and show ability can be 
employed on the same basis as men. However, this system too has complex and 
contradictory results, which will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
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Subtle pressure can be brought to bear even on single employees who 
continue to work. A 27 year-old employee of multi-national company, when 
asked whether her marital status affected the way she was viewed at work 
answered, 
"When they ask me "You aren't married yet. How old are you?" , it 
feels unpleasant." 
As Figure 5.3 indicates, women are willing to spend longer periods of time in 
the labour market. This can be partially attributed to increased longevity; a 
declining fertility rate70, an increase in housing and education costs, and 
changing social attitudes about women's place in society (Whittaker, 1990). 
However it is very difficult to re-enter a large company after a career break, 
as the reactions of companies to women with longer than average tenure 
(described above) might suggest. Even women who were successful in 
finding a job in a new company would not be able to transfer any eligibility for 
seniority pay. One of the major changes in women's position in the 
Japanese labour market since the war has been their increasing participation 
in the type of non-regular work know as 'paalo' (paalo taimu, from the English 
part-time), which has grown in response to contradictions of the position of 
women in the Japanese national model of capitalism. 
, 
The rise in paato work 
Part-time work has increased in many industrialized countries in recent 
decades (as Figure 5.4 shows). Furthermore part-time work cross-nationally 
tends to share the following characteristics: it is primarily performed by 
women; it is associated with marginal employment; its expansion has 
coincided with period of economic restructuring; and its increase has 
coincided with increase in number of women in labour market (Fagan and 
O'Reilly, 1998). This might suggest that the Japanese model has been 
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converging with other economies at similar levels of development. However, 
the increase in part-time work varies between countries with even quite 
similar industrial structures. Wakisaka and Bae (1998) have observed that 
despite both being 'Asian cultures' and developmental states, the level of 
part-time employment, compared to full-time employment is far higher in 
Japan than in South Korea. This they attribute partly to the different tax 
regimes in the two countries, which give Japanese women, but not South 
Koreans, a reason to limit their working hours. This section will trace the 
development of the paato workforce in Japan, showing how state policy was 
instrumental in the development of a largely female part-time workforce. 
Large firms in Japan began to make regular use of part-time workers in 1954, 
when Daimaru Department Store in Tokyo took on 250 part-time workers plus 
600 high school graduates, to enable the store to stay open until B.OOpm. 
Suzuki Kensuke Daimaru's General Manager introduced the system after 
being impressed with its use in the United States, where it enabled 
businesses to cope with fluctuations in demand. This would of course be a 
very significant advantage to firms in Japan, with a numerically inflexible 
workforce. 
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Figure 5.4: A Cross- National Comparison of the Growth in Part-Time 
Work 
(%) 
30 ~ ..... ----------------..... -------------------------------, 
U . .K. 
~ ....... 
U.S.A . 
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15 , ,:: 
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Fraoc{! 
1973 79 94 95 (Ytuu:) 
The definition of part-time used here is less than 35 hours per week in Japan and the US, less than 30 hour. In 
France and is dependent on the status and classification of employees in Germany and the UK. 
Source: Japan Insight, http://jin.jclc.or.jp/insight/htmllfocus05/data/DATA018-2.gif 
Over the next several decades, the desire to cut wage costs and to increase 
the numerical flexibility of the workforce, combined with social change to 
promote the growth of a female paato workforce. The number of female part-
timers more than quadrupled between 1970 and 1984 (Hunter, 1995: 479). 
By 1965, nearly 70 per cent of women who completed junior high went on to 
senior high school. This meant that there were far fewer young women 
available to carry out factory work, and firms being forced to turn to older 
married part-timers. By 1970, 51 per cent of married women were working 
(Iwao, 1993). One particular stimulus was the Japanese Archipelago 
Reformation Plan of 1970, under the auspices of which companies were 
given incentives to locate factories in rural areas. Most factories at the time 
were clustered around urban areas and the resulting pollution was a matter of 
public concern (McCormack, 1996). Around the same time, under the Rice 
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Acreage Reduction Policy, rice production was being cut back, which meant 
that many farming women were looking for work to supplement the family 
income. The increasing mechanization of agriculture also freed rural women 
for part-time work (Shiozawa and Hiroki, 1988). 
It is important to explain that regular and paato work are not necessarily 
distinguished by a difference in job content or hours worked, but rather in the 
rewards that accrue to the workers. Indeed, the Ministry of Labour's 1990 
Comprehensive Survey of the Condition of Part Time Workers actually 
defined the main criterion for inclusion in the survey as being "treated as so-
called part-timers" rather than as a regular employee. The term "paato taimu" 
seems in practice to mean therefore that such employees do not receive the 
same fringe benefits as regular employees. Part-timers receive few seniority 
raises and are unlikely to receive bonuses. As the bonuses of full-time 
employees are usually equivalent to several months' salary, this is a very 
significant difference. Many part-timers work long hours: in 1993 there were 
5.65 million workers who were defined by their workplaces as paato, but who 
worked more than 35 hours per week. (Wakisaka, 1997:144). Employing 
paato workers is therefore a very efficient means for companies to defray the 
high fixed costs of the regular workforce. 
As well as being economically beneficial to employers, paato work has also 
provided employment for women, who have been spending less time 
childrearing as birth rates fell (see footnote 3), and who, as seen in the 
previous section, seem increasingly ready to spend more time in the labour 
force. Where it is genuinely part-time, paato work can fit in with the 
expectations of women's reproductive work described earlier in this chapter. 
Part time work may act as a 'bridge to reconcile private care work and public 
waged work' (Fagan and O'Reilly, 1998:23) and might in some cases help to 
further transform the 'gender contract', as maternal employment becomes 
normalized. However, Imada (1997) suggests that the increase in part-time 
work may have retarded change and to have institutionalized women's 'dual 
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burden' of productive and reproductive work. If it is customary for wives to 
work part-time, this means there is less incentive for men to take equal 
responsibility for the care of children, the elderly and housework. A married 
part-time worker with adult children told me: 
"When I returned to work I didn't like to see my husband's frowning 
face, but he has changed now. He is okay now, if I don't do too much 
- if I'm not excessive ... [W]hen I'm very busy and I don't cook good 
food for him, he weeps. He acts. Usually he doesn't speak a lot. He 
is a quiet, very kind person, but one day, he made me a whiskey. He 
offered me a whiskey. He said, "Why don't you drink a glass of 
whiskey?". I thought something had happened, something serious had 
happened. And he said," Do you have any complaints?" I said, "No" 
and I asked why, and he said, "You have been ignoring the housework 
recently." So he thought I had some complaint about him, or home. 
But it wasn't true: I didn't have any complaints." 
State policy and consequent legislation has been instrumental in the growth 
of the female paato labour force. In 1963, the Economic Council of the Prime 
Minister's Office proposed "extensive use of young, unmarried female 
workers in simple jobs', "only a small number of educated women in 
supervisory positions", women returning to their families at "a suitable age for 
marriage" and rehiring "persons of middle age" (lebra, 1976b:110). 
However, in 1972, the Economic Deliberation Council argued that women's 
abilities had been insufficiently developed and recommended that women's 
labour be more effectively utilized by making part-time workers a permanent 
feature of the workforce, rather than regarding them as temporary workers 
(Shiozawa and Hiroki, 1988). 
The tax and benefits system in Japan has offered married women few 
incentives to work full-time. The 1949 Sharp Report recommended that a 
new tax system should be devised centred on the individual rather than the 
ie. A new tax system based on this came into effect the following year. Tax 
was based upon the individual but deductions were permitted for dependants, 
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with deductions of equal value for both spouses and dependants. In 1961, 
an effort was made to recognize the contribution to women's work within the 
home (naiyo no ko) and to distinguish spouses from children by the 
introduction of the Deduction for Spouses. (State payments to mothers had 
in fact been a major demand of almost all leading feminists in the Taisho era, 
1911-1925, Molony, 1999) However, once a wife's income exceeded a 
certain amount this deduction was lost. (This was changed to the benefit 
being phased out gradually as income rose, following complaints from 
companies that their workforce were trying to cut back their hours, just at the 
busiest time of year, Higuchi, 1997). 
The system was changed again in 1987. Since 1975 the difference between 
the allowance for spouses and the allowance for child dependants had been 
eliminated. In the wake of a backlash to a recently introduced and very 
unpopular consumption tax, the state introduced what was, in effect, a 
subsidy to male-breadwinner couples. From 1987, if a woman earned less 
than 700,000 yen, then her husband not only received the 350,000 yen 
Deduction for Spouses, but a further 350,000 yen to in recognition of the 
woman's naiyo no ko: in effect, wages for housework, but paid to the 
husband. If a second earner in a couple earns more than 1.3 million yen 
annually then, valuable tax breaks are lost, and the primary earner may also 
lose their entitlement to company family allowances (Osawa and Houseman, 
1998). (The average household income in 2000 was 6,731,448 yen (Ministry 
of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, 2001). 
These restrictions have a strong disincentive upon women seeking to further 
their careers: there is in fact a negative correlation among recipients of 
benefit between the wages of husband and wife. According to the Japan 
Institute for Workers' Evolution (2001: 2): 
"More than 30 per cent of part-time housewife workers adjust their 
income to match what is allowable by Japanese law and not to exceed 
their husbands' monthly spouse allowance." 
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This was reflected in responses from focus group and survey participants. 
One respondent made it clear that this had affected her work choices, stating: 
There is a tax regulation. If I earn up top one million yen, my husband 
can get tax relief for his wife and children. If my income exceeds one 
million yen, the tax relief .... he can't get tax relief, so I have to work 
less than 120 hours a month. 
57 year old employee of large corporation 
Sometimes this encouragement can be even more overt. According to one 
participant who took part in a discussion I organized with the English 
Discussion Society.71 
"I am working as a part-timer. I pay tax, but [ ... ] the clerk at the tax 
office said a few years ago, you should ... you work too hard ... too 
much. If you work this much, you have .. you don't have to pay this 
tax, something like that. If I cared about such a small thing, quite 
small, I can't work, so I don't care [about] that kind of thing. But I pay. 
I mean the pension, I pay the health insurance by myself, so the city 
tax ..... so I know how much [ .... ] disadvantage I have. And [ ... ] I have 
no bonus. U 
(English Discussion Society, 1999) 
In 1986 the Pension Fund Law was revised. Changes made it possible for 
non-working women to claim retirement benefits, although they had not paid 
towards a state retirement plan, even if their husbands had not paid a 
supplementary premium. Widows were also entitled to 75 per cent of their 
husbands' pension. A working woman who paid social security benefits, on 
the other hand, would receive retirement benefits in her own right, but after 
husband's death, she would have to choose between this benefit and her 
husband's. She would therefore either forsake Bereaved Family Benefit or 
the benefits for which she has made contributions. 
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Other benefits also strengthened preferential treatment for married couples 
where the woman did not work full-time (Higuchi, 1997). If a woman works 
less the 75 per cent of a normal working week or earns less than 1.3 million 
yen per annum, she does not have to pay health insurance or social security 
payments, and is treated as a dependent of her husband (or father). 
This system is particularly likely to deter educated women from continuing 
full-time participation in the labour force. Disparity in educational attainment 
between a couple is rare in Japan, so a highly educated high-earning 
husband is likely to have a better paid job, which would give the couple 
sufficient resources to survive on only one full-time income. There is in fact, 
among couples claiming spousal deductions, a negative correlation between 
the earnings of husbands and wives (Higuchi, 1997: 114). The system also 
disproportionately subsidizes higher income couples, as women in manual 
occupations are relatively keen to continue to work full-time after marriage or 
childbirth (Roberts, 1994). 
There has then been change in the position of women in the Japanese 
national model of capitalism. Women's tenure in the regular workforce has 
lengthened, but it is still usual for women to leave regular employment upon 
pregnancy. Although women still tend to be assigned stereotypically 
'feminine' roles in the workplace, reflecting their presumed reproductive work, 
an increasing proportion of women are finding work as 'specialists' or 
professionals. With the fall in Japan's birthrate, although assumptions of 
women's responsibility for almost all reproductive work persist, mothers 
spend a smaller proportion of their lives childrearing. Their availability for 
employment is articulated with employers' demands for a flexible and 
relatively inexpensive workforce, and state tax and pensions regulations to 
encourage the growth of a female non-regular workforce. 
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5.4. The Reciprocal Effects of Globalization on Women 
Workers in Japan 
The previous chapter listed some of the effects of globalization upon the 
Japanese national model of capitalism. As men and women have had very 
different roles in that national model, changes to that model, brought about by 
globalization, will impact upon them in different ways. This section will briefly 
outline some of the gendered impacts of globalization upon Japanese 
working women generally, before Chapters Six and Seven go on to discuss in 
detail the way globalization impacts upon Japanese women in the regular and 
non-regular workforces respectivell2• 
Liberalization and deregulation 
It was observed in Chapter Four that leading business organizations have 
recommended a shift towards the increased employment of non-regular 
workers. This shift has been facilitated by legal change, including the 
liberalization of temporary employment agencies, and the faCilitating of part-
time work in an attempt to make the Japanese workforce more numerically 
flexible. As much of the increased employment of women has been in non-
regular employment, this suggests employment opportunities for women will 
increase. However, but as has been discussed above, non-regular workers 
tend to have different conditions of work to those traditionally experienced by 
male regular workers. The cutting of tax rates and the reduction in welfare 
spending, referred to in the previous chapter, are also likely to have 
implications for women's reproductive work, and consequently their capacity 
to enter paid employment. These changes will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Six. 
Another effect of deregulation and liberalization is that it has eased the entry 
of foreign firms into the Japanese marketplace. The entry of foreign firms into 
72 The two workforces are treated separately because, as this chapter has shown, they tend 
to be firmly differentiated, socially and demographically, and are differently regulated. 
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the Japanese market appears to provide more attractive opportunities for 
high-achieving women who intend to continue working than is generally the 
case with Japanese firms. About 60 per cent of third year university students 
of both sexes express and interest in working for foreign companies and their 
affiliates in Japan, commonly believing that they offer chances for employees 
to improve their skills and to reach their full potential (White Paper on the 
National Lifestyle, FY 1999). While the transnationality index in Japan is 
lower that that of any other countries (see Section 4.4). Furthermore, even 
the minor presence of a foreign firm in a market can be influential in 
introducing changes in the organization of work (Yashiro, 1998). There can 
however be a gap between the image and reality of working for a foreign firm. 
This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Re-regulation 
It has been observed (see Chapter Three) that globalization can weaken 
local patriarchal structures by exposing traditional practices to global 
scrutiny, and increasing reflexivity. Japan's economic success had 
stimulated outside interest in the Japanese organization of production, and 
thereby raised awareness of the role of women within this (Kawashima, 
1995). There is widespread agreement in academic circles that Japan's 
1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law was passed partly in response to 
foreign criticism of the position of Japanese working women (Gelb, 1998). 
The next chapter will examine in more detail the role of the processes of 
globalization in the promulgation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law 
(EEOL) in 1986, and its revision in 1997 and its crucial role in reshaping 
women's employment. 
Dominant ideologies can lead a state and existing institutions to negotiate a 
compromise between encouraging change and maintaining current gender 
orders (Arat, 2002; Pyle, 1990). The EEOL was vigorously opposed by 
important sections of the business community. While business elites 'have 
been keen for Japan to adopt some of the deregulatory measures 
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characteristics of Anglo-American capitalism, they have not reacted with the 
same enthusiasm to attempts to bring Japanese laws surrounding sexual 
equality in the workforce into line with those elsewhere in the First World. 
The way the EEOL has been framed and interpreted as Chapter Six will 
show, have made it of limited practical applicability to most non-regular 
workers, and regular workers carrying out different roles than men. In fact, 
equal employment legislation has actually contributed to the 
institutionalization of a gendered dual labour market. 
Women and migration 
One of the processes associated with globalization is increased transnational 
flows of people, and the previous chapters remarked upon the increased flow 
of people into and out of Japan. As this thesis focuses on the gendered 
effects of globalization, two special features of the gendered nature of 
migration into Japan should be noted here. The location of production 
overseas had implications for the gendered nature of migration into Japan. 
As economic links between Japan and other East Asian states grew, and 
Japanese FDI in these areas increased, there was a corresponding upsurge 
in Japanese men's sex tours to South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and 
Thailand. These were usually offered by regular travel agents. Women's 
groups in the countries protested against these tours, castigating Japanese 
men as 'sex animals'. These Asian women's groups forged links with 
Japanese women's groups. The latter were successful in placing the issue on 
the agenda of the Diet and tourist offices ceased offering such tours (Okura, 
1996). However, their success in achieving their goal did not end the use of 
foreign prostitutes by Japanese men. In the mid-1980s the yakuza73 became 
involvement in procurement of sex workers from overseas to work in Japan. 
Around 100,000 women come to Japan each year to work in the sex industry 
(Murata, 1996: 116), from countries where there are strong trade and 
investment links with Japan. Matsuri (1996: 56) observed: 
73 The yakuza are organized criminal gangs. 
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"The number of Thai women being sent into Japan's sex industry 
skyrocketed at the same time that their country's economic growth rate 
went into double digits. n 
The 1980s saw japa-yuki-san74 from Southeast Asia being trafficked to 
Japan. Recession in Latin America, then the economic decline, and 
increased possibility of travel following the end of Cold War saw Eastern 
European and Russian women being trafficked. There has also been a 
significant increase in the migratory flow of brides (Piper, 2001). Another, 
unique, feature of the interaction between globalization and migration in the 
case of Japan, is the phenomenon of local government sponsored 
recruitment of foreign wives. Japanese agriculture become increasingly 
unprofitable in the face of economic globalization (Hikita, 1996), which has hit 
the traditionally protected farming sector. Japanese women are increasingly 
unwilling to marry farmers and to accept the hardships of work in an 
agricultural industry. Municipal governments in rural areas, therefore, have 
sponsored the recruitment of women, mainly from the Philippines and 
Thailand, to marry farmers, and provide farm labour. This policy had been 
adopted by around 100 rural governments by 1992. Although it is difficult to 
find records of exactly how many couples have married because of this 
system, in Yamagata prefecture alone, as of May 1992, there were 472 
Filipino women married to Japanese men as the result of community projects 
to provide brides (Se"ek, 2001: 183). 
The nature of 'flows' of people out of Japan is also gendered. More 
Japanese women than men live overseas. By the early 1990s, almost 80 per 
cent of Japanese students studying abroad were female (Kelsky, 2001: 2). 
The emergence of the internationally active Japanese woman has been 
attributed to Japanese institutions. Such women argue that their 'adaptability' 
to the expectations of the Other is because, variously: 
74 'Japayuki-san' literally means 'Ms Going to Japan' and is a play on the euphemistic term 
'Karayuki-san'(Ms Going Overseas): a phrase used to describe Japanese women who went 
to work in the sex industries in the US and South East Asia in the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
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• Marriage in Japan is traditionally patrilocal 
• Daughters are not so indulged as sons and thus develop 'inner 
resources' 
• The academic success of young women is not so highly valorized 
as that of young men, and therefore they have more liberty to 
explore their own interests 
• They are excluded from 'avenues of advancement' in Japanese 
corporations (Kelsky, 2001) 
Study or work experience overseas can sometimes allow Japanese to gain 
career or educational experiences that would have been more difficult to 
obtain in Japan. This can prove the foundation for later careers in Japan. 
Renshaw (1999) found that 70 per cent of the Japanese women managers 
that she had interviewed had been educated or lived overseas at some point 
in their lives. It should be noted that Japan, unlike other relatively 
prosperous nations in the region does not have a culture of importing 
domestic labour. This means that Japanese women's entry into paid 
employment has not been facilitated by the emergence of a class of female 
migrant domestic workers in Japan. 
5. 5. Conclusion 
The Japanese national model of capitalism though emerged in the very 
specific conditions of the immediate post war period. Although there was a 
long tradition of women working outside the home in Japan, legal change and 
political conditions led to an exodus of women from the labour force at the 
end of the Second World War. Firms' high fixed costs and traditions of pay 
and promotion by seniority meant that they relied on women's early 
retirement from regular jobs to maintain numerical flexibility in the workforce 
and to keep down wage costs. As firms expected women to leave the 
workforce upon marriage or childbirth, they gave them little training, and the 
vast majority of women worked in 'gendered' jobs. Married women, 
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especially mothers, on the other hand, were expected to carry out almost all 
reproductive labour in the conjugal household, and thus could not carry out 
the 'double shift' of full-time paid work and childcare and domestic work. 
Societal and demographic change, educational advance and the increased 
acceptance of the ideology of equal labour rights have meant that Japanese 
women's determination to continue to work has gradually increased, with a 
number remaining at work in the face of pressure to leave. A minority of 
determined women have succeeded in establishing themselves as 
professionals. Many more women have re-entered the workforce as non-
regular employees. This position both fits in with, and reinforces the 
Japanese gender order. 
Both as short term regular employees and as non-regular workers, Japanese 
women have enabled Japanese companies to maintain secure and well-
rewarded employment for most male company employees. Japan is 
becoming ever more integrated into a very different international economy to 
that prevailing in the 1940s and 1950s when the Japanese model took shape. 
Consequently, there has been deregulation and liberalization of the 
economy; regulation of, and changing attitudes to women's labour rights, and 
patterns of migrations into and out of Japan. These changes will both impact 
upon and be affected by the actions and choices of men and women within it. 
These changes will be examined in Chapters Six and Seven. 
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